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This dissertation explores the role of low-income housing in the development of 
two major Latin American societies that underwent demographic explosion, rural-to-
urban migration, and growing urban poverty in the postwar era. The central argument 
treats popular housing as a constitutive element of urban development, interamerican 
relations, and citizenship, interrogating the historical processes through which the modern 
Latin American city became a built environment of contrasts. I argue that local and 
national governments, social scientists, and technical elites of the postwar Americas 
sought to modernize Latin American societies by deepening the mechanisms for capitalist 
accumulation and by creating built environments designed to generate modern 
sociabilities and behaviors. Elite discourse and policy understood the urban home to be 
 
owner-occupied and built with a rationalized domestic layout. The modern home for the 
poor would rely upon a functioning local government capable of guaranteeing a reliable 
supply of electricity and clean water, as well as sewage and trash removal. Rational 
transportation planning would allow the city resident access between the home and 
workplaces, schools, medical centers, and police posts. 
As interamerican Cold War relations intensified in response to the Cuban 
Revolution, policymakers, urban scholars, planners, defined in transnational encounters 
an acute ―housing problem,‖ a term that condensed the myriad aspects involved in urban 
dwellings for low-income populations. The policy outcome of these encounters was the 
arrival of foreign economic and technical assistance dedicated to slum eradication and 
publically-financed popular housing. Within the policy and social sciences circuits of 
modernization theory during the Cold War context, housing policy emerged as a 
discursive and practical antidote to the problem of sheltering a burgeoning urban 
population and its attendant attributes of underdevelopment, poverty, and social unrest.  
The dissertation demonstrates how a handful of selected cases of popular housing 
erected in Rio and Buenos Aires ultimately did not fulfill the stated goals embraced by 
the proponents of developmentalism and interamerican assistance. It shows the extent to 
which a shortfall of outcomes relative to goals was indicative in part of hemispheric 
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The following are terms and corresponding English-language definitions for dwelling 
types commonly used during the period of study.  In some cases English-language studies 
of popular housing used the original Spanish and Portuguese-language terminology; in 
other cases, an English-language approximate was used. "Slum" is perhaps the most 
important non-local term found in the English-language literature for a wide range of 
dwelling types, land uses, and zoning classifications that had a numerous local names and 
meanings.  
 
It is important to note that in both the local and in the transnational context, terms like 
favela or villa miseria were used to characterize a social reality, and not merely describe 
a specific typology of dwelling or land title. This dissertation seeks to be attentive to 
these sociological readings of terms like favelas and villas, and their relationship with the 
historical evolution of the cities of Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires.  
 
 
bairro (Portuguese) or barrio (Spanish): neighborhood.  
 
barraco (Brazil): shack or shanty house built with poor materials.  
 
casas de alojamiento and pensiones (Buenos Aires): rooming houses. 
 
casas de cômodo (Rio de Janeiro): rooming houses. 
 
complejo habitacional (Spanish) or conjunto habitacional (Portuguese): Housing projects 
built particularly starting in the 1960s as a solution to the housing deficit for low-income 
populations. Although "projects" have acquired a stigma of prejudice and stereotype in 
the United States, in Argentina or Brazil, the local equivalent does not always invoke a 
negative connotation.  
 
conventillo (Buenos Aires): tenements with small rooms that open out onto a central 
outdoor common patio. Kitchen and bathroom were for the collective use. 
 
cortiço (Rio de Janeiro): tenements, the equivalent to the conventillos in Buenos Aires.  
 
favela (Brazil): slums or shantytowns;  informal settlements built in public or private 
lands, typically without public sanction or legal title to the occupied land. Original 
favelas constructions usually lacked access to urban infrastructure and public services. 
 
favelado (Brazil): a favela resident. As it is the case with villero, the term can be used 
negatively to mark class, ethnic, and racial bias.  
 





rancho (Argentina): rural housing of simple structure and austere characteristics.  
 
villa miseria or villa (Argentina): slums or shantytown; informal settlements built 
illegally in public or private lands. They usually lacked any kind of urban infrastructure 
and collective equipment. Note that the Portuguese-language vila often described a 
neighborhood (e.g. Vila Isabel) or a housing development for residents of modest means, 
often factory workers  (e.g., vila operaria). In these Brazilian cases, vila did not connote 
irregularity and stigma of its Spanish-language equivalent.  
 
villas de emergencia (Buenos Aires): it is the official name that the Argentine authorities 
give to villas miserias.  
 
villero (Argentina): a villa resident. Villero could be used pejoratively to mark class and 
ethnic bias in Argentina.  
 








In 2005, Hurricane Katrina devastated portions of the Gulf Coast of the United 
States, especially the city of New Orleans. National and international media covered the 
horrific scenes of devastation. The general public saw with horror how the residents of 
the Crescent City who were unable to evacuate, mostly black and poor, were left alone in 
a flooded city, overcrowding the city‘s convention center, with no water, food, or 
functioning bathrooms. The worst images showed corpses floating along water-filled 
streets and dead bodies ill-covered sitting in wheelchairs in the convention center. Scenes 
of looting and police repression were equally troubling. Katrina destroyed more than 
300,000 homes and displaced about 700,000 people.
1
 The hurricane made visible the 
inequality, racism, and dispossession that poor, in this case black, urban dwellers face, 
notably at moments of "natural" disasters. With anger and frustration, many wondered 
how such a thing happened in the United States. The images of New Orleans, it was 
possible to hear in television and in academic conversations, resembled the Third World.  
Coming from Latin America, I found those comments upsetting. It is true that 
natural disasters in Latin America and the Caribbean have a disproportionate impact on 
the poor. The earthquake in Haiti in 2010 is perhaps the best example of everything that 
is wrong in our region. There is no point in romanticizing our situation when comparing 
                                                 
1
 Joanne M. Nigg, John Barnshaw and Manuel R. Torres, ―Hurricane Katrina and the Flooding of New 
Orleans: Emergent Issues in Sheltering and Temporary Housing,‖Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science, vol. 604, Shelter from the Storm: Repairing the National Emergency 
Management System after Hurricane Katrina (March 2006): 113-128; Patrick Sharkey, ―Survival and Death 
in New Orleans: An Empirical Look at the Human Impact of Katrina,‖ Journal of Black Studies 37, No. 4, 





the devastation of New Orleans and the poor response that one of the richest and most 
powerful nation in the world gave to its own citizens. There is no solace in witnessing the 
pain of others. And yet, Katrina put in question the very own notion of what a ―modern‖ 
country should be. ―Backwardness,‖ with the regret of many, was not just a Third World 
attribute. Such discourse hindered how urban spaces of difference were the historical 
intersection of race, economics, and politics in postwar America laid the foundation for 
the social and economic downturn of US cities.  
In the aftermath of the hurricane, debates revolved around what was to be done 
with the large numbers of dispossessed residents of New Orleans and other affected areas 
of the Gulf Coast, many of whom began to wander around the US. Academics, experts, 
policymakers, and the public in general debated whether it was advisable to rebuild New 
Orleans, especially the poor areas such as the Lower Ninth Ward, and wondered who 
might bear the responsibility for such reconstruction. The George W. Bush administration 
sent FEMA trailers as a short-term response to the urgent need for shelter but the big 
questions remained open. About the same time, I came across Thomas Sugrue‘s Origins 
of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit (1996).  There Sugrue 
argues that ―Racially segregated neighborhoods are not alone the foreordained 
consequence of centuries of American racial prejudice; rather they are the result of the 
actions of the federal and local governments, real estate agents, individual home buyers 
and sellers, and community organizations. Economic and social structures act as 
parameters that limit the range off individual and collective decisions. The consequences 
of hundreds of individual acts or of collective identity, however, gradually strengthen, 




and agency is dialectical and history is the synthesis.‖ This passage, which I read in the 
immediate aftermath of Katrina, made me think about the historical causes that explain 
the development of urban spaces of difference and weak enfranchisement not only in US 
but also in Latin American cities. 
Back then, at the time when I was defining my research topic some questions 
came up. Who is in charge of building the housing capacity to house for the poor and the 
dispossessed? What is the role of the local and federal state, if any, in providing housing 
for its population? How effective is the private market in attending such need? What is 
the relationship between housing, property, and citizenship in this context? And, perhaps 
most importantly, what is the specific role of housing when dealing with poor populations 
whose social situation is the result of the type of structural forces and political choices 
observed by Sugrue. Looking at New Orleans with an eye in the terrible situation of 
slums in the Global South I wondered about the meaning of such concepts as ―modern‖ 
or ―backward,‖ ―developed‖ or ―underdeveloped,‖ especially as they related to popular 
housing. Coming from Latin America, where slums and poor urban spaces are all too 
familiar part of the landscape of the "modern" city, I asked about the modern historical 
roots of poverty and housing. In this historical present of economic crisis and historical 
recession, housing, once again, has triggered the worst depression since the 1930s 
making visible the mechanisms of capitalist accumulation. In this rather somber scenario, 
this dissertation interrogates, historicizes, and transnationalizes the responsibilities of the 
modern, capitalist state to house poor populations. In thinking of New Orleans in 2005, 
and Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro in 1960, and Detroit in the year 2020, I ask how --- 




Definition of the Research Problem 
 
This dissertation is a transnational history of the processes of modernization and 
development of Latin America urban societies in the postwar period. It interrogates the 
place of the urban poor, their built environment, and the role of public housing in the 
development of Latin American societies undergoing demographic explosion, rural-to-
urban migration, and the structuration of urban inequality. The central argument treats 
popular housing as a constitutive element of urban development, interamerican relations, 
and citizenship, interrogating the historical processes through which the modern Latin 
American city became a built environment of contrasts and poor housing.  
I argue that governments, social scientists, and technical elites of the postwar Americas 
sought to modernize Latin American societies not just by deepening the mechanisms for 
capitalist accumulation within the context of city-led developmentalism [Spanish: 
desarrollismo; Portuguese: desenvolvimentismo] but also by creating built environments 
designed to generate modern sociabilities and behaviors. Elite discourse and policy 
understood the modern urban home to be owner-occupied and built with a rationalized 
domestic layout. The imagined modern home would rely upon a functioning and 
responsive municipal government capable of guaranteeing a reliable supply of electricity 
and clean water, as well as sewage and trash removal. Rational transportation planning 
would allow the city resident easy access to places of employment, schools, medical 
centers, and police posts. 
The postwar era of modernization and developmentalism was also an era of 
slumification. By 1960, almost ten percent of the residents of Rio de Janeiro lived in 




modest three percent, but the absolute number of residents living in slums would double 
by the end of the decade. The dissertation looks closely at the emergence of a 
transnational social science and policymaking imaginary that sought to understand the 
dramatic transformations in Latin American societies that produced such a slumification 
is these two South Americans megapoli. I argue that this imaginary, fed by modernization 
theory and developmentalism, came to be shared by both US and Latin American social 
scientists and policymakers who were called upon to implement their ideas within the 
context of the Alliance for Progress, the U.S. government program focused on social 
reform in order to avert the imagined spread of the Cuban Revolution. Policymakers, 
urban scholars, planners, and architects came to define in transnational encounters an 
acute ―housing problem,‖ a term that synthesized a myriad of challenges for "decent" 
housing for burgeoning low-income urban populations. Within the policy and social 
sciences circuits of modernization theory and developmentalism created in the context of 
the Cold War, housing policy emerged as a discursive and practical response to the 
problem of housing and its attendant attributes of underdevelopment, poverty, and social 
unrest. 
The policy outcome of these encounters was the arrival of foreign economic and 
technical assistance dedicated to slum eradication and publically-financed popular. In Rio 
de Janeiro, the government of the recently-created State of Guanabara worked with the 
technical and financial assistance from the United States Agency for International 
Development to build a series of housing complexes on the outskirts of the city. These 
developments are now known as Vila Aliança, Vila Kennedy, Vila Esperança, and 




Development Bank helped finance the construction of more than fifteen thousand units in 
communities named Villa Lugano 1-2, located in Parque Almirante Brown, and Ciudad 
General Belgrano, situated in the neighboring partido [county] of La Matanza, in the 
Province of Buenos Aires.  
The dissertation demonstrates how and why the housing stock actually built in 
postwar Rio and Buenos Aires unevenly fulfilled many of the goals embraced by the 
proponents of developmentalism. It shows how the particular outcome of these housing 
projects developed are indicative of hemispheric transitions, but also of the particularities 
of the modernizing city in the second half on the twentieth century in each of these 
places. The research demonstrates how, ultimately, the planning and building of modern 
residences in Buenos Aires and Rio did not solve the ―housing problem.‖ In a close 
analysis of public housing construction in the two South American metropolises, I argue 
that the popular housing intended to alleviate that housing problem actually contributed 
in the creation of new urban landscapes of poverty as a constitutive part of urban 
development and the transnational politics of developmentalism. In other words, the 
plans and hopes for modernity through housing may have been partially fulfilled, but a 
poverty of housing became an intrinsic part of the modern Latin American urban 
landscape.  
 
Defining the “Housing Problem”  
 
The housing question and the problem of modernization of Latin American 
societies were certainly not new in the postwar period. These questions had already 




following decades of state-formation and regional integration. Since the late nineteenth 
century, in a period of rapidly expanding capital relations, the ―housing problem‖ came to 
be part of the ―social question,‖ as the ruling elites defined the set of problems that 
emerged with the increasing complexity of cities. By the eve of the First World War, 
capital cities once known for their colonial architecture became modern metropolises 
vibrating with the incorporation of massive contingents of foreign immigrants (especially 
in Buenos Aires) and internal migrants (a group that included former slaves in the 
Brazilian case). Epidemics, overcrowding, and social turmoil in popular-classes 
neighborhoods were part of such rapid transformation of cities like Rio or Buenos Aires. 
The states‘ initial responses ranged from sweeping, highly successful public health 
campaigns to the criminalization and repression of any manifestation of popular disorder. 
Progress and modernization of Latin American cities required multiple forms of 
regulation for the urban poor and their material living conditions.
2
 As what it was at stake 
was the health and the productivity of the nation, eugenics and hygienist approaches 
sought to contain poor urban environments, characterized as spaces of disease, pathology, 
and moral decadence. In some cases like in Rio, this understanding led to the razing of 
boarding houses and tenements.  
In the following decades, industrialization and urbanization gave place to new 
anxieties about the character of the urban working classes. Political and social elites 
framed their concern about the social and moral (including sexual) living conditions of 
the popular classes as part of the question about the productivity of the nation. As recent 
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historiography has shown, an alliance of a disciplinizing state and national industrialists 
attempted to regulate the urban masses were not only confined to the workplace or the 
public sphere but also to those spaces relative to the reproduction of the labor force, 
particularly to those related to domesticity and intimacy.
3
 State professionals, business 
and industrialists‘ organizations, and welfare administrations conceived of the urban 
household as a civilizing and disciplinizing space in the remaking of the urban working 
class. Industrialists in Brazil promoted vocational training programs, literacy campaigns, 
and social activities in working class neighborhoods to ―modernize‖ the worker. 
Colombian textile entrepreneurs attempted to fashion the female workers with social and 
educational programs in consonance with the bourgeois moral codes of sexual behavior 
in the 1940s and 1950s. Popular-Front leaders in Chile produced a gendered perception of 
men as hardworking laborers and women as housekeepers and family caregivers as a way 
to contribute to the health of the popular classes, to raise their standards of living, and to 
promote national economic development. In the first half of the twentieth century, thus, 
the home, as one of the privileged spaces of domesticity and the private sphere, became 
an area of intervention and regulation as dynamic as other spheres, reinforcing traditional 
gender roles and racial prejudices.  
The relationship between urban housing and the modernization of Latin American 
societies was, therefore, hardly new by the dawn of the post-WWII era. And yet, within 
these continuities, there is something particular about the housing problem in the postwar 
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era. Poverty and substandard forms of housing increased at an unprecedented rate 
accompanying the process of burgeoning urbanization. Overcrowded tenements and 
boarding houses packed the cities‘ downtowns. Meanwhile, illegal and irregular 
settlements occupied public and private lands located close to workplaces, usually in the 
outskirts of the city or, in the case of Rio, also on steep hills found throughout the city. 
Between 1940 and 1970 Rio‘s urban population more than doubled from 1.76 to 4.2 
million. The rate of growth was thirty-nine percent between 1950-60. The corresponding 
increase of the city's favelado population was an especially striking feature of aggregate 
population growth. Slum dwellers increased almost threefold from 1950 to 1970 (169,305 
in 1950 to 554,277 in 1970).
4
  The population of Buenos Aires and its immediate 
periphery grew from about 3.5 inhabitants in 1936 to 11.4 million in 1970.
  
 There too, the 
rise in slum dwellers was a notable feature of overall population growth, especially in the 
period most closely associated with desarrollismo. By the mid 1950s, the number of 
villas and their residents was relatively low: just one percent of the city‘s population and 
a two percent of the overall population in Greater Buenos Aires (GBA). But in one 
decade, by the late 1960s, the villa population peaked hitting a half million residents in 
GBA alone, almost Rio‘s number for the same period. From the strict demographic point 
of view, urbanization and the widespread presence of slums and shantytowns reached 
unprecedented proportions in the postwar years.  
The presence of new urban ―others‖ — some representing the continuation of the 
urban poor associated with the era of mass Atlantic migrations, but a much larger share 
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representing post-1929 internal migration from the countryside — could be highly 
disruptive. The reformist administrations of Getúlio Vargas in Brazil (president-dictator 
from 1930 to 1945; elected president in 1951-1954) and Juan D. Perón in Argentina 
(president, 1946-1955) politically mobilized the diverse urban population classes, 
bringing to national politics many longstanding social demands of the working poor, 
especially organized labor. As Daniel James pointed out in his work, the presence of 
Peronist masses in political rituals enacted on the streets of Buenos Aires represented a 
symbolic subversion of traditional spatial hierarchies consolidated during the 
―oligarchical‖ republic. Overall, the presence of dark-skinned and/or poor peoples in 
urban spaces acquired a radical (and new) material and symbolical dimension. Such 
cultural affront was significant considering that it was precisely in those years, when 
Buenos Aires middle classes consolidated their imagination of Buenos Aires as a white, 
European city –the ―Paris of South America.‖
5
  Well-heeled porteños (denonym for the 
resident of Buenos Aires) reacted with anxiety expressing class and racial hostility to 
these working masses that populated the suburbs of the city and the growing slums. 
Working class neighborhoods and slums became, therefore, scrutinized under a new 
interest, as those were the places were the popular support to the Vargas and Perón 
regimes was becoming stronger.
6
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In terms of the specificity of our time framework, the research shows that it was 
during the postwar regimes of Vargas and Perón — commonly described as populist —
 when the "housing problem‖ gained a new, transnational resonance. This was part of a 
broader process that Adrián Gorelik has defined as the emergence of the ―Latin American 
city,‖ a cultural ―trope‖ born from the ―intellectual desire to build it as an object of 
knowledge and action,‖
7
 This reflection among scholars, experts, policymakers, and 
technical elites about the Latin American city happened in a moment in which the whole 
region –Latin America- became a matter of discussion and debate as part of a postwar 
geo-political and social science/developmentalist spatialization of the globe. In this new 
Latin American era, the central preoccupation was to find the causes that explained the 
region‘s structural problems and also the policies that would lead to a new moment of 
development and growth.
8
 Developmentalist thinking and modernization theory provided 
not only the methodological tools but also a set of general assumptions and a sense of 
optimism and mission about the progress of the region. By the end of our periodization, 
those initial hopes turned to a somber conclusion. Modernization could happen, 
dependentistas would say, but it had to come through more radical ways that could break 
the neocolonial relationship with the industrialized North.  
In a global scale, the postwar period also witnessed the emergence of a global 
awareness about the development and ―progress‖ of humanity that brought together 
international organizations, philanthropic agencies, technical experts, policymakers, and 
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social scientists to solve the problems associated with poverty and inequality in the Third 
World. As Akira Iriye has pointed out, nations and peoples of the world became aware of 
their shared interests and objectives and of the potentialities of combining and joining 
collective efforts and resources through transnational cooperation.
9 
They participated in a 
universalizing understanding of the world and contributed in the production of 
knowledge that minimized unbridgeable difference in favor of comparability, 
standardization, and global applicability.  
In the postwar geography of power, development became a universal language 
that framed an understanding of how to alleviate poverty and put underdeveloped nations 
at a path of economic growth and social change. As Frederick Cooper and Randal 
Packard have argued, development ―appealed as much to leaders of ‗underdeveloped‘ 
societies as to the people of developed countries, and it gave citizens in both categories a 
share in the intellectual universe and in the moral community that grew up around the 
world-wide development initiative of the post-World War II era.‖
10 
The development 
discourse thus allowed for a universalistic operation that equated Latin America with 
Africa or Asia. In this way, Latin America became part of the underdeveloped world and 
received the attention of the recently created international organizations.
11
 
As the dissertation will show, this new transnational moment prompted a 
reconfiguration of Pan-American exchanges, materialized in an unprecedented, 
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increasing, and overlapping number of conferences, collaborative research initiatives, and 
published studies that covered most of the aspects of social life. Scholars, experts, 
policymakers that gathered at different meetings shared a vision of their historical times 
as one of sudden and unprecedented transformation that required the intervention of the 
state and the expert. They subscribed to the idea that, as Barbara Weinstein pointed out, 
―spatially organized inequalities would be addressed, corrected, and eventually erased 
through the proper modes of government and technical intervention.‖
12
 Science, 
technological innovation, and rational planning were the fundamental tools that Latin 
American nations had to apply for their economic development and social modernization.  
The lack of adequate housing for the middle and popular classes and the 
proliferation of illegal settlements was at the core of the urban question. A key meeting 
on the ―Problems of Urbanization in Latin America,‖ organized by the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA/CEPAL), scholars and experts of the 
region defined the widespread presence of slums and shantytowns as ―perhaps the most 
serious social problems of urban areas in Latin America…they dramatize[d] the acute 
character of the housing problem in Latin American cities and reveal[ed] some of the 
worst physical and social consequences of poverty and the low level of living.‖ Not 
surprisingly, many of the most influential Latin American sociologists of the time 
presented the results of their innovative field research on slums in that meeting, whose 
organizer was Philip Hauser, himself a central figure in the creation of networks of 
knowledge.   
In this perspective, burgeoning squatter settlements, land invasions, tenements, 
and slums in cities like Rio de Janeiro or Buenos Aires became something different than 
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they had been understood in earlier period. For governments, policymakers, scholars, and 
experts alike these spaces of urban poverty also became the undesirable result of the 
structural situation of Latin American economies. The emergence of a new sociological 
and urbanistic understanding of poverty and landscapes of poverty emerged, coexisting  
with more traditional moralistic and eugenic characterizations of the poor, but also 
providing a new base for a technical set of solutions to overcome poverty through  
managed development.  
For modernization theorists, slums and informal urban spaces were particularly 
significant to explore the settlement of migrant populations in the city and the degree of 
assimilation to the urban culture. Broadly speaking, the dissertation shows that within the 
antinomies of modernization theory, the city was conceived as a space of creation, 
change, innovation, rationality, secularism, and democracy. The model was the industrial 
European and American city that had given birth to an industrious class of entrepreneurs 
and middle classes. Cities were understood to be fundamentally democratic spaces.  In 
contrast, the countryside was portrayed as rather static, associated with tradition, 
superstition, kinship, emotion, and paternalism. Slums, and their improvised homes, 
represented in this model, rural, pre-modern ―enclaves‖ coexisting in an urban setting. In 
the city, they were the loci of tradition, rural ways of life, and personal disorganization 
that limited the full release of social, cultural, and productive forces necessary for the full 
development of Latin American nations. As Frank Bonilla has put it for the Brazilian 




has argued recently towards the concept of a ―village‖ in the city.
13
 With this logic, 
scholars and experts projected physical features into social attributes and life-styles. They 
assumed that the bad quality of the slums and the slums house was actually the 
manifestation of the internal qualities of slum dwellers. In addition, slums and working 
class neighborhoods were important to these scholars and policymakers because in the 
political history of Latin America these had been the places from where the populist 
regimes of Vargas in Brazil or Perón in Argentina received most support. Clientelism and 
populism were practices that these scholars associated with a limited or incomplete 
democracy and with the residual presence of rural and traditional elements in a society in 
transformation. In this context, governments and urban planners saw the provision of 
modern housing as an agent of transformation. It is in this sense that I argue that 
homeownership and modern housing were to remedy urban squalor, promote the 
integration and assimilation of new urban residents, stimulate middle-class habits and 
mass consumption, and moderate political behavior. Turning the ―villages‖ into 
neighborhoods of the city was the urbanistic aspect of this modernizing imagination. 
Key to the transnationalization of the housing problem and its solutions in the 
postwar period was the availability of foreign funds and technical assistance for the 
construction of affordable housing. In Latin America, developmentalist governments 
abandoned a strict economic nationalism and courted foreign countries and lending 
organism to finance development and social programs. The Cuban Revolution and 
expressions of anti-Americanism that US officials found in official visits in the region 
alarmed the US contributing to the reassessment of the place of the hemisphere within 
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Cold War geopolitics. The creation of the Alliance for Progress by president John F. 
Kennedy in 1961 sought to coordinate past and new channels of assistance with a new 
packaging, one that praised an era of pacific reform and growth in the region. In the area 
of housing, this basically meant the availability of new funds to boost the mortgage 
market, benefitting mostly the middle classes, and certain support for the financing 
affordable housing, community development, and aided self-help projects.  
This context of circulation of ideas and capital described above, I will show, 
defined certain development of key urban renewal projects in cities like Rio de Janeiro 
and Buenos Aires as well as the organization of the mortgage market in this latter city. It 
was in the 1950s and 1960s when these cities initiated large-scale projects to reorganize 
the urban space according to the needs of the mass society (sociedad de masas) and the 
market. Part of such program were the eradication of certain slums and squatter 
settlements and the relocation in large-scale housing complexes. The construction of Vila 
Aliança, Vila Kennedy (originally named Progresso), Vila Esperança, and the first stage 
of Cidade de Deus in the city of Rio de Janeiro –by then the State of Guanabara- was the 
outcome of such new moment of collaboration between US and Brazilian authorities. In 
Buenos Aires, such examples were the urbanization of the Bañado de Flores, a large 
swampland area within municipal limits equal to almost ten percent of the total surface of 
the city, and the construction of Villa Lugano 1-2 and Ciudad General Belgrano. The 
social imaginaries attached to these housing complexes emphasized the idea that 
homeownership and a respectable environment would contribute in the formation of 




developmentalism was about something more than the mere provision of a physical 
shelter to urban dwellers, it was part of the very project of modernization.  
 
Chapter Summaries 
To unravel this tangled history of housing, I have divided this dissertation in three 
parts. First, I analyze what I call the transnationalization of the housing problem. Second, 
I reconstruct the history of urban renewal and housing policies in Rio and Buenos Aires 
in the 1960s. Third, I seek an assessment of the distance between the social representation 
behind the housing projects and the way in which residents and experts experienced the 
new built environments.  
In Chapter 1, I explore the way in which social scientists in the Americas 
problematized the urban problem and the centrality that slums had in such 
characterization. The chapter starts with a description of the urban and social 
transformations of Rio and Buenos Aires, especially since the 1930s. It pays attention to 
the way in which the mobilization of the popular classes during the Vargas‘s second 
regime and Perón contributed in the problematization of the urban and the housing 
question. Here, I pay particular attention to certain circuits of knowledge between Latin 
American and US counterparts and the points of contact between modernization theory 
and the developmentalist school of thinking in a context of the ―Latin-Americanization‖ 
of the social sciences. Slums, I argue, became central in the study of the new era of mass 
society as they represented, in the minds of scholars and experts, the coexistence of 
rural/traditional behaviors in an urban/modern environment. The research shows how 




modernity to those prescribed by modernization theory scholars like Robert Redfield. In 
other words, scientific works produced in Latin America questioned the validity of the 
universalistic assumptions of modernization theory as they did not seem to fully apply in 
other context beyond the US, and perhaps not even in the US. 
In Chapter 2, I look specifically at the way in which housing became a matter of 
debate and analysis at a regional scale in the postwar era. I show the growing influence of 
U.S. urban planning in the region, especially through the work of multilateral 
organization led buy as the Organization of American States. As mapping out the whole 
universe of networks would be impossible for the possibilities of this work, instead, I 
decided to focus on some representative institutions and figures that would show the 
intensity that urban planning, and housing in particular, reached in this period. In these 
transnational circuits of knowledge, I argue, housing became scrutinized under a more 
technical gaze that ultimately decomposed the problem in a myriad of specific issues. If 
experts and policymakers in the field of urban planning insisted that their actions be taken 
in the broad names of development and modernization, they nonetheless developed an 
understanding of the housing problem that was piecemeal and fractured.  
For this reason, the second part of the chapter focuses particularly on the way in 
which the Alliance for Progress, from the standpoint of the US, characterized the problem 
of housing and the policies and actors involved in it during the 1960s. The analysis shows 
how the Alliance for Progress, that vague and amorphous institutional setting, actually 
favored housing for the middle classes and skilled working classes by pushing for the 
development of mortgage markets. To a lesser extent the Alliance also mobilized 




community development programs. The construction of housing complexes was a part of 
a broader program that sought to strength capitalist market relations, especially through 
bolstering the mortgage market and expanded homeownership. As I will explain below in 
this introduction, this dissertation agrees with Fernando Coronil‘s criticism to James C. 
Scott‘s Seeing Like a State (1998) in that ―high modernist‖ projects were not solely the 
result of the rule of experts but also the outcome of the forces of the capitalist market in 
high modernism.
14
 As Timothy Mitchell has explained for the case of Egypt, modernizing 
projects were intrinsic to the formation of  ―the market‖ and ―the economy.‖ The experts‘ 
knowledge, laws, private property were all part of the process in which Egypt made its 
entering into modernity.
15
 In this dissertation, I asked about the relationship between 
housing developments in two Latin American cities, the role of the United States during 
the Alliance for Progress to avert a leftist turn and US corporations and capital to 
consolidate the mortgage market.  
Chapter 3 reconstructs the history of the Guanabara Housing Program launched 
by Guanabara‘s first governor, Carlos Lacerda (1914-1977). The eradication of favelas 
and the relocation in new purpose-built public housing complexes as well as temporary 
shelters were part of a broader restructuration of the urban space. After describing the 
history of popular housing in Rio since the first decades of the twentieth century I 
recreate the history of the construction of the vilas, the eradication of favelas, and 
squatters‘ resistances to evictions. I pay particular attention to the relationship established 
between Brazilian authorities and the representatives of the United States Agency for 
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International Development (USAID). The chapter also shows the extent in which 
transnational process were locally grounded and influenced by local contexts. In this 
sense, the particular social and political history of Rio in the first half of the 1960s is 
central to understand the construction of the vilas. In this sense, the vilas are an 
interesting window to explore the mediations, borrowings, and negotiations between 
USAID and Brazilian experts. Attention to detail in the description of the design and 
construction of the projects comes from the attempt to show how certain social 
representations materialized in the floor plans and the whole conceptualization of the 
housing program. This chapter also seeks to historicize the origins of the vilas. Their 
existence and their relationship with the Alliance for Progress were always mentioned in 
the literature about Lacerda‘s administration or the history of public housing in Rio 
without much detail about their history.
16
 In this way, this chapter seeks to provide new 
elements for future work on this important chapter on the history of housing and Rio.  
Chapter 4 takes a similar approach for the case of Buenos Aires to analyze the 
urbanization of Parque Almirante Brown (PAB) and the construction of two housing 
complexes, Villa Lugano 1-2 (later renamed Conjunto General Savio) and Ciudad 
General Belgrano (now popularly known as Barrio BID, in a somewhat ironic homage to 
the presence of Interamerican Development Bank financing).  Public housing in Buenos 
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Aires offers a different perspective of analysis to understand the role of the Alliance for 
Progress. Different from Brazil, Argentina was, under both Argentine and North 
American eyes, already a ―modern‖ country in the era of developmentalism. As a result, 
resources for social programs, such as subsidized housing for the urban poor were of a 
much lesser urgency in comparison to Rio de Janeiro in the early 1960s. U.S. assistance 
in the field of housing came primarily in the form of a capitalization of private mortgage 
market in times when public and private finance interests tried to formalize the savings 
and loan system that might generate a self-sustaining, market of middle-class home 
owners. The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) provided partial funds for the 
construction of Villa Lugano 1-2 and Ciudad General Belgrano, in La Matanza. Each 
housing complex were intended for different subsections of lower-income earners who 
resided in Buenos Aires and the surrounding suburbs. Homes in Villa Lugano 1-2 were to 
be destined for state employees and skilled working classes that could afford a mortgage. 
Units at Ciudad General Belgrano, comparatively cheaper that in Villa Lugano, were to 
house the existing slum population residing in Parque Almirante Brown as well as those 
residents of boarding houses or tenements affected by the bulldozing of blocks for the 
extension works of Avenue 9 de Julio, in central Buenos Aires. The results of such 
differentiations were decidedly mixed, as I will demonstrate.  
The research shows how transnational flows that influenced specific interventions 
into the urban fabric were not confined just to North-South exchanges in the hemisphere. 
These flows were precisely global implying the existence of several vectors coming and 
going from and to the US, Europe, Latin America, and other areas of the so-called 




Villa Lugano 1-2 offers a more complex understanding of the transnational history of 
housing. The chapter shows how IDB authorities determined the construction of tall 
towers as a requirement of density, leaving design to the independent discretion of the 
Municipal Housing Agency and its team of architects. These architects, many committed 
to the ideas of a social architecture, were also followers of the contemporary debates 
within the modernist movement. The Argentine architects, faced with the opportunity of 
symbolically creating a ―city‖ or a neighborhood in the northwestern corner of Buenos 
Aires choose the ideas of the Team X, the group of architects that seceded from the 
Congrès Internationaux d'Architecture Moderne (CIAM; International Congresses of 
Modern Architecture). Villa Lugano 1-2 is thus an interesting point of convergence of 
transnational architectural languages and local technical determinants.   
Taking together, chapters 3 and 4 show how the housing programs in Rio and 
Buenos Aires worked to "develop" a new class of homeowners that participated in a new 
mortgage market. Yet, the research also shows how those unable to qualify for loans 
faced different prospects for a "right" to decent housing. In Buenos Aires, income would 
determine whether certain families had access to Villa Lugano 1-2 or Ciudad General 
Belgrano (or, for the large majority of villeros, neither). In Guanabara, those that did not 
meet the income requirement found themselves directed to temporary housing sites, many 
of substandard quality and difficult access to the amenities of the modern city. Both 
chapters argue that economic criteria for access to the low-income housing promoted 
within the Alliance for Progress organized a redistribution of space that created a new 
class of homeowners in one area of the city while at the same time socially and spatially 




Chapter, 5 goes back to the social imaginaries behind the design of the housing 
projects, particularly from the perspective of the state and the people involved in their 
construction. I make use of a cultural approach to explore the kind of modernization that 
the housing agencies promoted through housing. The chapter focuses on the way in 
which new residents and local and foreign experts responded to the new built 
environment in the short and longer-term. Here the evidence is incomplete and 
fragmented, which makes difficult easy generalizations. It combines the anthropological 
and sociological works produced in the years after the occupation, newspapers, and 
interviews with the residents. These interviews, however, do not constitute a 
representative sample but do help to point out many of the problems and positive aspects 
of the housing programs. The research demonstrates how the political and social situation 
determined many of the initial outcomes of the projects. While this study shows how 
disruptive the eviction and relocation in the new neighborhoods became, it also needs to 
bring to forefront that for many residents this was actually an opportunity to reach a 
―respectable‖ home and leave the slums and the stigmatization associated with life in the 
slums.  
The chapter ends with the analysis of other alternative solutions that a group of 
progressive architects and social scientists in both Rio and Buenos Airs proposed to cope 
with the housing problem by the late 1960s and early 1970s. I pay attention to the 
experiences of the urbanization of the favela Brás de Pina by the Community 
Development Company (CODESCO) in Rio and the urbanization of Villa #7 into the 
Barrio Villa Justo Suárez in Buenos Aires by the Comisión Municipal de la Vivienda 




of emerging transnational trends in the field of housing that argued in favor of thinking of 
housing from the perspective of the slum dweller rather than that of the policymaker or 
the expert.  
 
Theory, Methodology, and Historiography 
 
In this dissertation, I understand urban space and housing as both material and 
cultural constructions set in particular social formations. When Raymond Williams 
analyses the cultural transformations associated with modernity, he establishes that the 
city and the country were part of the same symbolic operation in literary and social 
discourses in a moment of increasing growth of urban industrial centers in Europe since 
the seventeenth century.
17 
Consequently, the city resulted in modern times a material and 
cultural construction. In Latin America, Angel Rama characterized the lettered city as an 
intellectual invention of ―lettered elites‖ that had imposed their imagination and design 
over the physical geographies of the cities and their hinterlands since colonial times. 
Adrián Gorelik has built upon this notion to argue that from the 1940s to the 1970s the 
―Latin American City‖ emerged as a cultural ―trope‖ born from the ―intellectual desire to 
build it as an object of knowledge and action.‖
18
  In a similar direction, Karin Rosemblatt 
has shown how scientific practices and theories, such as Oscar Lewis‘s notion of the 
―culture of poverty,‖ were part of national and transnational scientific networks that 
emerged through cross-border debates, contributing in the construction of North and 
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South geo-spatial and political difference, especially after the Second World War.
19
 The 
Latin American social scientists present at the 1959 meeting began nevertheless to 
question the universalizing aspiration of modernization theory by showing how certain 
rural, traditional institutions were actually contributing to the adaptation to urban, modern 
life of the recent migrant from the countryside. In so doing they were opening the 
possibility to think of Latin America as an ―alternative modernity.‖
20
 
For Henri Lefebvre, modern urban life occurred in a planned society and power 
relations were embedded in the spatial dimension of the city that manifest in both 
material and immaterial ways as space is a social production.
21
 In a mutually constitutive 
relationship, urban scholars like Gino Germani or several architects and urban planners 
were influenced by the particular relations of power that constitute the socially produced 
urban space and, at the same time, the particular prism through which they codified that 
reality contributed in defining specific interventions into the urban fabric. Therefore, 
scholars, professionals, and experts not only reflected about their cities and their housing 
conditions but they also contributed in the production of the city.  
Methodologically, this dissertation is not a comparative work between two 
historical cases of housing policies in different Latin American countries. It is rather a 
study of two different experiences of two localities that experienced the influx of monies 
for public housing that were channeled through bilateral agreements with the United 
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States government or though the multilateral organizations created in the post World War 
II period (i.e., ECLA, OAS, IDB). Although the two localities may not have directly 
coordinated their public housing programs, they shared and shaped the interamerican 
contexts of foreign aid and local development. The transnational approach thus provides 
an enriching understanding of local phenomena. It allows to put two major Latin 
American cities undergoing urban reorganization in a context of political turmoil, 
economic instability, and social anxieties within multileveled circuits of ideas, capital, 
and networks of interaction. Both cases provide evidence to see the way in which 
intellectual and technical imaginaries actually manifested in two different local contexts. 
In other terms, the research shows the importance of thinking transnational processes as 
they unfold locally to avoid easy generalizations and the erroneous temptation of seeing 
similarities instead of difference. Following Micol Seigel, comparison, therefore, is 
always present but as part of an analysis that seeks to put two cities within a more global 
setting. This does not mean that comparison is not important, or secondary. On the 
contrary, it is an inevitable component of this work which ultimately seeks to show how 
developments in Rio and Buenos Aires were part of hemispheric transformations, but 
also of the specificities of the modernizing city in the aftermath of the second post war.  
By the same token, my work seeks to contribute to the growing field of 
transnational urban history. Over the last ten years, several works – mainly edited 
volumes — have sought to define the contours and specificity of a global approach. Sean 
Purdy and Nancy Kwak have put together a special issue on new perspectives on public 






 Yet, transnationalism here is not a central element and more of the articles 
remain confined within national boundaries and narratives. Another Global City: 
Historical Explorations into the Transnational Municipal Moment, 1850–2000 (2008), 
coedited by Pierre-Yves Saunier and Shane Ewen, has shown the possibilities of thinking 
how local histories of cities are connected between each other. Most recently, Janice 
Reiff and Philip Ethington have coedited a volume on transnational urbanism that seeks 
to interrogate the specificity of transnational when thinking about cities. The results show 
how different scholars are still defining the contours and specificities of the field. My 
dissertation seeks to intervene in a field, which has predominantly focused on Europe and 
the U.S., by to incorporating Latin America into those transnational circuits of capital and 
ideas.  
In this dissertation, the election of the transnational approach implies decentering 
the nation. This does not mean that the nation-state is not important in this history. On the 
contrary, it was very much influential in the way in which foreign assistance arrived to 
the cities and in shaping local policies. In addition, the selection of Buenos Aires and Rio 
de Janeiro— rather than São Paulo (the largest of all South American cities), Brasilia (a 
city built "from nothing")  or San Juan (a colonial city rebuilt following a devastating 
natural disaster)— speaks to these cities‘ signal symbolic place in the imaginaries of 
Argentina and Brazil, and the global imaginary of postwar Latin American 
cosmopolitanism. Buenos Aires, the capital city, and a federal district until 1992 (still 
capital city) was politically and administratively shaped by the nation-state. Rio, on the 
other hand, remained the symbolic capital of Brazil even as it was defining its particular 
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relationship with the federal government as the city lost its status as the capital city of 
Brazil precisely in 1960, when Brasília was inaugurated. In addition, USAID assistance 
to the Guanabara Housing Program was certainly part of US geopolitics to influence 
national and local politics. In this way, the presence of the nation in this history is very 
important as far as it is connected to the history of the housing problem in Rio and 
Buenos Aires. As a result, this dissertation is not a history of public housing in Argentina 
or Brazil, but rather the history of low-income housing initiatives localized in global 
networks of interaction. Framed in this way, I tried to avoid the risk of oversimplifying 
and generalizing processes that are too complex to put under a similar prism. This was 
certainly a challenging task. The own nature of the historical problem required making 
certain analysis that would not totally satisfy a reader who wants only a history of 
housing in Argentina or in Brazil.    
My work not only crosses several geographical borders but also disciplinary 
fields. This is in part the reflection of the object of study. Slums and low-income housing 
in the postwar period became such an object of concern for so many disciplines that this 
analysis had to incorporate such complexity. Interdisciplinarity was one of the salient 
points in the production of knowledge on cities and slums: sociologists, anthropologists, 
economists, architects, urban planners, policymakers, social workers, among other actors 
worked together, debated among them, and formed interdisciplinary working teams. My 
crossing of disciplines seeks to recreate this complex world and I take from each 





Dealing with several scholarly corpuses from three different countries and in three 
different languages has not always been an easy task, especially in the context in which 
the literature on popular housing and especially slums in the Argentina, Brazil, and the 
United States can be overwhelming. Ten years ago, Licia do Prado Valladares, Filipina 
Chinelli, and Lidia de Medeiros documented more than six hundred publications just on 
the subject on Brazilian favelas.
23
 In Argentina and Brazil, housing and the poor have 
been the métier of number of sociologists, anthropologists, and political scientists who 
were particularly interested in understanding the formation of grassroots movements that, 
as it happened in the Brazilian case were important to push for a social agenda during the 
dictatorship. Social historians have also focused on the history of housing, urban renewal, 
and squatter settlements concentrating predominantly in the formative years of the 
modern cities, from the late nineteenth century and the first decades of the twentieth 
century. Classic works such as Oscar Yujnovsky‘s on housing policies in Argentina 
between 1955-1983 (1984) or Nabil Bonduki‘s on the origins of social housing in Brazil 
(1998) have paved the way for historically-sensitive research in this field from multiple 
perspectives.  
New cultural approaches to urban Latin American history have opened the 
possibilities for new questions, topics, and sources. In Argentina, works like Anahí 
Ballent or Rosa Aboy on housing and Peronism, Valeria Manzano or Isabella Cosse on 
domesticity, gender relations, and youth in Buenos Aires have showed a renovated 
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interest in postwar periods, especially the 1950s and 1960s.
24
 In Brazil Licia do Prado 
Valladares work on the social imaginaries on favelas since the late nineteenth century to 
more contemporary times, Brodwyn Fischer‘s history of urban poor in Rio, Bryan 
McCann‘s work on community organizations and neighborhood associations in shaping 
urban politics, just to mention a few, make evident the recent historiographical trends.
25
  
I build upon these contributions to recreate the history of Rio‘s vilas and Villa 
Lugano1-2 and Ciudad General Belgrano in Buenos Aires. These housing projects have 
been partially analyzed in different historical accounts but a thorough analysis was still 
pending. In the case of the vilas, most of the literature focused on the relationship 
between Lacerda‘s urban agenda and real estates interests. In addition, these plans 
became the first experience at favela eviction and relocation in Rio. After the military 
coup in 1964, the military government of Castelo Branco took the experience of the 
Guanabara Popular Housing Policy and, with certain modifications, made it the official 
federal policy toward low-income housing. On the other hand, more contemporary 
revisionists studies of the Lacerda administration that stressed his diligence and 
―efficiency‖ minimized the negative aspects of the housing program and even tend to 
downplay the degree of U.S. assistance.
26
 In this accounts, the history of vilas appear as 
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part of an innovative urban agenda that prioritize popular the housing and education of 
the popular classes. On the other hand, few works on the history of US-Latin American 
relations mention the role of USAID building the alliance. Jeffrey Taffet‘s Foreign Aid as 
a Tool of Foreign Policy, for instance, touches upon the construction of the vilas to stress 
US geopolitical interests in Brazil but does not provide much detail beyond what others 
had already said. In all these cases, the history of the vilas vanished as fast as they 
appeared. 
In the case of Villa Lugano 1-2 and Ciudad General Belgrano and, more 
generally, the urbanization of the Parque Almirante Brown, have lacked a thorough 
historical treatment. In the case of the Parque and Villa Lugano, located in the 
southwestern corner of Buenos Aires, the area with highest density of slums within the 
capital city's boundaries, is a place relatively unknown for most of the porteños that do 
not live in the city‘s south.
27
 Anahí Ballent has offered very interesting ideas to think 
about the new orientation of Buenos Aires to the west during the Peronista 
administration. During those years, the Peronista government urbanized the swamplands 
of Flores (as the Parque was formerly known), built the international airport, recreational 
areas in Ezeiza, and Ciudad Evita (a planned garden city), and designed the parkway that 
connected these places with central Buenos Aires. According to Ballent, this was part of a 
symbolic operation to challenge the traditional orientation of the city around the port and 
the Rio de la Plata, a symbol of the liberal project. Although Ballent‘s periodization ends 
before our study starts, her insights offered an excellent opportunity to think about the 
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development of that area of the city and the centrality of thinking urban planning, 
aesthetics languages, and social imaginaries in the intersection of politics and power.  
One of the few works that explore the housing complexes within the 
modernization of Buenos Aires in the developmentalist era is Laura Podalsky cultural 
study Specular City: Transforming Culture, Consumption, and Space in Buenos Aires, 
1955-1973 (2004). Her insightful work offers a rich analysis of the cultural and urban 
modernization in the years after the ouster of Perón. Her main thesis is that the porteño 
middle-classes sought to reassert their hegemony over Buenos Aires after the irruption of 
the working class in the peronista through the material and discursive renovation of the 
city. Part of that project was the construction of apartment buildings and office towers in 
international styles that dialogued with the most advanced trends in the world. While this 
new cosmpolitanization of culture and architecture in Buenos Aires was certainly part of 
modernizing trends in the post-Peronist years, this hypothesis is too encompassing and 
requires a more nuanced analysis when studying particular cases to avoid easy 
generalizations. Still, her work is one of the few that has explored urban renewal in post 
1955 Buenos Aires years from a cultural perspective and her portrayal of the spatial 
changes in connection to the new era of mass consumption and cosmopolitanism as well 
as to increasing levels of social inequality are important.   
I build upon the contributions of these works to explain how state interventions 
into the urban fabric and landscapes of urban poverty were not merely short-term 
attempts to solve urgent needs for housing but rather the physical manifestation of 
expectations, hopes, but also fears, and desires transnationally built about the 
modernization of Latin American societies. In so doing, I seek to provide a nuanced view 




that has tended to focus on the hot spots of the Cold War, and all-out anti-communist 
struggles. The analysis is animated by the new cultural approaches to the history of US-
Latin American relations that challenge us to think about hemispheric relations in terms 
of ―contact zones.‖ A formulation first coined by Mary Louis Pratt, such zones refer to 
that range of networks, exchanges, borrowings, discourses, behaviors, and meanings 
―whereby the external became internalized in Latin America; to the way in which foreign 
people, ideas, commodities, and institutions have been received, contested, and 
appropriated.‖
28
  Contact zones are sites of transculturation. As Gilbert Joseph argued, 
―contact zones are not geographic places with stable significations; they may represent 
attempts at hegemony, but are simultaneously sites of multivocality; of negotiation, 
borrowing, and exchange; and of redeployment and reversal.‖
29
  I argue that public 
housing in Rio and Buenos Aires is precisely one of these zones built by multivocality, 
by negotiation, and by unstable borrowings. 
This conceptualization helped me to gradually modify the initial assumptions 
during the first stages of my dissertation. I was initially struck by the fact that housing for 
the poor was actually a matter of concern and policymaking for technical, intellectual, 
and governmental elites in Latin American countries, especially in the aftermath of the 
second postwar. Cities like Rio de Janeiro or Buenos Aires actually underwent major 
urban restructuration and housing for the poor became an important part of such 
governmental interventions into the urban fabric. Slum eradications and relocation in 
housing complexes were part of the solutions put in practice by local governments as 
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foreign loans became available for social programs. The optimistic hopes of 
modernization and development in Latin America framed the conception and execution 
of these housing programs. In the longer term, however, these modernization projects 
intended to alleviate the housing problem and promote in the incorporation of the former 
squatter into citizenry ultimately contributed in the modernization of poverty in Latin 
American cities. Where my historical cases evidence of what James Scott defined as 
―high modernism,‖ a state ideology ―envisioning a sweeping, rational engineering of all 
aspects of social life in order to improve the human condition‖?
30
 This overall framework 
seemed very tempting initially but the implications of Scott‘s insights were not entirely 
convincing to me. As many scholars have argued, the notion of high modernism gave the 
state a high degree of autonomy from social formations. As Coronil has pointed out, what 
is missing in Scott‘s analysis is actually the problematization of the relationship between 
the state and the capitalist market.
31
 High Modernism, Coronil would say, was not an 
ideology that came from the state, disarticulated from broader social and economic 
forces. Without denying the specificity of the state and the policymakers, Coronil helps 
us re-think about modernization projects also as part of the history of capitalism.
32
 For 
that reason, thinking the construction of the housing complexes built in Rio and Buenos 
Aires as part of transnational flows of peoples and ideas (as contact zones) provides a 
more nuanced picture that the one that would result when applying Scott‘s model. 
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There is another element in Scott‘s insightful work that was also very influential 
in the initial stages of this dissertation and this is was the condemnation of certain high 
modernist projects as failures. At first, it was tempting to see the housing developments 
in Rio and Buenos Aires as failures, considering the rapid way in which these places fell 
into disrepair and social ills. Such perspective was, however, teleological and less 
historical. In addition, thinking failure or success historically imposes a series of 
problems: how would various historical actors evaluate their built environment in 
changing historical conditions? How would residents adequately address this question 
since they are always considering the limited alternatives: a home in the Vila could be 
better than living in a favela or a favela better than living on the street? Scholars also 
differed in their assessment of the vilas in the years that followed their inauguration. 
Scholars like Licia do Prado Valladares identified in her work on Cidade de Deus, how 
former favelados actually abandoned their new homes in the vilas rapidly to go back to 
the slum or to make a small profit that would allow them to move to the suburbs.
33
 This 
movement of people allowed low- and middle-class sectors to move to the homes that the 
original residents were leaving behind. Other criticism also pointed out the poor planning 
of the housing programs and how isolated from the city‘s center the new neighborhoods 
were. On the other hand, scholars like anthropologist Alba Zaluar disagreed with 
Valladares‘ criticism to the housing developments and showed a more varied response 
from the residents, including their active appropriation and transformation of the new 
built environment.
34
 As Janice Perlman‘s recent work also showed, the assessing of these 
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places really depend on the changing historical contexts and the individual life histories 
of the residents over the longer term.
35
 For many, eradication meant getting rid of the 
negative stigma of favelados while for others it meant differently. In any case, there are 
no general answers to these questions. There is also the issue of how residents built their 
identity as residents of housing complexes and the relationship with the memory and 
representation of favelados. This dissertation seeks to move forward from the analysis of 
these housing developments as success or failure and to explore how the various actors 
involved in this history were re-imagining the urban landscape in an era when the urban 
population was growing very rapidly and new arrivals had few resources.  
Finally, Scott criticism of the role of the state from the left could also be taken by 
right-wing ideologues to argue that welfare policies or state large-scale interventions are 
harmful. The debates about the reconstruction of New Orleans post Katrina is a good 
evidence of the kinds of misunderstandings that the reading of Scott may lead to. In my 
work, the critical assessment of the history of the housing programs implemented under 
the Alliance for Progress is not a reaction against state interventionism in social areas but 
rather the problematization of how the implementation and conception of such 
interventions contributed in the modernization of urban poverty. What is still pending is 
the debate about what to do, and whose the responsibilities are, to house the 
overwhelming number of people that live in terrible conditions in the ―underdeveloped‖ 
spaces of the globe.  
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In July 1959, the United Nations‘ Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO), the Bureau of Social Affairs, and the Economic Commission for Latin 
America (ECLA/CEPAL) organized in Santiago, Chile at ECLA‘s headquarters, a key 
seminar on urbanization problems in Latin America. The conference‘s immediate 
objectives, as stated by the rapporteurs Philip M. Hauser (1909-1994) and José Medina 
Echavarría (1903-1977), were to produce knowledge on the impact of the rapid 
urbanization process in Latin American in order to assist the republics of the region in the 
formulation of policy.
1
 In addition, the conference aimed to expand the exchange of 
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scholarship at an inter-American scale.
2
 The conference participants included a number 
of social scientists from throughout the Americas who had been conducting fieldwork in 
slums and working class neighborhoods of Latin America.  Chief among the 
participations were sociologists, Gino Germani (1909-1977), who had worked with villas 
miserias of Buenos Aires, José Matos Mar (1925-   ), who had studied the barriadas of 
Lima, Andrew Pearse, who had worked with favelas of Rio de Janeiro, and Juarez 
Rubens Brandão Lopes (1925-2011), who had conducted similar work in São Paulo.
3 
 
The meeting at ECLA identified the widespread presence of slums and 
shantytowns as ―perhaps the most serious social problems of urban areas in Latin 
America,‖ as ―they dramatize the acute character of the housing problem in Latin 
American cities and reveal some of the worst physical and social consequences of 
poverty and the low level of living.‖
4
 The ―housing problem‖ became one of the salient 
aspects of the urban transformation that were rapidly transforming the cities‘ landscapes. 
The scholars present at the conference shared a vision of their historical times as one of 
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sudden and unprecedented transformation that required the intervention of the state and 
the expert in guiding such process into an era of modernization and development. They 
subscribed to the idea that, as Barbara Weinstein has pointed out, ―spatially organized 
inequalities would be addressed, corrected, and eventually erased through the proper 
modes of government and technical intervention.‖
5
  
In the postwar era moment, the housing ―problem‖ came to be defined as a 
challenge of physically building urban housing to the standards of Western capitalist 
democracy; defining the state‘s role as an agent of material modernization, 
democratization and the social integration of the urban dweller; and applying the social 
sciences to the technocratic administration of planned housing, redevelopment and 
urbanization. More specifically, the problem of housing was defined by the inadequacy of 
the housing stock for middle and working classes as a result of the lack of homes and the 
advanced degree of obsolete dwellings; the disorganization of the mortgage market and 
credit to facilitate access to homeownership; the paucity of the building industry; and the 
unregulated use of urban land. In addition, the housing question was directly associated 
with the productivity of the nation, as the home was the basic unit in which the workers 
reproduced its labor force. As a problem of productivity it was also a problem of 
development and its solution had to be part of broader comprehensive national planning. 
Within the sociological and political circuits of knowledge produced to address the Latin 
American path to post-war modernity, housing policy emerged as a discursive and 
practical antidote to underdevelopment, poverty and social instability.  
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The meeting at ECLA revealed a strong concern for the most dramatic 
manifestation of the housing problem which was the alarming growth of slums and other 
forms of substandard housing. From a sociological and anthropological perspective, the 
slum house, allegedly inhabited by rural migrants, was part of a landscape of urban 
misery that contributed in the reproduction of psychological and cultural traits associated 
with traditional-rural ways of life. As this chapter will show, slums were, therefore, rural 
―enclaves‖ in the city, which could impact negatively in the best efforts to unleash the 
forces of progress and modernization. Modernization theory and the developmentalist 
school of thinking associated with ECLA, identified the presence of a dual society in 
Latin American cities, characterized by the coexistence of ―traditional‖/―rural‖ and 
―modern‖/―industrial‖ patterns of behavior. The question, then, was about the character 
of the integration, acculturation, and assimilation of the traditional into the modern.  
Characterized as a mass living at the margins of urban society, urban scholars, but 
also policymakers, urban planners and experts, were mostly concerned with the presence 
of a ―new type of personality,‖ as the manifestation of the ―psycho-social aspect of urban 
culture;‖ a mentality carried out by a ―class of human beings with special attitude towards 
the world and his relations with the rest of mankind.‖
6
 This depiction was certainly 
associated with the anxieties caused by the political and social mobilization of this mass 
of new urban residents that supported the populist experience. This support, according to 
the scientific and political elites considered, had been detrimental to the full development 
of truly democratic institutions in the region. With the overthrow of charismatic leaders, 
particularly Juan Perón in Argentina (1946-1955) and Getúlio Vargas in Brazil (1930-
1945; 1951-1954), elites asked how to promote economic modernization and social 
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incorporation in a stable democracy or how to consolidate capitalist accumulation in a 
context of political moderation.  
In locating traits of traditional-rural life in the slums, as evidenced, for instance, in 
the spontaneous and rudimentary construction of ranchos in illegal lands, these elites 
projected physical features into social attributes and life-styles. In so doing, they assumed 
that the bad quality of the poor urban environment and the kind of solution adopted by 
poor resident to their problem of shelter was actually the manifestation of internal 
qualities. The presence of slums and poor residents, therefore, posited the problem of 
what to do and how to incorporate them in order to unleash the social and cultural forces 
to modernization. As a result, the ―housing problem‖ was both a physical and a socio-
cultural problem. In the first case it required the complex articulation of solutions crafted 
by the urban planner, state experts, and economists. In the second case, it condensed the 
postwar expectations and cold-war anxieties about the ―personality structure‖ in 
transitional societies. As slums, and their homes, became the loci where scholars sought 
to find the clues about the disruptive effect of traditional/rural ways of life and social and 
personal disorganization the housing ―problem‖ became a central of the urban ―problem.‖ 
By arguing that the problems of urbanization became inseparable from those of 
development, this chapter explores the role of low-income housing and urban landscapes 
of poverty at the historical confluence of developmentalism, social sciences, and urban 
planning in the late 1950s. I ask why the social sciences, urban experts, and governments 
of the Americas granted working class conditions and housing renewed attention. I 
contend that governments, social scientists, and technical elites of the postwar Americas 




capitalist accumulation but also by creating built environments designed to generate 
modern sociabilities and behaviors. Modern housing would remedy urban squalor, 
promote the integration and assimilation of new urban residents, stimulate middle-class 
habits and mass consumption, and moderate political behavior, especially among the 
poor. Community life would integrate the individual into the polity and socialize him for 
the responsibilities and duties of citizenship. Housing and urban planning came to be both 
a desired outcome of modernization and an antidote to underdevelopment and social 
disintegration.  
The chapter begins with a statistical analysis of the demographic and geographic 
expansion of Rio and Buenos Aires since the late 19
th
 century throughout the period 
under consideration. The analysis pays attention to the key political interventions of the 
populist governments of Vargas and Perón in the area of low-income housing. I explore 
the impact of the presence of the urban ―other,‖ the recent rural migrant, in the 
understanding of the problem. The attention then moves to the study of the way in which 
ECLA and U.S. modernization theorists met in the analysis of the urban problem. Here, I 
pay particular attention to the way in which U.S. sociologists and demographers became 
aware of the situation of Latin American cities, following a trend that anthropologists had 
opened in their studies of peasant indigenous societies in Latin America.  I also explore 
the efforts of Latin American social scientists to renovate the social science at a national 
and regional level to demonstrate how the consolidation of social sciences in Latin 
America occurred in a time when urban studies were becoming central. The point is to 
verify how social studies undertaken in those years analyzed slums and their inhabitants 




universalizing postulates of modernization theory. In concluding, the chapter summarizes 
the arguments that came to challenge the assumptions of modernization theorists in 
respect to the characterization of the ―marginality‖ located in the ―urban slums.‖ I explore 
how dependency theory and Marxist theory begun to reassess the experience of the slums 
characterizing them as a ―solution‖ rather than as a ―problem.‖  
 
Urban Growth and Substandard Housing: A Historical Review  
The rapid process of urbanization that followed the end of the Second World War 
irreversibly altered the physical and social geography of cities in the so-called 
underdeveloped world. Massive rural to urban migration, industrialization, more and 
better job opportunities, lower mortality rates, and the general improvement of living 
conditions contributed to this change. Contemporary demographers like Kingsley Davis 
explained this growth as different from the historical experience of the advanced 
industrial countries whose cities grew as a ―function‖ of industrialization.
7 
In Latin 
America, the stagnation and decline of the rural sector aggravated by adverse weather 
conditions, offered little to the inhabitants of the countryside in comparison with the 
opportunities, real or apparent, of the city. Thus, massive migrations to urban centers 
became the independent explanatory variable of the demographic expansion of Latin 
American cities.   
Urban centers in the region grew faster than in any other part of the world, at a 
rate of 55 percent between 1950 and 1960. By 1950, almost a quarter of Latin America‘s 
total population lived in cities with more than 20,000 inhabitants and 17 percent resided 
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in cities of 100,000 or more.8  This differed from the U.S. with more people living in 
smaller cities of 2,000 or 5,000 or more. Latin America was predominantly rural in 1950 
with an average urban population living in cities of more than 2,000 residents at 39 
percent (61 million people). Ten years later the rate of urbanized population had 
increased to 46 percent evidencing a trend that accelerated in the following decades. This 
situation varied from country to country: Uruguay, Argentina, and Chile were 
demographically speaking the most urbanized countries while the Dominican Republic, 
Honduras, and Haiti showed the lowest levels by 1960.9 By 1950, almost a quarter of 
Latin America‘s total population lived in cities with more than 20,000 inhabitants and 17 
percent resided in cities of 100,000 or more. This differed, for instance, from the U.S. 
where more people lived in smaller cities of 2,000 or 5,000 or more.  
Comparatively, Latin American was more urban than Asia and Africa but less 
than North America, Europe, and Australia.  For contemporary demographers and social 
scientists like Kingsley Davis, Philip Hauser, Harley Browning, or Bert Hoselitz this 
demographic ―explosion‖ exceeded the cities‘ productive capacity, creating a delicate 
situation in which urban growth surpassed economic productivity leading to rising 
inequality and social gap.  Demographers and social scientists called this process ―over-
urbanization,‖ defining urban growth as the result of the transference of rural poverty to 
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the city than a factor of industrialization.
10 
For Hauser, over-urbanization was at the core 




Cities became more populated, imposing stresses on the physical capacity of the 
urban infrastructure. Spaces of urban poverty proliferated, as housing options for middle- 
and working-class families became scarce. As a result, substandard forms of living 
intensified in central areas –overcrowding the existing tenements and boarding houses- 
while shantytowns, slums, and squatter settlements multiplied along the limits of the 
cities, or, when geography allowed, in the hillsides of cities like Rio de Janeiro or 
Caracas.  The lower segments of the working class inhabited those places. They were 
usually unskilled workers employed in the service sector (petty trade, street vending, 
construction, domestic service) and, to a lesser extent, in industry. Semi-skilled workers 
and state employees also could live in slums as these places provided an affordable 
shelter and a proximity to the workplace, as it was the case with those workers who lived 
closed to Rio‘s port.  A large part of these new residents had recently arrived from the 
countryside and settled in the slums, assisted by already settled acquaintances and family. 
Slums were an alternative to the lack of affordable housing. In many cases, new residents 
found people that had came from their same place of origin, and those networks provided 
some sort of initial support and opportunity. While the features of slums and shantytowns 
varied from country to country, from city to city, and from site to site, they shared certain 
similarities. Slums usually occupied illegally private and public lands; improvised shacks 
were generally single-room, rudimentarily built (at least initially) with unsuitable 
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materials, and for the most part lacked sanitary facilities and close access to urban 
services (hospitals or schools). Social inequality manifested increasingly in the growing 
segregated slums becoming one of the most striking features of the post-war modern 
Latin American city.  
In the specific history of Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro, both cities shared 
certain structural trends that affected each city in particular ways. Both port cities began 
their first cycle of modernization between 1880 and 1930 as a result of the expansion of 
capitalism led by the export sector and the modernizing government. In few decades, 
both cities turned from colonial capitals to modern, cosmopolitan cities.  In the late 
nineteenth century, the Argentine export-driven economy and the massive European 
immigration altered the social and physical composition of the city with the population 
growing from 239,000 to 2,035,000 between 1869 and 1914.
12  
In Rio, the coffee export 
boom, the abolition of slavery, and the end of imperial rule also altered the city. 
Overcrowded tenements and boarding homes, located in the cities‘ downtown, came to be 
the general solution for shelter that poor workers found. Exploitative rental conditions 
and the lack of hygienic conditions showed the inequalities of economic growth and 
precipitated social unrest. In the early twentieth century the state intervened first in a 
repressive way and then through an agenda of social engineering and eugenics. In Rio, 
the first favela emerged in Morro da Providéncia (Providencia Hill) at the end of the 
nineteenth century initiating the long process of occupation of Rio‘s hillsides.  
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A new cycle of urban expansion began in the 1930s as a result of protectionism 
and incipient state-led import-substitution industrialization in a context of decline of the 
traditional rural export sector.  The city‘s population grew from 3,457,000 in 1936 to 
4,724,000 in 1947 to 6,739,000 in 1960 to 8,353,000 in 1970.
13 
And while the population 
of the city of Buenos Aires remained constant over the period, the growth spread toward 
the suburbs of Greater Buenos Aires (GBA), consolidating the metropolitan region.
14 
Such an impressive growth was the result of a second wave of migrants this time coming 
from the countryside instead of abroad. By 1947 almost half of the population of the 
country was concentrated in this area. But while the percentages are impressive they 
nevertheless show that this considerable growth was still moderate: 2.7 percent 
comparing with the urban explosion that other cities in the region (e.g. São Paulo or 
Bogotá) began to experience at that same time.  New neighborhoods and villas miserias 
appeared close to the industries, while existing working-class areas kept growing as new 
contingents of workers arrived.
15  
In the mid 1950s, the number of villas and people living 
there was relatively low (just one percent of the city‘s population and two percent of the 
overall population in GBA) compared with other cities like Rio de Janeiro, although the 
number of slum residents doubled in the following decade.
16
 As a result, what many 
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initially regarded as a temporary housing solution was becoming a permanent aspect of 
the city.  
Rio de Janeiro also grew spectacularly starting in the 1930s as new industries 
began to spread into the city‘s suburbs, especially to the north of the historical city center. 
Given Rio‘s hilly geography, urban expansion from the center was largely conditioned 
upon the railway network into the North Zone, and tunnel-construction and landfill 
projects in the South Zone. Chapter 3 describes this process in more detail the process of 
the differentiation of function, as industries settled in the north (Maracanã, Meier) while 
the middle and upper classes moved to the south (e.g., Botafogo, Copacabana).
 17
 The 
decline of mortality rates, the improvement in life expectancy, and especially migration 
from neighboring states set the conditions for a steady population growth starting in the 
1940s. Rio‘s urban population more than doubled between 1940 and 1970 with a 
historical decennial growth rate of thirty-nine percent in the 1950s.
 18
 In contrast, Rio‘s 
rural population growth was negative in the 1960s. This was part of a broader, structural 
national process in which 39 million people moved from rural areas to urban centers 
between 1950 and 1970.
19
  São Paulo, a metropolitan center like Rio and itself an 
industrial juggernaut, received more migrants than Rio.
20
 By 1950, São Paulo‘s 
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population began to overpass that of Rio and it almost doubled in 1970.
21
  But Rio 
outmatched São Paulo in the number of favela residents: while the slum population of 
São Paulo represented a 1.1% of the municipal population in 1974, in Rio it increased 
almost threefold from 1950 to 1970 (169,305 in 1950 to 554,277 in 1970).
22
  
The existence of favelas in Rio and its imprint in popular culture preceded the 
generalization of villas miserias in Buenos Aires.
23
  Yet, both cities came to recognize 
that irregular settlements were part of the urban fabric. The first ever taken census of 
favelas in 1948, organized by the municipal government of the Federal District, 
established that almost 139,000 people lived in 105 favelas.  The vast majority had settled 
in the suburbs of the north (44%), while the rest occupied in similar proportions the South 
Zone (24%) and the Centro-Tijuca area (22%). In terms of their place of origin, the 
census reported that 52% of favelados had come from the neighboring states of Rio de 
Janeiro, Minas Gerais, and Espírito Santo, and that only 13% of them chose to live in a 
favela.  Despite a general assumption that people of color constituted the vast majority of 
favelados, the data of the 1948 census and the numbers that emerged from the 1950 
favela census indicated that favelas were racially diverse. 28.96% of favelados were 
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recorded to be whites [brancos], 35.07% blacks [pretos]; 35.88% mixed [pardos]; and 
0.09% Asian [amarelos]).
24
  In terms of occupation, 30% of the enumerated population 
worked in the secondary sector, 20% in construction, and 20% as domestic workers, 
being construction and domestic service concentrated in southern Rio. By the time our 
periodization begins, Rio‘s favelas were thus already present in Rio‘s geography and 
culture, but their imprint in the city would begin to increase dramatically since them.   
In Buenos Aires, villas miserias were not as old as in Rio de Janeiro. 
Nevertheless, a history of irregular settlements stretched back into late nineteenth 
century.
25  
 These settlements localized in Retiro and in the city‘s south, were usually 
temporal or short-term. By then, it was more extended the practice of living in 
overcrowding tenements or housing boards (conventillos and casas de pensión). With the 
increasing industrialization of the city in the 1930s and 1940s, new villas appeared in the 
industrial areas, especially in the suburbs, as extensions of existing working class 
neighborhoods.
 
By the mid 1950s, the number of villas and their residents was relatively 
low especially if compared with Rio: just 1% of the city‘s population and a 2% of the 
overall population in GBA.
26
  The numbers changed markedly in the 1960s and the 1970s 
as a result of the regressive distribution of wealth after the ouster of Perón.  By the late 
1960s, the villa population peaked, hitting a half million residents in GBA alone by the 
end of the decade, almost Rio‘s number for the same period.  If many thought of these 
settlements as logical and even inevitable temporary solution in a structural transition, it 
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would become later clear that they were a more permanent reminder of the social 
inequalities of economic modernization. 
Quantifying the scope of housing stock for the case Buenos Aires and Rio de 
Janeiro is difficult due to inconsistency and lack of standardization of the data as well as 
the changing definitions of household and dwelling in the different censuses. Comparison 
between different historical periods and the disaggregation of statistics were usually done 
by approximation. This was mostly a problem that the own historical actors were well 
aware about almost over the whole period under analysis. International organizations, 
scholars, urban planners, policymakers throughout the Americas complained about the 
lack of reliable and comparable data to understand not only the housing market but also 
most social indicators. In this regard, the standardization of censuses across the region 
was also part of the demands of the OAS and the UN, as part of the attempts to 
modernize Latin American nations. Good planning, the basis for any rational 
development program, required a reliable source of information.
27
  
In Argentina, there were three censuses in the period under consideration: 1947, 
1960, 1970 and each of it have defined ―household‖ and ―dwelling‖ in different ways. 
The 1960 census, for instance, accounted only for occupied dwellings [viviendas 
particulares ocupadas], leaving aside those units that were temporally occupied or 
vacant.
28
 The three censuses sought to account for most of the housing possibilities, 
ranging from the single-family home and apartment buildings to the most substandard 
form of shelter. Yet, the 1960 census considered particular dwellings as ―the combination 
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of one or more rooms, kitchen, and bath exclusively used by an individual or a group of 
people that conformed the ‗census household.‘ What the census left aside was any form 
of collective dwelling –boarding houses (pensiones or inquilinatos) and tenements 
(conventillos)- in which individuals or families shared facilities (bathroom and kitchen). 
It also left aside the villas, ranchos, or any other form of substandard housing that rarely 




 1947 1960 1970 
Capital Federal 763,000 659,000 (680,000)
a
 922,000 




Table 1 - Housing Censuses (1947, 1960, and 1970) – round values.  
(a)
 between brackets the total amount of housing adding the unoccupied units.  
 
 
In 1947, the housing stock was greater in the city than in the outskirts although 
Greater Buenos Aires was growing at a much rapid pace. The total number of rooms was 
1,945,000, the ratio between residents and housing was 3.70, and the ratio between 
residents and rooms was 1.45. In general terms, the 1947 census show for the whole 
nation a situation of overcrowding [Spanish hacinamiento] in which almost three fourths 
of the total population (11.5 million people) lived in dwellings of no more than three 
rooms. For the cluster of people living in one-room homes, the percentage was 3.47 
people per room and 1.92 for the cluster of two and three rooms. In the industrialized 
countries of the West, a ―comfortable‖ proportion was one person per room.   
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In 1960, the total number of private dwellings in the Federal Capital was 680,027, 
while in GBA the figure grew almost twofold from the last census to 961,000. In the city, 
almost the same proportion of residents owned or rented their primary dwelling (almost 
half percent each sector). The rate of homeownership grew significantly compared to the 
17.5% in 1947. Taken together the city and GBA, the ownership grew from 26.8% to 
58.1%.
30
 This expansion was mainly due to the sanctioning of the 1949 Horizontal 
Property Law that allowed for the ownership of separate apartments in multifamily 




Comparing the figures in the Federal Capital it is possible to see a slight decrease 
in the number of individual occupied homes. Yet, the number of rooms increased to 
2,347,000 which might be due to the construction of apartment buildings as well as the 
replacement of older housing for office and corporative buildings in the city‘s center 
(downtown). The 1960 census also showed that the large majority of people (94.5%) 
lived in single-family homes and apartment buildings although an important percentage, 
the remaining 6.7%, lived in substandard housing, including boarding homes, tenements, 
and slums. The index of family composition in 1963 was, according to the National 
Housing Bank, 3.15 people per family.
32
 As a result, there were more than one family 
(1.4) per dwelling, the average number of residents per housing was 4.4 while the 
average number of rooms per dwelling was 3.6, which led to an average of 1.3 people per 
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room -still high. Of course, this quantitative information is based in aggregated figures 
and presents a rather static image of the housing situation.  
The housing stock grew between 1960 and 1970, increasing 39.9% in the city and 
notably 69.5% in GBA. In the latter case, the most significant increase occurred in the 
outer ring, where most of working class dwellings had been recently built. In the case of 
the Federal Capital, the Municipal Housing Commission estimated in late 1969 that the 
housing deficit was at least 182,000 units, 20% of the total housing stock for the city (the 
percentage for the whole nation was in the late 1960s, 32%). One in every five families, 
according to the CMV, shared the same dwelling or lived in substandard conditions. The 
housing deficit affected fundamentally the low-income sectors. In the city of Buenos 
Aires, a fourth of the families in need of housing had no saving capacity and the 
remaining percentage could afford a home only in the long term if given cheap 
mortgages. Of a total deficit of 182,000 the CMV calculated that 120,000 units were the 
result of overcrowding (hacinamiento) while 62,000 the number of families living in 
boarding houses, tenements, and slums. The construction of the housing programs studied 
in this dissertation sought to intervene in the real estate market supplying few of the 
needed dwellings for the lower income sectors.
 33
 
In the case of Rio de Janeiro, the comparison across censuses is more consistent 
than in the Argentine case because there is more continuity in the definitions and 
methodologies. In the particular case of Rio, however, there was a significant 
jurisdictional transformation (the city of Rio became the State of Guanabara in 1960 
when the Federal District moved to Brasília) that altered the organization of the census 
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districts. The census of 1960 only accounted particular dwellings, not collective housing, 
which makes also difficult to determine the number of residents and rooms in boarding 
houses, slums, and other forms of substandard housing. Boarding houses, for instance, 
were considered as apartment building and each room were counted individually. The 
1960 census also surveyed the favelas of Rio de Janeiro, which complements the 




 1920 1940 1950 1960 
Households   434,121 712,767 
Dwellings 128,961 301,701 442,593 708,218 
Particular 125,994 291,149 434,121 708,218 
Collective 2,967 10,552 8,472 N/A 
Table 2 - Households and dwellings in Rio de Janeiro 
* Source: National Censuses.  
 
The housing stock in Rio followed population growth and the expansion of the 
city, particularly in the 1950s and 1960s. As we have seen before, these were the years of 
consolidation of Rio‘s suburbs, especially to the working-class suburbs to the north. It is 
also possible to see an increasing density in areas in the South Zone, particularly 
Copacabana. In 1962, the government of Rio de Janeiro (jurisdictionally the State of 
Guanabara between 1960 and 1975) estimated that around a million people out of 3.5 
million lived in substandard housing.
35
 The housing deficit, according to official 
information, was 200,000 dwellings, including the favela residents and the population of 
the casas de cômodo (boarding houses). Considering that the total population of Rio grew 
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from 2,377,000 (1950) to 3,281,000 (1960) at 3.36% annual rate, the government 
estimated an increase of more than 110,000 people a year. With an average of five 
residents per household, the calculation was that more than 23,500 homes had to be built 
every year just to keep pace with the population growth. In addition, there was also an 
average of 2,000 dwellings bulldozed every year as a result of dilapidation, condemnation 
decrees, public works, and replacement with new construction. In this backdrop, the 
number of new homes that the private market built in those years was around 14,000. As 
a result, there were only 11,000 new dwellings available every year, a number that fell 
short from the 23,500 required. The State projected an increase in the number of housing 
deficit with a rate of 5.7% a year, almost twice the rate of population growth. With this 
scenario in mind, the state considered that more people would live in the favela. For that 
reason, the state considered an intervention in the housing market, especially for the 
lower income sectors, urgent in the early 1960s.  
While these statistics are very useful to size the transformation of Latin American 
cities, particularly Rio and Buenos Aires, they nevertheless present a static image that, 
without further analysis, may understate the dynamic structuration of those social and 
geographical spaces.  
 
City and Housing under Vargas and Perón 
In Brazil and Argentina, the pro-labor governments of Vargas and Perón, 
organized a redistributive model that based on a class alliance that favored the national 
industrial sector and the urban working class through state interventionism. The 




rights, raised the living standards of the popular classes, and allowed upward social 
mobility.
36  
Housing became, for the first time in a massive way, the object of state direct 
intervention abandoning the previous liberal, free-market approach.
37 
In Peron‘s social 
justice agenda, housing became a social right and a constitutive aspect of citizenship in 
the Constitutional Amendment of 1949 that sanctioned the ―right to a home‖ for the 
working population.
38
 Between 1946 and 1955, but especially during the economic 
bonanza of the first presidential term (1946-52), public housing construction reached 
unprecedented levels: 5,000 units in single-detached homes and apartment buildings.  
Additionally, indirect actions also sought to regulate the mortgage and housing market by 
capitalizing the National Mortgage Bank (Banco Hipotecario Nacional; BHN) with state 
funds, loosening its lending policies, granting rent control laws, freezing rent prices, and 
sanctioning the Horizontal Property Law that allowed the subdivision of property in 
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apartment buildings in 1949.
39  
This more active role of the state gave many working-
class families the opportunity to achieve their dream of the ―casa propia‖ 
(homeownership) for the first time.  
In Brazil, Vargas did not establish housing as part of the estadonovista 
Constitution (1937-1945) but his government was the first in assuming a more active role 
in this field at the federal level.  Public officials, industrialists, and businessmen linked 
the housing question with the productivity of the nation, which required state action. As 
Roberto Simonsen, Brazil‘s most influential industrialist, pointed out in 1942, housing 
was  
…A problem of difficult situation for the simple private initiative, because in a 
country were capital is scarce and expensive and where the average purchasing 
power is so low we cannot expect private enterprise to come on a scale sufficient to 
meet the needs of the mass providing them with economic housing. The problem of 
housing in large populous cities becomes a matter of urban planning (urbanismo), 
subordinated to the needs of individual, social, technical, demographic, and 





Simonsen‘s characterization of the housing problem represented a point of 
inflection among ruling elites about the role of housing in the modernization of Latin 
American societies.  
Vargas‘s main initiatives in the area of housing were the Lei do Inquilinato (1942; 
tenancy law) that froze rents and established rent control; the subsidization of housing 
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production through the Institutos de Aposentadoria e Previdência (IAPs; Retirement and 
Pension Institutes); and the creation of the Fundação da Casa Popular (Popular Housing 
Foundation) that made possible the financing of real estate operations.
41
 [Chapter 3 
describes this process in more detail] These policies were somewhat similar to those 
applied in Argentina during Perón‘s administration and sought to reduce the cost of rents 
in the purchasing power of working families.  
Yet, as Bonduki pointed out for the Brazilian case, it would be wrong to 
characterize Vargas‘ housing policy as a systematic and coherent program to cope with 
the critical needs for dwelling. As it was also the case in Argentina, the lack of a well-
structured strategy and the lack of adequate legislation and the institutional framework to 
coordinate all the areas involved in the planning and execution of housing resulted in the 
overlapping of authorities that offered different, conflicting solutions. In addition, Vargas 
and Perón‘s policies targeted the formal working class and state employees, leaving 
unattended an important (and growing) social sector of non-unionized or temporary 
workers. As a result, while the State assumed large-scale housing policies for the first 
time, the efforts remained short in relation to the needs of the most poor who kept 
engrossing favelas and villas miserias.  
Yet, the impact of populist politics in the urban space was not only confined to the 
realm of housing. Varguismo and Peronismo became the political expression and the 
class identity of the workers, the poor, and the dispossessed. As part of the political ritual, 
these regimes mobilized crowds of workers into public demonstrations taking over the 
city‘s streets and public spaces, making visible this urban ―other:‖ the masses that lived 
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in the periphery and in the hills. In Buenos Aires, the political mobilization of the 
working class occupying the public space and performing their identity in the streets to 
support their political leader signified, as Daniel James has pointed out, ―a clear political 
content [that] represented a symbolic subversion of accepted codes of behavior and 
deference for the working class.‖
42
 Middle and upper class porteños (denonym for the 
resident of Buenos Aires) reacted with horror and surprise to the presence of this urban 
―other,‖ calling them derogatorily ―cabecitas negras‖ (literally ―black heads,‖ a term used 
to mark the earth-colored faces of the recent migrants). This term that stressed their 
visible earthed colored faces reproduced a racist bias that targeted the ethnic and 
countryside origins of these Indian descendants, whose presence in the city challenged 
the imaginary of Buenos Aires as the ―Paris of South America.‖  Metaphors of enclosure 
and feelings of being seized by bestial popular forces showed social and spatial anxieties 
in literature, as it was the case in Jorge Luis Borges and Adolfo Bioy Casares‘ short story 
―La fiesta del monstruo‖ or Julio Cortázar, ―Casa tomada‖ (A House Taken Over; 1951).  
As Laura Podalsky has argued, ―In these stories, the city becomes the space of the 
unknowable, threatening ‗other‘: and the locus of an epistemological crisis.‖
43
 Villas 
miserias appeared depicted in literature and film; Bernardo Verbitsky‘s book Villa 
Miseria también es América (1957) and Fernando Birri‘s film Tire Dié (Spare me a 
Dime, 1956/57) were almost sociological works that carefully narrated the situation of 
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the poor residents of the villa while Lucas Demare‘s Detrás de un Largo Muro (1958) 
represented them with the language of Italian realism.
44
  
In Brazil, middle and upper class reaction was perhaps less extreme as working 
classes were less directly defiant of spatial hierarchies.  That did not prevent favelas and 
poor urban residents to become stigmatized by the local press in a series of editorials 
such as those of journalist –and later governor of the State of Guanabara- Carlos Lacerda 
in the journal Correio da Manhã under the title ―The Battle of Rio‖ by.  In a series of 
articles, Lacerda denounced the politics of Varguismo and the manipulation and 
perpetuation of misery and desperation of favelados by greedy local bosses and national 
politicians. For that reason, the ―Battle of Rio‖ called for a social action in the favelas as 
a social duty to ―rescue‖ slum residents out of the ―pernicious‖ influence of populist 
leaders and agitators of ―foreign ideologies.‖  In addition, the Catholic Church also began 
to react with alarm to the popularity that the Communist Party received in municipal 
elections after the lifting of the political ban in a moment of increasing the anxiety about 
favela politics in 1947. The organization of the Fundação Leão XIII, named after Pope 
Leo XIII –the author of the encyclical Rerum Novarum- allowed the Church to settle in 
favelas to Christianize and discipline the poor. [See Chapter 3]  
In this way, as Dulce Chaves Pandolfi and Mário Grynszpan have pointed out, 
favelas came to ―gain visibility and attention, constantly occupying significant space in 
the media, constituting a recurring theme of discussions.‖ The mentioning of favelas 
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―produced, automatically, an effect of recognition and assent. This meant not only that 
the term became widely used, but also that its meanings had being shared and 
generalized. Everyone agrees about what a slum is, everyone can see them and clearly 
identify them.‖
45
  For the general public, then, the separation between the ―hill‖ and the 
―asphalt‖ (o morro e o asfalto) was one that divided criminality, disease, promiscuity, 
and immorality from the opposite, represented by the rational and formal city.  Yet, the 
morro came to be romanticized and represented an ambiguous attraction to bohemian 
writers and singers, as favelas became the site of popular culture as symbolized in, for 
instance, samba‘s schools and carnival.  
Therefore, the process of industrialization of Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires that 
picked up since the 1930s slowly altered the spatial and social geography of both cities. 
In the 1940s, this new urban residents, composed mostly of poor rural migrants who 
joined the lower ranks of the working class, became suddenly visible as a result of the 
policies of the welfares state. They managed to access to housing and urban spaces that 
were previously reserved for middle and upper classes. But while the general public and 
certain sectors of the press and the Church reacted with fear and anxiety, social scholars 
began to ask about the nature of this social change. To these scholars, developmentalism 
provided a sense of compromise and a language to explore the scientific clues to inform 
policies to help in the modernization of their countries.  
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Slums and Development in Transnational Networks of Social Sciences  
 
As we have see, the history of housing as a ―problem‖ was certainly not new in 
Latin America by the mid twentieth century and they were actually part of the debate 
about the progress of the nations. Poor urban spaces were scrutinized since the late 
nineteenth century through a moral and sanitary lens, legitimizing police intervention, 
hygienic campaigns, the criminalization and pathologization of poverty and, eventually, 
the bulldozing of tenements and squatter areas. By the 1940s, at the juncture of populist 
politics, industrialization, and urban expansion, political and social elites framed their 
concern about the social and moral (including sexual) living conditions of the popular 
classes as part of the question about the productivity of the nation. State professionals, 
business and industrialists‘ organizations, and welfare administrations conceived of the 
urban household as a civilizing and disciplinizing space in the remaking of the urban 
working class. Industrialists in Brazil promoted vocational training programs, literacy 
campaigns, and social activities in working class neighborhoods to ―modernize‖ the 
worker beyond the limits of the workplace. Colombian textile entrepreneurs attempted to 
fashion the female workers with social and educational programs in consonance with the 
bourgeois moral code of sexual behavior in the 1940s and 1950s. Popular-front leaders in 
Chile reproduced a gendered perception of men as hardworking laborers and women as 
housekeepers and family caregivers as a way to contribute to the health of the popular 
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The housing ―problem‖ gained a new transnational attention in the aftermath of 
World War II. The emergence of a global awareness about the development and 
―progress‖ of humanity brought together international organizations, philanthropic 
agencies, technical experts, policymakers, and social scientists to solve the problems 
associated with poverty and inequality in the Third World.
 
Nations and peoples became 
aware of their shared interests and objectives and of the potentialities of combining and 
joining collective efforts and resources through transnational cooperation.
47
 They shared 
a universalizing understanding of the world and contributed in the production of a 
knowledge that minimized unbridgeable difference in favor of comparability, 
standardization, and global applicability. The UN and the OAS built much of the 
organizational infrastructure to deal with all these different aspects of poverty, whether 
from a technical perspective or promoting research. In Latin America, this new 
transnational moment prompted Pan-American exchanges, materialized in an increasing 
and overlapping number of ―contact zones‖ that covered most of the aspects of social life. 
Housing, in this backdrop, became scrutinized under a more technical gaze that 
ultimately decomposed the problem in a myriad of specific issues. If experts and 
policymakers in the field of urban planning insisted that their actions be taken in the 
broad names of development and modernization, they nonetheless developed an 
understanding of the housing problem that was piecemeal and fractured.
48
 [Chapter 2] 
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In the postwar geography of power, development became a universal language 
that framed the understanding of how to alleviate poverty and impulse underdeveloped 
nations into a path of economic growth and social change.
 
As Frederick Cooper and 
Randal Packard have argued, it ―appealed as much to leaders of ‗underdeveloped‘ 
societies as to the people of developed countries, and it gave citizens in both categories a 
share in the intellectual universe and in the moral community that grew up around the 
world-wide development initiative of the post-World War II era.‖
49 
The development 
discourse thus allowed for a universalistic operation that equated Latin America with 
Africa or Asia. Latin America became part of the underdeveloped world.
50
 This 
universalizing understanding of the world civilizations was part of the aftermath of the 
world and the awareness among social scientists about the horrific consequences of racist 
thinking. Rather than races, scholars and international organizations became concerned 
about the ―evolution‖ of humanity, understood now as one human race. Underplaying 
difference in favor of common features, scientific knowledge emphasized comparison, 
standardization, and global applicability.
51  Particular explanations about the functioning 
of individual societies in circumscribed historical contexts were now assumed to have a 
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general and global validity for the rest of the world. U.S. functionalism and 
modernization theory, in the aftermath of the war, became highly influential as 
international organizations and philanthropic agencies promoted research in the whole 
globe, validating many of those assumptions.  
Since the 1950s, Latin American social scientists turned their attention to explain 
the social and political problems of the era of mass society. These were the years of the 
scientific renovation of the social sciences in the region that proposed to learn about 
societies through careful empirical observation as a departure to the traditional 
philosophical/speculative approach of the past.
52 
Scholars focused on the study of such 
topics as social mobility, the transformation of the social structure and the system of 
stratification, the consequences of massive migration, urbanization, and marginalization, 
and political participation. The urban space became one of the privileged loci of inquiry 
as it condensed most of the issues at stake in the modernization of the region. Certainly, 
this does not mean that the ―urban‖ dominated the social sciences research agenda as 
rural issues were still very important, especially in a context when agrarian reform was 
becoming a hot topic for scholars, policymakers, and radical politics. Yet, even 
anthropology, a science related in Latin America to the study of peasant, indigenous 
communities, was very much influenced by questions about the question about the 
disruptive effects of modernization and the urban, modern way of life. In the city, but 
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especially in working class neighborhoods –and even more particularly in the slums-
sociologists sought to understand the presence of that dual society
.53 
 
In those years, scholars like Germani, L.A. Costa Pinto, Jose Medina Echavarría, 
Pablo González Casanovas, and Albert Hirschman, among others, pushed for the 
construction of an inter-American community of scholars based on research collaboration 
and exchange programs. International organizations and philanthropic agencies 
sponsored these research projects in the region and supported the creation of intellectual 
hubs for Latin American scholars in the late 1950s and 1960s, including the Facultad 
Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO; Latin American School of Social 
Sciences) in Santiago, Chile (1957) and the Centro Latinoamericano de Investigación en 
Ciencias Sociales (CLAPCS; Latin American Center for Social Science Research; 1958) 
in Rio de Janeiro.
54
 In those years, UNESCO, the OAS, and CLAPCS supported the Four 
City Study, a joint research project on social mobility and stratification in Santiago, 
Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro, and Montevideo, which included Germani.
55  
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In July 1959, UNESCO, the UN Bureau of Social Affairs, and ECLA organized 
the seminar on urbanization problems in Latin America, held in Santiago, Chile. The 
meeting was part of a series of regional symposia that UNESCO had been organizing on 
the impact of urbanization in the ―underdeveloped‖ world that included Africa (1954) and 
Asia and the Far East (1956).
56
  As mentioned in the introduction of the chapter, the 
conference‘s objectives to produce research and knowledge on the urban situation to be 
used in the formulation of public policy as well as to promote the internationalization of 
social sciences, the development of research centers, and the establishment of standards 
of comparability for the region, which speaks about the relationship between the urban 
and the transnationalization of social sciences. Among the participants were key 
sociologists of the Americas who presented their research conducted in slums of Latin 
America: Germani in the villa miseria of Isla Maciel, José Matos Mar in barriadas of 
Lima, Andrew Pearse in favelas of Rio de Janeiro, and Juarez Rubens Brandão Lopes in 
São Paulo‘s working class neighborhoods.
 They
 identified a series of pressing issues in 
Latin American urbanization that included massive rural-to-urban migration; housing 
shortages, especially for the lower income groups; the presence of ―traditional‖ co-
existing with ―industrial‖ patterns of behavior; the character of the integration, 
acculturation, and assimilation of the individual to modern urban living; social 
disorganization, delinquency, crime, mental illness, and alcoholism; low productivity; 
problems of health, nutrition, literacy, lack of labor skills; political immaturity and 
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apathy; and the role of the family and the community as a pivotal unit of socialization. 
The meeting became a point of encounter of different circuits and networks of knowledge 
that had began to emerge in the 1950s. In all these venues, the 1959 seminar became an 
exceptional event for the assemblage of personalities and ideas as well as a point in the 
larger spectrum of activities, exchanges, and figures that came to redefine the urban –and 
within it the housing- ―problem.‖  
The conference‘s initial document, which set the tone for rest of the encounter, 
put the city (the town) at the center of modern life, and defined it as a positive social 
force ―whose influence is capable of affecting human ways in the most widely various 
ways.‖ The idea of the city as a ―generator of change,‖ a space of creation, change, and 
innovation posited an urban biased that relegated the ―rural‖ to a static, traditional past. It 
also offered an alternative interpretation of the city as a space of pathology. The city was 
thus the locus where ―the psycho-social aspect of urban culture manifests itself in a new 
type of personality, that is, in a class of human beings with special attitude towards the 
world and his relations with the rest of mankind.‖
57
 The arrival of countrymen into the 
city had created the coexistence of a dual society. Or, as Matos Mar put it more 
concretely in his research on the barriadas of Lima, ―The migrants who come to settle at 
Lima, preferably in the barriadas, bring with them their traditional way of life and have 
to face an urban existence that proceeds at a different pace. The contrast between two 
ways of life leads to serious conflicts which are reflected in mental, social and economic 
maladjustment that militates against satisfactory integration.‖ In a dichotomous view, 
scholars found on the one side, ―the receptive attitude to foreigners, the emotional 
detachment and the capacity for abstract thought which are typical of the town-dweller;‖ 
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on the other side ―the xenophobia, the strong emotional ties and the directly concrete 
habits of thought which are characteristic of the countryman, and which make it difficult 
for him to adapt himself quickly to the stereotyped and impersonal relationship of the big 
city.‖
58
 As a result, the urban personality became associated with change and innovation, 
key conditions for development, while the rural one represented, by definition, the 
opposite.  
In this rationale, the widespread emergence of slums and squatter settlements 
represented a rural ―enclave‖ in the city, an obstacle to the chances of development and 
modernization. For Hauser slums were ―perhaps the most serious problem of urban 
areas‖ as ―they dramatize the acute character of the housing problem in Latin American 
cities and reveal some of the worst physical and social consequences of poverty and the 
low level of living.‖
59
 For Andrew Pearse, the favela house was ―indeed a house of the 
rustic type, being nothing more nor less than the intrusion, into the interstices of an urban 
system of life, of rural standards of housing…‖
60
 By portraying the precarious slum 
houses as reproductions of the rural home into an urban setting, these scholars interpreted 
the external environment (and its deficiencies), influencing the internal qualities and life-
styles of the poor. In this sense, a modern home located in an urbanized neighborhood 
could impact positively in the life of the poor resident.  
Slums, therefore, became the loci of tradition, rural ways of life, and personal and 
collective disorganization that limited the full release of social, cultural, and productive 
forces for the full development of Latin American nations. As Frank Bonilla put it in 
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1961 studying Rio‘s favelas, they where ―the rural slum within the city.‖
61
 Or as Adrián 
Gorelik pointed out more recently, they represented the ―village‖ (aldea) in the city. It is 
in this way that we argue that the housing ―problem‖ was central to the problem of 
urbanization, prompting social scientists to study these places.
62
 In so doing, these 
scholars located difference within the limits of the nation and the city instead of focusing 
on the relationship between the underdeveloped Third World (the periphery) and the First 
World (the center). As Karin Rosemblatt, points out, this is part of the discussions among 
anthropologists in the 1950s about the notion of internal colonialism.
63
 
The concerns and assumptions of functionalism and modernization theory framed 
the general spirit of the conference in Chile although, as we will see, the papers presented 
began to question the general validity of its basic principles. In the 1950s, U.S. 
sociologists began to test their understanding of the urbanization process by transcending 
their national border.
64 
Modernization theory provided a particular interpretation of the 
world whose generalizations served the U.S. to self-identify as the ultimate form of 
modernity and democracy, promoting a foreign policy and international research agenda 
that reified these assumptions.65  In the minds of modernization theorists, the fairly 
linear path to modernity was a transition from ―traditionalism‖ and ―backwardness‖ to 
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modernity and democracy which followed the normative model of Western, industrial 
nations. Industrialization, secularization, specialization, social differentiation, and 
achievement, were the central features that defined an ideal modern society.  To unleash 
the economic, technological, material, and natural forces necessary to the advancement of 
capitalism in the underdeveloped world was not just a matter of foreign economic and 
technical assistance but also of the promotion of a whole set of values, behaviors, and 
attitudes compatible with modern industrial and (urban) life. Urbanization, 
industrialization, and modernization, in this model, became almost interchangeable terms.  
Bert Hoselitz, a modernization theorist and a specialist on cultural and 
technological conditions for industrial development in underdeveloped nations, asked in 
an articled titled ―The Role of Cities in the Economic Growth of Underdeveloped 
Countries‖ (1953), ―To what extent is the growth of an urban culture in underdeveloped 
countries a vehicle for changing the values and beliefs of the society so as to make it 
more inclined to accept economic growth?‖
66
  From Weber to Talcott Parsons and W.W. 
Rostow, Hoselitz associated each economic stage with a particular social and cultural 
structure and defined a research agenda to study ―the mechanisms by which the social 
structure of an underdeveloped country becomes altered and takes on the features which 
characterize economically advanced countries.‖
67
 For modernization theorists like 
Hoselitz or Everett Hagan, among others, Latin American cities lacked the socio-cultural 
conditions that had made possible the modernizing potential of European and American 
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urban centers in the past. There, according to Hoselitz, rural migrants ―soon found new 
homes and loyalties in the city,‖ while ―their modern counterparts in underdeveloped 
countries continue ‗belonging‘ to their places of origin. The city remains strange to them 
and forces to seek out as associated persons from their own kinship group or region. 
Patterns of co-operation, authority and responsibility are fashioned upon rural models 
rather than upon those of the Western City.‖
68
 It was in the expansion of European and 
US cities that entrepreneurial middle classes assumed the risks of industrial innovation 
and technological investment contributing to the formation and expansion of capitalism, a 
feature that, according to this perspective, was lacking in Latin America.  
For modernization theorists, then, cities occupied a central place as they 
represented ―the main force and the chief locus for the introduction of new ideas and new 
ways of doing things,‖ and where ―adaptation to new ways, new technologies, new 
consumption and production patterns, and new social institutions is achieved.‖
69
 
Likewise, the author argued that ―commerce, financial institutions, industrial 
establishments, governmental bureaucracies, and advanced educational and intellectual 
training facilities all require an urban climate to develop and flourish.‖
70
 By exploring 
moral and social psychological aspects it was possible to understand the kind of 
―adaptations‖ to modern values and habits that could lead to the development of a 
modern society and ―the degree to which the changed cultures of the urban centers affects 
the surrounding ‗sea‘ of traditional folk-like ways of life.‖
71 
 Therefore, these scholars 
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placed a strong emphasis on culture and behavior and localized in the cities the values 
associated with industrialism, democracy, specialization, and political moderation.  
Hoselitz was building upon previous studies on the differences in social structure 
and cultural relations in different types of societies as explored in the dichotomies 
between tradition-oriented patterns of social actions and those of purposive rationality 
(Max Weber), the contrast between ―community‖ and ―society‖ (Ferdinad Toennies), and 
the folk-urban continuum (Robert Redfield).
72
 Since the 1920s, the Chicago School of 
Sociology had been bridging the concern about the impact of modernity and capitalism of 
the German and French intellectuals to the analysis of the constitution of a complex urban 
society like Chicago.
73
 It was Louis Wirth who synthesized the assumptions of the 
Chicago School in his classic work ―Urbanism as a Way of Life‖ (1938) where he 
distinguished between the concepts of ―urbanization‖ and ―urbanism.‖ The first term 
referred to the increasing proportion of the world‘s population residing in cities and the 
physical expansion of such agglomerations, stressing urban ecology variables. Urbanism 
was a ―way of life,‖ defined as ―a set of attitudes and ideas, and a constellation of 
personalities engaging in typical forms of collective behavior and subject to characteristic 
mechanisms of social control.‖
74
 The characteristics of urban life were isolation, 
functional specialization, secularization, mobility, competition, instability, and insecurity.  
Family and kinship ties vanished in cities making human relations impersonal, 
superficial, transitory, segmental, and utilitarian.  If not contained by social organizations 
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or by welfare policies, urbanism could impact negatively in the individual personality and 
behavior, leading to situations of personal disorganization, mental breakdown, suicide, 
delinquency, crime, corruption, and disorder. Meanwhile, the rural (folk) way of life was 
defined in contrast to the urban way.  
It was cultural anthropologist Robert Redfield who explored the folk life, studying 
the impact of modern life in Tepoztlán, a Mexican peasant village.
75  
Redfield took from 
Park, his father-in-law and intellectual reference, the notion that cities exerted their 
modernizing influence into their hinterlands, asking about the forces that made for 
cultural stability and integration. From there, Redfield elaborated his theory of cultural 
change in a continuum from small rural villages to large cities: the folk-urban continuum. 
For Redfield, the cityward progression operated a gradual breakdown of traditional 
forms, for instance, of familial organization or kinship ties to forms of social relations 
similar to the ones described by Wirth. Characterizing the urban environment as a place 
of social anomy, Redfield‘s view of the city was negative. 
By 1950, U.S. cultural anthropology began to turn their ethnographic work about 
the social integration of ―non-Western‖ communities into urban environments. In his 
presidential address to the American Anthropological Association, titled ―Urbanism, 
Urbanization, and Acculturation,‖ Ralph Beals challenged his colleagues to follow 
sociologists in the study of the modification of human behavior, culture, assimilation or 
acculturation to urban life.
76
 According to him, U.S. sociologists had paid more attention 
to urbanization (urban growth) than to urbanism (way of life), but the anthropologist was 
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better equipped to understand the urban ―others.‖ This urban ―other‖ for Beals could be 
the Native American, African American, or poor whites that moved to the North 
American city as well as the rural peasants and the indigenous population living in Latin 
American urban centers. As he pointed out, ―We believe there are common factors which 
link together the processes taking place among the peoples of Yucatán, or such Indian 
group as the Tarascans, the immigrant Mexicans in Southern California, the rural 
southern Negro or white moving into an urban setting, or the Iowa or Kansas farm family 




Oscar Lewis was working precisely in the direction that Beals had 
suggested. In 1952, he had published ―Urbanization Without Breakdown: A Case Study‖ 
where he challenged Redfield‘s notion of the folk-urban continuum by exploring the 
changes in the habits, attitudes, and system of values of Tepoztecan individuals and 
families who moved from rural Mexico to the Federal City. Lewis worked with families 
of rural origin who settled in the vecindades of Mexico City (an equivalent of American 
tenements). It was precisely in these places where Lewis later localized in 1959 a distinct 
culture of the poor–the ―culture of poverty,‖ a notion that would become a subject of 
intellectual controversy in the 1960s.
78
 
Lewis initially found that modern urban life did not bring ―personal 
maladjustment, breakdown of family life, decline of religion, and increase of 
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delinquency‖ as Wirth and Redfield had predicted.
79
 On the contrary, Lewis saw little 
evidence of family disorganization in the city and proved that family ties and kinship 
rather than an element of tradition actually provided cohesiveness and stability in the city. 
This evidence contrasted with the harshness that Lewis noted for the U.S. farm families 
that had migrated to urban America. In so doing, Lewis was not only challenging the 
influential folk-urban continuum but was also alerting U.S. scholars about the risks of 
taking as universals generalizations that were too grounded in the U.S. experience. As 
Hauser noted the urbanization process for Lewis was not ―a simple, unitary, universally 
similar process, but that it assumes different forms and meanings, depending upon the 
prevailing historic, economic, social, and cultural conditions.‖
80
  
By the time Lewis was working in the discussion of the folk-urban continuum and 
some of the assumptions of the Chicago School, he was part of the Social Science 
Research Council (SSRC) Committee on Urbanization (1958-1965). This committee, 
directed by Hauser, gathered a multidisciplinary group of U.S. recognized experts 
charged with the task to review the assumptions and generalizations regarding 
urbanization and, especially, their applicability to ―other cultures and areas‖ in order to 
formulate a research agenda for the future. Most of the committee members had also 
participated in a special issue on ―World Urbanism,‖ that Hauser had organized in 1955 
for the American Journal of Sociology.
81
 That issue recognized that the increasing 
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knowledge on urbanization of non-Western societies represented an effort to reconsider 
the past generalizations of American sociology. During the SSRC committee, Hauser and 
Lewis worked revising Redfield‘s model and shared a concern about going too far in 
generalizing it to the study of the urbanization process abroad. The debates around 
Redfield‘s folk-urban continuum and Lewis‘ criticism of it, as Gorelik has indicated, 
framed the discussions on the urbanization of Latin America in the period under 
consideration.
82
 These debates and conversations, which circulated through transnational 
networks of scholarship, framed the general tone and the individual papers introduced at 
the ECLA meeting in Chile.  
Most of the research presented at the conference agreed on underlying the 
structural socio-economic origins of poor housing conditions. For Matos Mar, ―various 
factors, which are generally representative of defects in the economic and social structure 
of the nation as a whole, have given rise to colonies of dwellings that are known by 
different names but are, as a rule, fairly similar.‖
83
  For Pearse, Rio‘s favelas were even 
economic responses to the impossibility of poor migrant families to afford to own or rent 
a house in a context of a growing gap between living and building costs, estate values, 
and poor wages. In that sense, the favela was functional, as it ―performs an inevitable and 
essential function in the relation between the urban, industrial and rich sector, and the 
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This understanding was not totally new in the late 1950s, but it was indicative of 
the degree of consensus among scholars in explaining slums as a consequence of poverty. 
For instance, Raul Prebisch, ECLA‘s leading figure, explained the expansion of slums as 
the result of the unequal pattern of growth in the region, a characterization that would 
become increasingly generalized in the 1960s,
 
An appreciable proportion of the increase in the active population is not properly 
absorbed in the production process: economic development passes it by. This is 
mainly true of the population that moves from the country areas to the towns… 
This must inevitably happen in the process of economic development, but what is 
not inevitable is the fate of such people. Far from achieving integration in city 
life, and sharing in better patterns of living, they put up their wretched shanty 
towns and eke out a hand to mouth existence in a whole wide range of ill-paid 
personal services, with periods of out-and-out unemployment. Thus, poverty, 
frustration and resentment surge in from the country to the towns where the 
symptoms of the concentration of income are already so conspicuous. This is 
clear proof of explosive social polarization of development, imputable to its 




This framing of poverty and slums as the result of the contradictions of capitalist 
accumulation implied a departure in Latin American scholarship from explanations 
focused on internal ―pathological‖ traits of the poor. In addition, this implied a difference 
with U.S. scholarship that would increasingly look at their own segregated urban spaces 
with racist underpinnings hidden in culturalist and behaviorist assessments of poor 
African American families.
86
 Both explanations would nevertheless coexist but the fact 
that scholars began to paid attention to broader socio-structural conditions is indicative of 
the shift in the characterization of the housing problem in Latin America.  
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At the conference, Germani presented provisional results on his research 
undertaken between July 1957 and February 1958 in Isla Maciel.
87
 In the late 1950s, 
there were two differentiated zones at Maciel: the urbanized area populated by city-born 
families and migrants who had arrived by the late 1930s and early 1940s, who lived in 
modest houses of wood or corrugated iron (conventillos), and Villa Maciel, the slum, 
consisting of rudimentary huts in a squatter settlement with no urban services. Germani 
found out that most of the residents of the villa were recent migrants (no longer than 
fifteen years) of rural origins that came from the provinces of Argentine‘s littoral region. 
To assess patterns of social disorganization and degree of adaptation to the urban culture, 
Germani followed Redfield‘s indicators to compare migrants and city-born residents. The 
sociologist divided the population into five different groups according to average length 
and place of residence (the villa or the urbanized area) and date of migration to GBA. As 
Gorelik has pointed out, this analytical division allowed Germani to reproduce Redfield‘s 
stages of the folk-urban continuum in Maciel‘s social composition.
88
 According to 
Germani, each of these areas showed differences in terms of ownership of the land, of the 
dwelling, the building material used, flooring, and the utilities provided –water, 
sewerage, electricity.  
In his study, Germani‘s concluded that Maciel‘s slum residents were the less able 
to integrate into urban life, as suggested by the analysis of people‘s formal and informal 
participation in voluntary associations (social clubs, local communities, unions) and the 
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consumption of mass media (newspapers, magazines, and radio) ―through which migrants 
may be brought into contact with different aspects of the life of the city and of society as 
a whole.‖ The study concluded that the villa residents did not belong to local 
associations, and very few had connection with local clubs. Membership to trade unions 
and mutual societies, when happened, did not implied political compromise. In terms of 
social organization, Germani localized in the villas a ―tendency towards the 
accumulation‖ of ―demoralizing factors‖ that, for him, were not only the result of 
economic difficulties and primitive housing conditions but also ―of the factors which 
arise from the inclination of individuals already on the fringe of normal behavior, or 
partly disintegrated, to gather there.‖
89
 The mechanisms of social control were weak 
although Germani saw in the kinship group around the nuclear family a source of a 
limited but still vital stabilizing influence. The process of ―cultural assimilation‖ thus had 
a simultaneous and ―somewhat paradoxical‖ effect of ―knitting some families together 
and disorganizing others,‖ the same kind of tension that Lewis found in Mexico. Still, 
social disorganization and disintegration was more pronounced among the recent 
migrants who lived in the slum while older residents showed higher levels of assimilation 
and integration. Nevertheless, he found a more complex and ambiguous picture that the 
one suggested by Redfield. ―The idea that families in rural and highly urbanized areas 
exhibit a greater degree of stability and attachment to the traditional family values,‖ 
argued Germani, ―clearly cannot be applied without reservation to these groups…It is 
therefore a rather complicated matter to determine the ‗impact‘ of the city on groups of 
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The presence of familiar institutions or religious belief was, then, seen less as 
elements of disruption –or the continuation of tradition and rural habits- that could limit 
integration. They rather ―functioned‖ as institutions that facilitated adaptation and 
provided stability. Matos Mar, for instance, argued that, ―…when their structure is 
examined, the barriadas and the trade unions are likewise compensating factors which 
alleviate the social and economic problems of the inhabitants. However, it is always the 
family which provides the greatest source of security for the inhabitants of these areas. 
Even when very unsettled and living in overcrowding conditions, the family is always the 
mainstay of its members."  
In this way, scholars like Germani or Matos Mar, arrived to similar conclusions of 
those of Lewis for the Mexican case in which families and kin groups proved ―very little 
evidence of family disorganization in the city.‖
91
 As Richard Morse pointed out few years 
later, ―the point is not that rural or familial institutions are indefinitely preserved, or 
precisely duplicated, in the Latin American city. It is, rather, that the utilization and 
adaptation of such forms are a necessary alternative in the near-absence of mechanisms 
for the rapid assimilation of migrants into the urban milieu.‖
92
 As Gorelik argues, 
Germani and the rest of the participants in the Santiago seminar shared the intention to 
demonstrate that this population, rather than marginal and pathological, was becoming 
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In contextualizing the origins of slums as the result of structural economic forces 
and showing that modern urban life in Latin America actually implied the adaptation of 
―traditional‖ institutions such as religious beliefs and kinship links, these scholars 
allowed for the questioning of the ethnocentric attitude behind the universalizing 
aspirations of the functionalist paradigm of modernization theory and opened the 




Slums and the Politics of Populism in the Dual City 
 
Slums also represented for those scholars the opportunity to understand the 
political process in Latin America and the support that popular sectors gave to populism, 
questions that were directly related with the formation of stables democracies and a more 
responsible citizenship. As we have mentioned, for modernization theorists at the height 
of the Cold War, the question about the modernization of underdeveloped societies was 
not only related to the expansion of capitalism. It was also a way to promote political 
participation and modern citizenship, understood as the exercise of political responsibility 
with moderation. Democracy and economic development were considered part of the 
same process.
95
 It is in this sense that more modernity would ward off any totalitarian 
threat.  
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Germani and Pearse were writing in contexts where the communist threat in 
Brazil and Argentina was not yet a source of real anxiety. It was rather the populist past 
and the authoritarian experiences what worried these scholars the most. Among 
Germani‘s central preoccupations was the massive support that the popular classes had 
given to Perón, a leader that Germani saw as very close to the ideal-type of a charismatic 
authoritarian leader. As a social scientist advocated to the study of social life, an Italian 
citizen who had to emigrate from Mussolini‘s regime, and as a humanist worried with the 
horrors of Fascism and Nazism, the sociologist needed to explain what he saw as the 
exceptionality of Argentine society. Different from Italy, where the middle classes 
backed Mussolini, in Argentina the working classes supported massively Perón. The 
striking thing for Germani is that this occurred in a country whose social structure and 
economy was among the most advanced in the region. For Germani, this was the result of 
the particular character of the industrialization and urbanization process and the social 
structure between mid-1930s and mid-1940s.
96 
 
The emergence of the Argentine modern national state in the late nineteenth 
century contributed to the economic modernization of the country and the transformation 
of the social structure in a process that was controlled by traditional ―oligarchies‖ of 
Buenos Aires who monopolized the political power. In this perspective, the city‘s social 
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dynamism contrasted with the lack of it countryside. The implicit assumption was that the 
countryside did not develop a modern middle class of consumers that could contribute to 
a stable process of democratization, as allegedly was the case in the United States. In 
addition, this economically modern but politically conservative elites that rule Argentina 
from 1880 and 1916, and the frustrated attempts of democratic governments between 
1916 and 1930 to incorporate popular classes to the political game, led to frustration and 
provide a fertile ground for the emergence of authoritarian governments in the 1930s. 
Thus, Germani, as many others, saw a disequilibrium between a developed littoral 
(leaded by Buenos Aires) and an underdeveloped interior, whose ―consequences…were 
evident by the middle of the century.‖
97 
 
The new wave of industrialization and the agricultural crisis of the 1930s 
triggered the massive rural migration to the cities. Germani characterized this process as 
―An exodus en masse, by which vast layers of people from the underdeveloped zones—
masses until that moment completely outside the bounds of the political life of the 
country- were established in the large cities and particularly in Buenos Aires.‖
98
  For 
Germani, the inability of Argentine political system to incorporate and give expression to 
the material needs and the sentiments of the popular masses left them in a ―state of 
‗availability‘‖ (disponibilidad), ―making them an element inclined to be exploited 
through whatever happenstance might offer them some form of participation.‖
99
  The 
emergence of the Peronism in 1946, born within a nationalist sector of the military that 
took power with a coup in 1943, capitalized those ―available masses‖ by appealing to 
their needs. The cultural and behavioral attitudes of these masses of recent migrants, for 
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Germani, responded to the ideal-types prescribed by Weber or Redfield: emotion, 
religiosity and magical thinking, family and clan loyalties. In this interpretation, these 
masses had been already exposed in the countryside to the authority and charisma of the 
caudillo since the independence. As these masses arrived to the city, the incomplete 
transition and acculturation to urban life made them more receptive to the kind of 
political mobilization that Perón represented. 
By the time Germani was reaching these conclusions and conducting his research 
at Maciel, in the beginning of Frondizi‘s desarrollista administration, he expressed that 
feeling of living at a historical crossroad when he claimed that ―the incorporation of all 
social strata into national political life within a democracy functioning in an effective 
manner and based on the respect of political and social rights summarizes in itself the 
history of the present and of the immediate future in Argentina.‖
100 
 It is in that sense, that 
we can understand the contrast that Germani identified between the family ―atmosphere‖ 
of Isla Maciel‘s urbanized area, where there was a ―greater degree of friendliness‖ and 
more ―co-operative and democratic behavior,‖ and the ―authoritarian‖ atmosphere present 
in the villa, despite the element of cohesiveness of the kin group.  In identifying that 
―democratic behavior‖ in the working class area, Germani did not demonize the working 
class –as other liberal sectors were doing- and, on the contrary, saw a potential basis for a 
democratic maturity.   
As it happened in Argentina, social scientists also went to the favelas to explore 
the relationship between populist politics and clientelistic practices through which Vargas 
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In his research, Andrew Pearse identified in the favelado an 
attitude of indifference towards his surroundings or anything beyond the limits of the kin 
group. Despite this attitude, however, the sociologist saw how the favelado negotiated 
certain immediate needs and material improvements with the local boss. It is precisely 
that relationship between the poor urban dweller and the local boss that synthesized, for 
the British scholar, the basis of populist politics in Rio de Janeiro and the reproduction, 
among popular classes, of the notion that the government was a protector. For Pearse, the 
favelado had socialized first in the countryside were he had established relationships of 
subordination and dependency with his patrão (the landowner), ―whose land they had 
cultivated and to whom they had looked for a day‘s work for wages, a house or the right 
to build a house…‖
102  
In coming to the city, the favelado brought with him his 
understanding of the nature of social relationships and the ―inevitability of the boss.‖ 
Still, populist practices represented, for Pearse, an instrumental function as he saw it as 
an agent of ―cultural assimilation‖ and dominant characteristics of Brazilian urban 
culture.  
The exchange of benefits for votes and personal loyalties was a mechanism that 
reproduced itself in every level from the local neighborhood or favela, the municipality, 
the state, to the national level. In this way populist leaders guaranteed his flows of votes 
while cultivating loyalty through personalism and charisma. For Pearse, the condition of 
possibility for such relationship, thus, came from the attitude of the rural migrant that 
arrived to the city predisposed to reproduce a subordinated relationship in his new urban 
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environment. Populism, therefore, although impacted negatively in the quality of 
democracy and citizenship provided, according to Pearse, an element of assimilation as 
―owing to his background and the socio-economic situation which he confronts in the 
city, the in-migrant is easily assimilated into those aspects of city culture…‖ In this sense, 
poor people‘s religiosity and even their fascination for popular games such as the jogo do 
bicho reflected ―his powerlessness greatly to improve or even secure his lot by his own 
and his family‘s endeavors and his habitual hope for the intervention and protection of a 
good patrão, a political leader or a strong saint.‖
103
  
To similar conclusions, although framed from a different perspective, arrived 
sociologist José Arthur Rios and his research team in what became the first and, until 
then, most exhaustive social analysis of Rio‘s slums. In Aspectos Humanos da Favela 
Carioca (Human Aspects of the Carioca Favela; 1960), Rios argued that clientelism was 
possible because the worker failed ―to find in the urban structure the powerful 
organizations of professional and social solidarity which constitute the bulwark of urban 
life in the highly industrialized countries‖ and, therefore, he ―seeks to rebuild his political 
behavior following the guidelines of agrarian patriarchalism. The local ward boss is 
utilized by his higher-ups in the same way the agrarian ‗clan‘ leader once utilized the 
compadre, the authority figure of the extended-family relation.‖
104 
 
Germani and Pearse‘s approaches to the study of populist politics are but two 
examples of the ways in which slums became this particular place where to look for traits 
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of tradition in a context where the forces of modernization were creating a new type of 
personality. Yet, as the next section will show, the work of Rios and his research team 
demonstrates that the new interest on villas and favelas was not the exclusive patrimony 
of modernization theory in the America. Transnationalism implied all kind circuits of 
knowledge. In the case of Brazil, the arrival of Father Lebret‘s social Catholicism 
contributed and deeply influenced the study of favelas.  
 
Économie et Humanism, Social Catholicism, and the study of favelas in Brazil  
 
In 1960, sociologist José Arthur Rios undertook the direction of the study of Rio‘s 
favelas organized by the center for social research that French Dominican social reformer, 
Father Louis-Joseph Lebret (1897-1966) opened in São Paulo. Lebret had founded 
―Économie et Humanism‖ in France in 1941 to study human and social realities and to 
―put back the economy at the service of man‖ challenging the social doctrine of the 
Catholic Church.
105
 Together with French economist François Perroux, a fervent 
opponent of the financial and economic policies of the industrial West to the Third 
World, they embraced a new approach to poor nations influenced by Marxism. In France, 
the movement developed a social research office (SAGMA – Société d‘Analyse 
Graphique et Mécanographique des Agglomérations) and participated in the French Sixth 
Republic through an agreement with the Ministry of Reconstruction to develop urban 
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policy informed by the careful study of the country‘s housing conditions.
106
 Lebret‘s 
interest in the Third World and Latin America in particular came, according to Leme, to 
the difficulties the movement found in the Catholic Church because of the intellectual 
proximity with Marxism. It was through his contact to the Brazilian social situation and 
the Third World, that Lebret became interested in the notion of underdevelopment, 
incorporating it into the movement‘s general understanding of processes of urban spatial 
and social structuration.  
Father Lebret‘s relationship with Brazil began in São Paulo where he organized in 
1947 a socioeconomic research laboratory, SAGMACS (Sociedade de Análises Gráficas 
e Mecanográficas Aplicadas aos Complexos Sociais), devoted to the study of social 
issues.
107  
Those were years of scientific renovation in São Paulo, especially in the social 
sciences. The arrival of U.S. sociologist Donald Pierson and his role in the Department of 
Sociology and Social Anthropology in Universidad de São Paulo meant the incorporation 
of the methodological and theoretical understandings of the School of Chicago, from 
where Pierson was coming. But the French influence was also significant with the 
presence of Roger Bastide and Claude Levi Strauss as it was the impulse that UNESCO 
gave to social research on the topic of race relations.
108
  
Lebret‘s involvement in Rio de Janeiro began during Lebret‘s second trip to 
Brazil in 1952 where he coordinated a social research project about living conditions in 
thirty-four Brazilian cities commissioned by Josué de Castro in the Comissão de Bem 
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Estar Social (Social Welfare Commission).
109
 In Rio, he got in contact with Dom Helder 
Camêra, a carioca priest who had been working with and was socially committed to the 
situation of the poor. He actually developed the Cruzada São Sebastião, an early housing 
development undertaken by the Church for the residents of Praia do Pinto, the favela 
located next to the Lagoa Rodrigo Freitas in the coveted neighborhood of Leblon [See 
Chapter 3]. Camêra had expressed to Lebret the importance of conducting a 
comprehensive and serious social study of Rio‘s favelas, a scientific analysis based on 
social surveys whose results would, in addition, provide evidence to support claims about 
state actions in this area. In 1958, O Estado de São Paulo, whose director Julio Mesquita 
was an opponent of President Kubitscheck, asked Father Lebret to organize the a 
SEGMACS local office in Rio and coordinate the study of Rio‘s slums.  
Rios was the coordinator that Lebret choose for this study. The sociologist, who 
had also participated in inter-American sociological encounters in the past decade, 
gathered a multidisiciplinary team of twenty scholars from sociology, economy, 
anthropology, and geography, among other disciplines. After three years of fieldwork and 
analysis of previous data, SEGMACS published their report Aspectos Humanos da 
Favela Carioca, in O Estado in 1960. It became the first most systematic attempt to study 
the human and social universe of the favela with a methodology that combined scientific 
quantitative and qualitative analysis and whose results made a huge impact in the 
community of scholars and experts in the following decades. The work –as Parisse, Valla, 
and Valladares have analyzed- was a careful empirical work of Rio‘s favelas taken 
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 The study singled out structural factors that explained the 
emergence of the favelas, the situation of the favelados in relation to the job market, 
access to health, degree of literacy, and relationship with political forces. In every case, 
the research avoided easy generalizations. The analysis of individual cases allowed the 
general public and experts to understand that favela was a too overarching and 
oversimplifying term to describe a much more complex situation, composed of a whole 
universe of different particular situations and contexts.  What favelas had in common 
were their degree of illegality, inequality, poverty, social and spatial segregation, and a 
subordinated relationship with urban politics based on an unequal relation of power. 
Besides those very general aspects, each favela represented a whole world in itself and its 
solution required a careful assessment of individual cases.  
The results of the research, according to Valladares and Leme, shaped the 
research agenda, the debates, and policy on low-income housing in Rio‘s favelas for the 
next decade.
111
 Likewise, it also contributed in setting the tone for a more humanistic 
approach to favelas among social scientists in the 1960s, one that tried to understand 
favelas from the favelado perspective. Rios would apply his broad knowledge about 
favelas and his humanist approach when Governor Lacerda appointed him, in 1960, 
Secretary of Social Services, the state organism in charge of coordinating actions towards 
favelas. As Chapter 3 will show, during his short tenure (1960-62), Rios adopted a policy 
that encouraged the organization of favelas associations to promote aided self-help and 
community development projects (operação mutirão) to encourage favelado involvement 
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in solving the slums more urgent problems. This policy, however, proved to be too much 
for the political and urban plans of governor Lacerda who, in 1962, adopted a more 
aggressive policy of slum relocation and construction of new public housing 
developments. In the history of low-income housing in the 1960s, the positive appraisal 
of favelas that figures like Rios helped to develop became the basis for the organization 
of favelados’ resistance to eradications and the claim for slum rehabilitation policies.
112  
 
As a result, the transnational construction of the housing problem was built in the 
encounter of different circuits of ideas and experiences that circulated not only within the 
Americas but, as the example of Father Lebret in Brazil shows, also from Europe through 
its contact with the ―underdeveloped‖ –and decolonizing- world. The US and 
modernization theory were certainly very influential as the latter provided the ideological 
rationale to the country‘s hegemonic position in the postwar order. In addition, 
modernization theory also informed research around the world through the work of 
international and philanthropic organizations, such as the UN.  
Yet, as the papers presented at the ECLA meeting and SEGMACS research show, 
these different approaches shared, explicitly or implicitly, the representation of slums as 
almost rural enclaves in the city, as spaces of marginality where traits of tradition and 
countryside behavior coexisted with an urban way of life. At the same time, however, the 
ethnographies and surveys undertaken by Latin American scholarship began to show that 
the universalistic and generalizing pretensions of modernization theory were not 
empirically observable in Latin American cases or, at least, they presented many 
exceptions to the rule. As Gorelik has argued, these scholars begun to realize that 
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development and economic growth, by themselves, did not necessarily lead to the 
integration of these ―marginal‖ populations. As a result, scholars began to think that 




Coda: The Housing Problem in the 1960s Between Modernization and Dependency 
 
The optimistic expectations about the reformists and integrative possibilities of 
economic growth associated with developmentalism began to fade away in the 1960s as 
modernization arrived with higher levels of inequality, fostering an era of political and 
economic instability.  Socially, the cost of such pattern of growth, which favored upper- 
middle and upper classes and a smaller part of skilled labor showed that development did 
not go hand-in-hand with better standards of living and social integration. Slums 
continued to grow steadily in rapid proportions, evidencing structural economic 
limitations.  
With this evidence in hand, and with an increasing disavowal of US geopolitical 
and intellectual hegemony, the consolidation of research centers created in the late 1950s 
as well as the emergence of new and influential schools of urban studies in the 1960s, 
provided the intellectual grounds for new circuits of knowledge that challenged the 
universalistic pretensions of U.S. theories. Taken together, these intellectual trends 
sought to counterbalance, from different theoretical foundations, the notion that low-
income populations and the recent rural migrants living in Latin American slums were 
marginal. In so doing, they begun to praise the experience of slums residents and the way 
                                                 
113
 On a similar argumentation for the case of Mexican anthropology, see Karin Rosemblatt, ―The Crisis of 




they organized their urban environment. Many would gradually see them as the 
inspiration for radical politics.  
Gorelik has identified two kinds of reactions to the characterization of poor urban 
sectors as marginals, the radical monism and the exasperated dualism. In the first case, 
scholars simply denied the negative categorization of poor residents as marginal and their 
built environments as places for the self-reproduction of misery. US anthropologists like 
Anthony Leeds, William Mangin, Alejandro Portes, or Janice Perlman, to name a few, 
showed that poor urban residents rather than marginal were actually integrated in the 
social and economic structure of the city: they lived, produced and consumed the city. 
Urban social reconstruction was possible as slum residents actually formed their own 
associations. Regional and kinship ties were the basis for mutual-aid associations and 
solidarity rather than elements of disorganization and disintegration. As Morse pointed 
out, the works of scholars like Lewis, Mangin, and Butterworth ―warns us not to dismiss 
regional origin and culture as a potential binding force for the fortuitous communities of 
the city.‖ Leeds, a pioneer anthropologist working in Rio‘s favelas and an influential 
figure in the expansion of favela studies in the following decades, was a fervent opponent 
to Oscar Lewis‘ ―culture of poverty‖ approach.
114
 From a heterodox Marxist approach to 
the study of favelas of Rio and the barriadas of Lima (where he worked closely with 
Matos Mar) Leeds considered Lewis‘ notion a misleading portrayal of favelados and, 
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By the same token, Mangin believed that slums were actually the solution, rather 
than a problem.
116
 His work was part of a broader collective effort to probe that, in the 
long-term, poor people actually improved their housing conditions and their surroundings 
by investing with capital and labor in the improvement of their dwellings. Architect John 
Turner, who worked with Mangin and Matos Mar in Perú, also appraised positively the 
experience of squatters with their built environment and called for the support to aided 
self-help construction and slum rehabilitation programs.
117
 As Chapter 3 and 5 will show, 
the problems associated with the displacement of eradicated slums dwellers in new 
popular housing project by the late 1960s gave place to a movement that pushed for the 
rehabilitation of favelas.  Such approach was possible thanks to the reversal of fatalistic 
assumptions shared among modernization theorists that projected the slums and slum 
houses‘ physical realities as the materialization of poor people‘s lifestyles. The detractors 
to this vision shared, however, the same intellectual operation –the projection of people‘s 
character from their homes and built environment- but turned it into positive evidence.   
On the other hand, the emergence of dependency theory was part of what Gorelik 
defines as the exasperated dualism. Dependentists reinforced the notion of the existence 
of a dual society in Latin America as the result of neo-colonial center-periphery relations. 
While modernization theorists believed that poor people‘s low living standards were a 
consequence of the nations‘ low productivity, the problem in the late 1960s was that 
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more productivity did not produce more equality. The pattern of capitalist accumulation, 
dependentistas would say, precisely perpetuated social inequality. As the spatial 
reproduction of social relations, the structuration of he city and thus the presence of 
slums were, therefore, the direct result of neocolonialism.   
Many dependentist urban scholars, as Gorelik has pointed out, while keeping the 
traditional difference between the rural and the urban –and the rural in the urban- actually 
reversed the negative stereotyping of rural migrants portraying them as potential elements 
that could subvert the cultural and political dominant order of the city.
118
  In the 1970s, 
scholars like Manuel Castells began to praise new grassroots movements, such as 
neighborhood associations, to advance social transformation, especially in countries were 
military regimes repressed class-based organizations. The political agency and 
transformative capacity of the urban resident –precisely as an urban resident rather than 
as a worker- could offered a resistance that maybe did not articulate an alternative to 
capitalism but that in any case channeled a more offensive stance against the prevailing 
order.
119
  In the context of the political radicalization of the late 1960s and the early 
1970s, urban landscapes of poverty became one of the central spaces that radical 
movements choose to organize a new social order.   
As this chapter tried to show, slums -and within them slum houses- were central 
part of the ―urban problem‖ in the historical conjuncture of modernization theory and 
developmentalism. It was precisely in the burgeoning slums of Latin American largest 
urban centers where older and newer working classes and popular sectors found shelter. It 
was there were sociologists, anthropologists, and other social scientists run to find the 
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interpretative keys that might help to understand social change in Latin America in order 
to orient the transition to modernization. It is here, I argue, where lies the central 
relationship between housing and the city in this crucial, ―urgent‖ moment where the 







THINKING AND PLANNING ON HOUSING: THE TRANSNATIONAL 





In 1942, Francis Violich, an American architect and city planner teaching at 
University of California, Berkeley, began a ten-month traveling surveying low-income 
housing and urban planning in major Latin American cities.  That research became the 
basis for his book Cities of Latin America: Planning and Housing in the South (1944), a 
book motivated by Violich‘s desire of bringing ―a general picture of urban planning and 
housing practice in Latin America, in the interest of promoting closer professional 
relations with the technicians of those countries.‖1  Cities of Latin America came to be 
one of the first systematic attempts of a US scholar to reach out to Latin America and 
introduce the North American audience into the reality of cities and urban life south to 
his country.2  The book offered a succinct analysis of the critical housing situation, an 
examination of governmental policies, and a survey on the state of affairs in the field of 
urban planning.  With optimism about the role that housing might play in the 
modernization of Latin American societies in the areas of economy, health, education, 
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and culture, Violich called for a new era of housing and urban policy based on Pan-
American cooperation and the production and circulation of knowledge.  His trip 
evidenced the interest that Latin American cities drew in the final years of President 
Roosevelt‘s Good Neighbor Policy among U.S. urban experts and architects.  Latin 
American cities had something to offer to the American public and for Violich it was the 
opportunity to self-reflect about US urban practices where private speculation, rather than 
public interest, determined urban land uses. 
US-based architects also ―discovered‖ Latin American cities and their architecture 
in the 1940s.  For instance, Philip L. Goodwin (1888-1958), the Modernist architect of 
the New York Museum of Modern Art (MOMA), travelled to Brazil also in 1942 to learn 
more about Brazilian Modernist architecture.  Goodwin was inspired by the success of 
the Brazilian pavilion at the New York World‘s Fair in 1939 and, as the Chairman of 
both the Committee on Foreign Relations of the American Institute of Architects and the 
MOMA‘s Architecture Committee, he organized the exhibition Brazil Builds in 1943.  
The retrospective featured, for the first time, the architecture of a Latin American country 
in the United States.3  In a similar vein, Richard Neutra, another Modernist architect, 
began his work for the Puerto Rican government in 1943-1944.  This experience 
triggered the architect‘s involvement in the region as a planning expert and consultant in 
Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic. During the war, the US Department of State 
sent Neutra to Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil to deliver talks and 
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conferences on architecture.  His work, Architecture of Social Concern in Regions of 
Mild Climate, published in Brazil in 1948 in Portuguese and English, documented his 
participation in low-cost construction and local architectural practices in Puerto Rico.4  
For Goodwin or Neutra, Latin American architecture represented the possibility to 
consider the relationship between modernist architecture and the significance of climate 
in temperate zones. More important, it also meant the opportunity to build a truly 
American architectural tradition –the international style, undermining European 
preeminence.  
This increasing interest of US urban planner and architects on Latin American 
cities and their attention to urban and rural issues, where low-income housing played a 
central role, was indicative of a new era of increasing inter-American exchanges in these 
fields that grew steadily in the following decades.  As Violich noted after coming back 
from his long trip,  
I became aware of how much we take for granted in our cities and all that they 
contain ... Our isolationist thinking even led us to take for granted our security in 
North America and to build a mental Maginot line around ourselves … We now 
realize how we had ignored the rest of the world, particularly those whom we had 




In the same way sociologists and urban scholars of the Americas found in the 
Latin American landscapes of urban poverty the locus for the interpretative keys to 
understand the paramount transformation of their societies, as Chapter 1 pointed out, 
housing for the poor also became the subject of transnational thinking and policy.  This 
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chapter explores the transnational construction of the housing ―problem‖ in the postwar 
period from the perspective of individual and institutional actors that had a decisive 
influence in defining the terms and policies towards low-income housing.  Understanding 
planning as a spatial practice rather than abstract thinking applied to the formulation of 
urban policy, the chapter understands that urban planners and housing specialists did not 
only reflect about their cities and their dwelling units, but were actually producing cities.  
As David Perry has argued, building upon the insights of Henri Lefebvre and Michel 
Foucault, ―to think of planning spatially is to think of it not as the conceptualization of 
relations within the boundaries of abstract space but to see it as both the critical 
interrogation and affirmative intervention of such abstraction, as the ‗production of 
space‘.  For Lefebvre, modern urban life occurred in a planned society and in the spatial 
dimension of the city are embedded power relations that manifest in both material and 
immaterial ways as space is a social production.  Thinking spatially, argues Perry, means 
―seeing the various politics and technologies of planning –its various discourses- in their 
contextual place(s) in society.  They become examples of particular relations of power 
that constitute the conditions of freedom and dominance in the socially produced urban 
space.‖
6
  I explore why landscapes of urban poverty and, within them, substandard 
housing, became such an object of thinking and action in discourse and practice after the 
end of the Second World War to the extent that housing came to be addressed in a 
hemispheric and even global level in an unprecedented way.  
 Housing and urbanism were certainly transnational issues before the war; in that 
sense our period does not represent a sharp departure with the past.  Yet, despite 
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continuities, there were particular configurations that made the postwar moment a 
significantly different era in the field of housing and urban planning.  Within the 
optimistic predictions about a new era of prosperity through the application of the 
adequate governmental and technical measures, the modernization and developmentalist 
paradigm sought to respond to the existence of spaces of urban poverty and inequality.  
These attempts at modernizing and domesticizing those spaces differed from previous 
experiences.  Poverty came to be explained less in pathological terms and more as the 
result of the structural character of capitalist expansion in the region.  In addition, a 
technical imagination embodied in new institutional and administrative arrangements 
came to assist a welfare state that assumed an active role in planning and organizing 
economic and social life.  Finally, postwar hopes and fears, sparked by cold-war anxieties 
in the region, created a new inter-American context in which dollars and technical aid 
arrived massively to build not only the physical infrastructure of development but also to 
cope with social reforms seen as urgent.  U.S. funds arrived to Latin America in the 
context of the cold war driven Alliance for Progress, allowing the first massive and large-
scale urban renewal and low-income housing projects, as well as community 
development programs based on the notion of aided-self help. 
This chapter, thus, explores the way in which the housing ―problem‖ came to be 
addressed in a scientific-technical era built through transnational networks of expertise, in 
a particular juncture marked by developmentalism, modernization, and Pan-American 
collaboration.  The chapter starts with a historical review of the way in which the 
―housing problem‖ came to be define since the own birth of the nations in the late 




century, and the historical account of the character of the professionalization and 
institutionalization of the fields of urban planning and architecture in relation to housing.  
That revision allows for an understanding of the continuities but also the differences with 
the specific period under consideration.  Attention is also put into the particular 
architectural and urban planning languages available before the arrival of US urban and 
regional planning by the 1940s.  In this case, the aim is at showing that many Latin 
American countries had a tradition of thinking –and building- popular housing according 
to the ideas of the Modernist movement that came from Europe in the late 1920s and 
were rapidly adapted to local conditions.  The narration moves then to the 
characterization of the postwar period, exploring the constitutions of certain spaces in 
which scholars and experts of the Americas thought of housing and urban issues in a 
more technical way.  I suggest some of the many possible intellectual and institutional 
paths as representative of spaces and intersections –the ―contact zones‖- in which people 
and ideas on urban planning and low-income housing circulated in Latin America.  The 
map of networks and institutions is, nevertheless, incomplete as such a task is beyond the 
possibilities of this dissertation.  Actually, every one of these actors deserves their own 
monographic work.  Building upon the contribution that recent Latin American urban 
historiography has done to uncover these spaces of knowledge, I suggest an overarching 
framework that will be changed and definitively corrected by future analysis.  The last 
section moves the analysis to the emergence of the Alliance for Progress and the 
mechanisms implemented to assist in the construction of low-income housing in the 
region during the 1960s.  Such analysis provides the historical and analytical framework 




Inter-American assistance in particular low-income housing projects in Rio de Janeiro 
and Buenos Aires. 
 
The Housing “Problem”: A Historical Review  
 
The concern about spaces of urban poverty began with the nation-state 
consolidation during the late nineteenth-century, when the ruling elites and social 
engineers reacted to explosions of disease and social unrest that, according to them, 
threatened the very own health of the nation.  Capitalist expansion in the turn-of-the-
twentieth-century changed the social and physical colonial aspect of the region‘s largest 
cities, as new contingents of migrants as well as freed slaves in countries like Brazil 
joined the urban labor force.  In a society in rapid transformation, the housing problem 
came to be part of the ―social question‖ – a term that the ruling classes coined referring to 
the working class struggles against exploitative working and rent conditions.7  Ruling 
elites saw with alarm the popular outburst during the ―Vaccine Revolt‖ in Rio de Janeiro 
in 1904 and the tenants‘ strike in Buenos Aires in 1907.  The economically liberal but 
politically conservative governments in Argentina and Brazil treated poor dwellings as 
places of social disorder, disease, and moral corruption.  Police repression first, and 
social engineering later became the first state attempts at disciplining urban space.  
Sanitary and hygienic campaigns and urban reforms –á la Haussmann- included the 
                                                 
7
 Jeffrey D Needell, ―The ‗Revolta contra Vacina‘ of 1904: The Revolt Against ‗Modernization‘ in ‗Belle-
Epoque‘ Rio de Janeiro,‖ Hispanic American Historical Review 67, no. 2 (1987): 233-269; Nicolau 
Sevcenko, A revolta da vacina: mentes insanas em corpos rebeldes (São Paulo: Editora Scipione, 1993); 
José Murilho de Carvalho, Os Bestializados:  Rio de Janeiro e a República que não foi (São Paulo: 
Companhia das Letras, 1987); Juan Suriano, La huelga de inquilinos de 1907 (Buenos Aires: Centro Editor 




razing of large areas, tenements, and the opening and beautification of streets and parks 
during the belle époque.
8
  
In the following decades, housing of ―social interest‖ remained limited to a 
handful of projects undertaken by sectors of the civic sphere, i.e. the Catholic Church or 
the Socialist Party in Argentina, which competed for the organization of the working 
class.
9
  The first state attempts in the area of housing for the working class appeared 
timidly but more clearly during the 1930s.  Chile, for instance, became a leading country 
in the area of town planning and popular housing in Latin America, with the creation of 
the Popular Housing Fund (Caja de la Habitación Popular) as well as with Karl Brunner‘s 
urban and housing plans of 1936 for Santiago.
10
  In other cities, European urban planners 
invited by national governments also recognized the problem of ill-housing conditions for 
poor populations although that awareness did not translate in policy.  Between 1928 and 
1930, French Alfred Agache elaborated a master plan for Rio de Janeiro where he 
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The presence of these European figures in the field of urbanism was an indicator 
of both the professionalization and institutionalization of the disciplinary field in the 
region since the 1920s, and the strong influence of Europe (and the almost inexistent 
dialogues with US ideas in the first half of the century).
12
  French architects and urban 
planners like Joseph Bouvard, Jean-Claude Nicolas Forestier, and Alfred Agache in 
Buenos Aires, Havana, or Rio de Janeiro show the degree of influence of European 
modern urbanism and the high level of excellence attained during the first half of the 
century.  When Violich travelled to Latin America he was impressed by the fine degree 
of professionalization and the achievements in these fields in Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, 
Colombia, and Brazil, which he recognized as heavily European centered.   
Since the 1930s, and particularly in the 1940s and 1950s, central states started a 
more active stance toward urban space and working-class housing, as Latin American 
social structure began to change as a consequence of state-led industrialization and rural-
to-urban migration.  In terms of urban planning and architecture, one of the languages 
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that seemed to fit perfectly well with state modernizing efforts was the one of the 
Modernist movement of the Congrès International d‘Architecture Moderne (CIAM).  
Since the arrival of Le Corbusier to South America in 1929, the preoccupations of 
Modernism for a functional architecture suitable for modern living, the debates and 
proposals for mass production of working class housing, and the uses of technological 
advancements for that purpose became part of the conversations among many Latin 
American architects.  An architecture that epitomized the ideology of the big central state 
–be it a democracy or a dictatorship- sparked the state construction of an important 
number of public buildings and social housing projects.  International and local architects 
were called upon by states to carry on master plans, urban renewal, and housing 
programs.  As the literature has indicated, the works of Hannes Meyer in Mexico, 
building upon the previous efforts of Juan O‘Gorman, Juan Legarreta, and Villagrán 
García; Richard Neutra, Walter Gropius, Joseph Albers, and Jose Luis Sert in Cuba; Sert, 
Robert Moses, Francis Violich, and Maurice Rotival in Venezuela, among others, 
indicates the degree of influence of Modernism in public construction and the progressive 
changes in the urban planning practice.
13
  The influence of Modernism did not imply 
plain imposition but rather the adaptation of the principles of functional rationalism to 
those vernacular languages already available in countries like Mexico, Venezuela, and 
Brazil.  The outcome was an original architecture that followed the principles of 
Modernism adapted to past architectural and building traditions with an eye on local 
                                                 
13
 Arturo Almandoz, ―From Urban to Regional Planning in Latin America, 1920-50;‖ Valerie Fraser, 
Building the New World: Studies in the Modern Architecture of Latin America, 1930-1960 (London; New 
York: Verso, 2000), 1-22 and 145-245; Adrián Gorelik, Das vanguardas a Brasília : cultura urbana e 
arquitetura na América Latina (Belo Horizonte: Editora UFMG, 2005); Lauro Cavalcanti, ―Architecture, 
Urbanism, and The Good Neighbor Policy: Brazil and the United States;‖ in Carlos Brillembourg, ed., 
Latin American Architecture, 1929-1960: Contemporary Reflections (New York: Monacelli Press, 2004), 
50-59; Jorge Francisco Liernur, Trazas de futuro: episodios de la cultura arquitectónica de la modernidad 




conditions, including climate.  It was precisely that originality embodied in Brazilian 
Tropical Modernism what caught the attention of Philip Goodwin in the 1940s. 
In Brazil and Argentina, the pro-labor governments of Getúlio Vargas (1930-
1954) and Juan D. Perón in (1946-1955) rose to power changing drastically the 
conception of the central state government.  They assumed an aggressive agenda of social 
inclusion and welfare policies that combined state incentives, certain benefits to the 
popular classes, and incentives to business.  The construction of ―social housing‖ for 
working-class families, and even the sanctioning of housing as a social right -the ―right to 
a home‖- in the Argentine Constitutional Amendment of 1949, showed the alliance 
between the central state, the urban working class, and the national industrial 
bourgeoisie.14  At the juncture of populist politics, welfare state, and industrialization, 
both Brazil and Argentina became directly involved in the construction of low-income 
housing, and indirectly, by passing rent control laws and establishing a policy of cheap 
mortgages and loans subsidized by central (federal) banks. 
In terms of the housing construction, Modernism became the architectural 
language of the Vargas‘ Estado Novo, embodied in public buildings like the Ministry of 
Education and Health and working-class buildings built with pension funds (Institutos de 
Aposentaduria; IAPS).
15
  Affordable, modernist apartments were expected to be the home 
of the estadonovista worker for which the state might provide for it. Yet, despite the fame 
of Brazilian modernist architecture, low-income housing complexes built between 1930 
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and 1960 were extremely diverse typologically and included modernist pavillions, 
multifamily buildings, and single-family residences.  As Nabil Bonduki and Flavia Brito 
de Nascimento have pointed out, CIAM ideals, garden-cities, and American town 
planning coexisted in Brazil as architects tried different solutions.
 16
  In Argentina, the 
presence of Modernism was less univocal and it actually became one of the many 
languages that the Peronist state adopted for its first large-scale housing projects, and it 
was confined to a group of architects associated with Le Corbusier in the crafting of a 
master plan for Buenos Aires who were also working for the Municipality of Buenos 
Aires.
17
  They strongly supported a modernist solution to working class housing backing 
the construction of apartment buildings arranged in the typical modernist pavillions but 
they had to compete with other conservative, catholic groups within the Peronist state that 
pushed for less radical solutions and were fervent defenders of single-family dettached 
homes.
18
  But regardless the point of which adminsitration made of Modernism its 
representative public housing style, a discussion that is very important when thinking on 
the relationship between certain aesthetic decisions (culture) and politics, for the purpose 
of this chapter it is important to point out the presence of architectural and urban planning 
languages before the increasing influence of the United States in these areas at the end of 
the war, as it is better explained later.  
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The efforts of the Vargas and Perón‘s administrations to provide for working-
class housing and to recognize housing as a social right meant a radical difference with 
past attempts.  Yet, these interventions remained low quantitatively, as the number of 
built units fell well short of the level of demand, which kept growing as a result of 
upward mobility and arrival of new migrants.  In addition, these administrations favored 
the formal, unionized working-class and leaving those workers employed in the informal 
market and recent migrants who were not able to find any better housing option.  In any 
case, these housing policies of welfare states in Argentina and Brazil began to officially 
recognize spaces of urban poverty inequality while increasingly explaining them as the 
result of social problems, although the new language did not end with previous depictions 
that stressed helplessness, immorality, criminality, pathology and disease.  
This increasing involvement of the state in the area of low-income housing 
required the mobilization of an important group of experts and professionals.  During the 
second half of the 1940s and in the 1950s, as Arturo Almandoz or Alicia Novick pointed 
out, there was a disciplinary shift toward a more technical and pragmatic conception of 
urban planning; a move that turned the urbanista into an urban planner (planificador), an 
expert ready to use his expertise to contribute in the crafting of plans to serve the 
modernizing purposes of the nations committed to their development.  This shift was 
directly related to the ascending influence of the Anglo conception of town planning, 
which in the US became the official credo of New Deal‘s comprehensive urban and 
regional planning, as it will come clear in the next section. 
Therefore, the history of housing as a problem for political and social elites as 




the recent formed nation-states in Latin America.  For decades, the spaces of urban 
poverty inhabited by the working class were scrutinized through a moral and sanitary 
lens, legitimizing police intervention, hygienic campaigns, the criminalization and 
pathologization of poverty, and eventually the bulldozing of tenements and squatter 
areas.  As we move to the late 1930s and 1940s, depending on the country, it is possible 
to see that while the ―pathological‖ gaze did not disappear there was a growing awareness 
and social concern for the domestic conditions of working-class families at the juncture 
of populist politics, industrialization, and urban expansion.  The concern about the social 
and moral (including sexual) conditions of the popular classes became part of the 
concern, as we will see, about the productivity of the nation. In this context, social 
reformism in the area of housing became increasingly the métier of architects urban 
planners, and experts who began to find an institutional place and public recognition in 
many countries of the region. 
This concern, however, was not confined to national boundaries; on the contrary, 
it was also part of a process that was occurring in other nations of the America.  Popular 
housing, therefore, became part of the agenda of the first regional and inter-American 
meetings, in what can be considered the first moment of the transnationalization of the 
―housing problem.‖  As Table 1 shows, the convergence of experts and professionals 
associations begun since the 1920s.  The Pan-American Congresses of Architects 
gathered national associations of architects since 1920, passing resolutions that 
acknowledged the importance of affordable urban and rural housing and called for the 
application of technical innovations to their solutions.19  Buenos Aires hosted the First 
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International Congress of Urbanism (Congreso de Urbanismo) in 1935, and the first 
conference especially on the issue of popular housing in the First Pan-American Congress 
on Popular Housing in 1939.  The Sixteenth International Congress on Housing and 
Town Planning took place for the first time in Latin America in 1938, in Mexico City.20  
Many other meetings that thematized housing met before the postwar period, including 
the Eleventh Pan American Sanitary Conference (Rio, 1942); the congresses of the Inter-
American Municipal Organization (Havana, 1938 and Santiago, 1941) that recommended 
public policies in the area of housing, planning administration, and zoning legislation.  
As Table 1 shows, before 1950 there were only few congresses that addressed 
housing and urban planning in specific terms although it was clear that it was a matter of 
concern for architects, planners, and public health specialist.  These inter-American 
meetings, however, occurred at an irregular frequency.  Taken together, these encounters 
helped to develop collective points of view, to define a working agenda, and to call for 
the creation of national housing agencies.  The First Pan-American Congress on Popular 
Housing, the only one until the reorganization of the Pan American system in 1948, put 
the housing ―problem‖ in the forefront.  This congress indicated the urgent need for the 
identification and quantification of the aspects involved in housing, as the lack of reliable 
data was the general condition in almost every country.  Likewise, it stressed the need for 
research in the areas of architectural design; experimentation on building systems to 
cheapen costs, including standardization, rationalization, prefabrication; the use of 
regional native construction materials; and the development of national building 
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industries.  Finally, the participants agreed on the need to create a permanent inter-
American housing body entrusted with the task of articulating housing centers, training 
experts, researching construction methods, and disseminating knowledge on urban 
planning and housing.21  Significantly, this first congress on housing did not come up 
with an official definition of ―popular housing,‖ leaving such thing to each individual 
country.  The fact that these meetings did not produce concrete solutions at the inter-
American scale indicated the lack of integration among Latin American nations and the 
absence of a permanent inter-American body in charge of centralizing and producing 
information and organizing exchanges.  Nevertheless, the meetings innovated in the fact 
that they call for more state intervention and anticipated the increasing specialization and 
atomization of the approaches to housing and urban issues. 
As a result, the transnationalization of the housing problem was not an invention 
of the postwar period, as there were already previous attempts at establishing more 
formal contacts and exchanges.  Yet, these meetings were more sporadic, held at an 
irregular frequency, and did not have the capacity to enforce their recommendations 
within the agenda of the Pan-American Union.  As the next section will show, these 
conditions changed significantly in the postwar period, contributing in a new moment in 
the transnational formation of the housing ―problem.‖ 
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The Transnationalization of the Housing Problem in the Scientific-Technical Era 
To address the challenges of the postwar era in a context of growing urban 
poverty and poor housing conditions, nations, experts, and technicians of the world 
became aware of their shared interests and objectives -that transcended national 
boundaries- and of the potentialities of combining and joining collective efforts and 
resources through transnational cooperation.22
 
 Inter-American conferences, 
intergovernmental organizations, and the ―encounters‖ of scholars, professionals, 
specialists, and policymakers grew steadily in number and were sustained over those 
years.  Malnutrition, illiteracy, disease, ill-housing conditions, and widespread poverty in 
rural and urban areas of the now self-called ―underdeveloped‖ world generated programs 
of socioeconomic rehabilitation in India, Africa, Asia, and also in Latin America. 
As the postwar order brought a global awareness about the progress of humanity, 
also policymakers, urban experts, and international organizations contributed in the 
creation of a universalizing understanding of the world and the production the technology 
of knowledge that minimized difference in favor of comparability, standardization, and 
global applicability. With the sponsor of intergovernmental organizations like the United 
Nations (UN) or the Organization of American States (OAS), these actors began to 
analyze the causes and impact of the uneven urbanization process in the world, especially 
in the ―third world.‖  As it was also the case with social scientists, as we have seen in 
Chapter 1, urban experts came to share a new conviction about the role of technological 
innovation, applied scientific research, and comprehensive planning to assist in the 
development and betterment of poor countries.  The ever-growing presence of meetings, 
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symposiums, and forums as well as the creation of international housing and urban 
agencies, professional societies, and the impressive circulation of experts and technicians, 
demonstrated the emergence of transnational spaces where ideas were articulated, 
exchanged, and often reformulated. In these ―contact zones,‖ housing came to be 
scrutinized under a technical gaze that ultimately decomposed the problem in a myriad of 
specific issues, each one addressed almost exclusively by the expert.   
If experts and policymakers insisted that their actions could be taken in the name 
of development and modernization, they nonetheless developed an understanding of the 
housing problem that was piecemeal and fractured.  All the involved aspects of housing 
received specific attention and debates sparked on such issues as, the social impact of 
rapid urbanization, housing construction, financing, and urban and regional planning, 
among others.  A sense of urgency permeated discourses and practices, as action was 
vital to accelerate Latin American path toward modern ways of life.  The role of urban 
experts, in their capacity to assist in the regulation of urban space, was critical; as Violich 
envisioned, the expert was responsible ―to improve the cities of the hemisphere with the 
use of modern technology, science, and the application of rational democratic planning.‖  
With the establishment of the UN and the reorganization of the OAS at the end of 
World War II, the housing became part of the institutional agenda of both organizations 
from the outset.
23
  The UN General Assembly in 1946, called for an ongoing international 
exchange of technical experience and expertise on housing, under the supervision of the 
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UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).  By 1949, the Social Department of the 
UN Secretariat began the publication of Housing and Country Planning, which circulated 
the result UN-sponsored studies and related material on the field of housing.
24
  While the 
General Assembly denied the formation of a long-term program of housing assistance 
that ECOSOC had prepared in 1950, it nevertheless approved the creation of the 
Housing, Building, and Planning Program.  Its first director, Ernest Weissmann, a 
Yugoslav architect and a member of the CIAM with strong connections with housing and 
urban experts in the world, initiated a program of foreign missions of experts to assess 
housing conditions in decolonizing countries while also assisting them in the creation of 
national planning agencies, public administrative bodies, and research centers.
25
  Many of 
the experts that Weissmann hired were well-known housing reformers –especially from 
the United States- including Catherine Brauer, Charles Abrams, and Jacob L. Crane or 
Otto Konigsberg.
26
  The UN housing branch promoted studies on urban land problems 
and policies; community services and facilities in large-scale projects; tropical housing 
and construction techniques; stabilized soil construction; financing; planning of 
education; cooperation among countries; regional planning and cooperative housing.  
Still, as Abrams recalled in his work The Man’s Struggle for Shelter in an Urbanizing 
World (1964), housing received less institutional attention and resources during the 1950s 
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in comparison to other areas like health, education, and economic reconstruction.
27
  
Actually, it was not until a decade later, in the early 1960s, that the UN Secretariat 
approved the formalization of the Center for Housing, Building, and Planning, launching 
a significant program of international cooperation on low-cost housing based on notions 
of aided self-help and mutual aid.  In any case, the role of the UN in Latin America was 
less decisive in comparison to other regions and its influence came mediated through 
collaborative work with the OAS.  
The 1950s were the years of the formation of a Pan-American understanding of 
the urban and housing ―problem‖ that sparked an agenda of technical expertise and 
practice.  The OAS, the Inter-American Housing and Planning Center, and the Inter-
American Society of Planners were among the most important actors in the constitution 
of hemispheric spaces of production and circulation of knowledge on housing.  US 
notions on urban and regional planning (with stress on regional decentralization), self-
help and community development programs, and the inclusion of housing planning as 
part of broader centralized comprehensive national planning spread through these spaces 
and circuits.
28
  As we have seen in the previous section, housing and urbanism were 
already transnational issues; they certainly were to a degree heretofore inexperienced.  
The novelty of this period laid in the significant impulse, attention and invested resources 
that the issue received at a Pan-American level in a context of optimism about the 
possibility to solve spatial inequalities through state planning, applied science and 
technology, contributing to the development and modernization of the region.  The next 
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pages analyzed the formation of some representative spaces and how ideas and 
personalities circulated among them.  
The reorganization of the Pan American system in the Chapter of Bogota (1948) 
that created the OAS, sought to strengthen hemispheric integration in a context of 
postwar diplomacy, the ascendant hegemonic attitudes of the United States, and the 
expectations about the social and economic progress of the region.29  For the US, the 
OAS became the place to impose its geopolitical interests through diplomacy, science, 
and technology.  For Latin American nations it meant a place to play the opportunities 
made available by the US and to push for their own individual and regional agenda.  
Low-income housing, received new impetus and a higher status within the OAS social 
and technical agenda since the mid-1940s, and especially in the 1950s with the 
establishment and consolidation of the Inter-American Housing and Planning Center 
(CINVA) between 1951 and 1972.  For the next two decades the OAS and CINVA called 
for, and assisted in most of the areas related to housing. Effort had to be made in the 
production and circulation of standardized, comparable data and statistics on population 
and housing organized in censuses, compilation of planning legislation and building 
codes, assessment of construction techniques and materials, and calculations on labor 
costs; exchange of experts and housing authorities; consultancies and missions to assist in 
the formation of national administrative and technical bodies; and research.30  The OAS 
                                                 
29
 To avoid confusion, the Pan American Union was part of the inter-American System and in 1948 it 
became the General Secretariat of the OAS; G. Pope Atkins, Encyclopedia of the Inter-American System 
(Westport: Greenwood, 1997). 
30
 Of course, the quantity and quality of statistical data varied from country to country. Yet, organizations 
like the OAS and the UN pushed for the generalization of new methodologies and data recollection 
techniques. The creation of the Inter-American Statistical Institute in 1940 was an indication of the need for 
such knowledge. The First Inter-American Congress on Demography (Mexico, 1943), recommended 
standard criteria for the surveys to be conducted in the 1950 census. In Brazil and Argentina, these were 




also became a centerpiece in the introduction of US ideas of comprehensive urban and 
regional planning as well as aided self-help and community development projects in 
Latin America. 
 After the recommendations of the Pan-American Union‘s (PAU) Inter-American 
Conference on Problems of War and Peace, held in Chapultepec in 1945, the Inter-
American Economic and Social Council (IA-ECOSOC) became involved in low-income 
housing through the Division of Housing and Planning.  The Department of Economic 
and Social Affairs (c. 1951) absorbed the functions of the former Housing Section of the 
Division of Labor and Social Affairs (c. 1949) providing a more overarching institutional 
and material support. Anatole Solow (1913-1978), an architect originally from Swiss 
with strong contacts in the US and in the UN, became the chief of the housing section.  In 
1949, Solow edited a volume that Violich had prepared on the housing situation in Latin 
America, based on his own data and in the previous work of Robert C. Jones.
31
  Low-Cost 
Housing in Latin America updated Violich‘s previous Cities of Latin America and 
became the first institutional recollection of data on housing needs, slums, urban 
legislation, and residential programs in single nations.  Jones noted in the preface of the 
book, ―adequate low-cost housing,‖ he observed, ―is undoubtedly one of the most critical 
needs in all countries. Reading the literature of the period of exploration and expansion in 
America, one is force to admit that the housing problem is not a new one.  Yet, today, at 
the close of the first half of the twentieth century, the American republics face the gravest 
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housing crisis in their history.‖
32
 Solow defined the housing crisis as a problem of 
development and living standards in the region, which required the concerted actions of 
municipal, state, and national agencies in charge of broad social, economic, and technical 
programs. Thus, the solution was not limited to the construction of new dwellings or the 
rehabilitation of obsolete stock but rather the general improvement of the economic and 
social situation. For Violich, such a solution was an fundamental part of citizenship and 
the construction of a stable democracy; as he argued, ―man‘s concept of democracy, 
feeling of class equality, basic sense of security and resultant spirit of cooperation cannot 
be expected to flourish in the midst of squalor and a degrading environment.‖
33
 
The next decisive step in the Pan-Americanization of the housing agenda was the 
organization of the Ad-Hoc Committee for the Study of the Low Cost Housing Problem, 
called upon the IA-ECOSOC in 1953.
34
  This meeting of experts in Washington aimed at 
providing a careful picture of the housing situation in Latin America, a balance of what 
had been accomplished in terms of actions, policies, and research.  The resolutions of the 
committee, presented in its final report ―The Problem of Housing of Social Interest in 
Latin America,‖ were later sanctioned in the Tenth Pan-American Meeting in Caracas in 
1954 and defined the housing agenda for the next years.  The committee defined the 
―housing problem‖ as the twofold result of, on the one hand, ―the scarcity of hygienic and 
comfortable dwellings‖ because of population increase and low productivity, and, on the 
other hand, the ―present discrepancy between the low purchasing power of the family 
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income and the high cost of housing production.‖  Thus, social and sanitary aspects of 
housing were now less understood as the outcome of misery, pathology, disease, and 
crime and more the result of economic structural forces and social change.  While the 
moral and hygienic condemnation still pervaded as a residual element in the cultural 
formation of the 1950s, the dominant characterization emphasized productivity, costs, 
production, and homeownership.  Solutions to a social problem came to be increasingly 
addressed in economic and financial terms.  
In a context of limited resources, the housing problem came, therefore, mostly 
defined as one of development.
35
  It was, then, pressing to channel domestic savings 
toward housing through the creation of a credit and mortgage market in savings and loans 
institutions, to strength the building industry, to introduce pre-fabrication techniques, and 
to encourage self-help projects; all measures aimed at lowering construction costs and 
providing homeownership.  For the committee, the State had a central role in providing 
the legal and institutional support to stimulate the private initiative, and defining the 
relationship of housing within an integrated national economic plan.  In practice, the 
recommendations of the committee benefited lower middle classes, the only ones in the 
capacity to access and to pay for mortgages.  For the lowest sectors, urban and regional 
planning might contribute in the decentralization of economic activities and limit the 
overwhelming population growth in largest cities.  Self-aided housing and community 
development programs, mostly in rural areas, and state direct construction of low-income 
housing was also recommended.  
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The debates about the relationship between housing, economic growth, and the 
productivity of the nation –housing as a tool of economic development– permeated most 
of the conversations, particularly in the U.S. around the years in which low-income 
housing was a hot topic with the passage of the 1949 and 1954 Housing Act.
36
  Precisely 
in 1954, few months before the Ad Hoc committee, the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology organized a conference on ―Housing and Economic Development.‖
37
  Two 
confronting positions emerged clearly around the productivity issue during the meeting: 
on the one side, a group of economic and financial experts and, on the other side, a group 
of housing reformers.  In the first group were figures like Max Millikan, Leo Grebler, and 
Paul Samuelson, who were also part of the think tanks of modernization theory and 
foreign policy.
38
  For them, the problem was that housing in the underdeveloped world 
was an expensive investment that competed with other, more productive ventures, such as 
basic infrastructure (i.e., dams, highways, power).  Any housing policy, this group 
argued, had to be part of carefully crafted national economic development plans.  They 
would define, for instance, whether it was more economically rational to use public funds 
for housing or to develop other economic regions slowing down massive migration to 
largest cities.  In all cases, the point was that the priority was economic growth, and then 
the rest.  For Leo Grebler, by then the associate director and research professor at 
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Columbia University's Institute for Urban Land Use and Housing Studies and the author 
of Capital Formation in Residential Real Estate (1956),  
It is low productivity that prevents underdeveloped countries from realizing their 
potentialities in production and living standards. An increase in their productive 
efficiency is, in fact, a necessary pre-condition for an improvement in living 
standards. The emphasis on productivity has been questioned on the ground that 
development programs should advance people‘s welfare rather than productivity, 
but I believe the dichotomy between productivity and welfare is a false one. The 




For Max Millikan, who had served as the CIA director from 1951-52, this 
economic problem was more related to US geopolitical interests in the region.  The 
director of the MIT‘s Center for International Studies (CIS) put it bluntly, ―Insofar as the 
objective of economic development as seen from the United States‘ point of view is a 
political objective,‖ and ―insofar as we are trying to help achieve a standard of living 
sufficient to prevent large scale political instability in these underdeveloped areas, we are 
interested in putting our investment in things that will pay off as soon as possible.‖  For 
Millikan food, in this context, would ―pay-off‖ more than housing.
40
  
On the other side, the ―housing reformers‖ adopted a more humanistic 
perspective.
41
 Anatole Solow chose the Latin American experience to answer the most 
―efficiency‖ positions, ―Does higher productivity in itself mean improvement in living 
standards?‖ he asked.  ―Have the tin mines of Bolivia brought more wealth to the Indian 
mine worker? Or has the United Fruit Company‘s activity in Guatemala automatically 
improved living conditions in the shocking slums of Puerto Barrio‘s dock workers?‖  The 
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fact that Solow, whose position put him right in between US and Latin American 
interests, used two cases (Bolivia and Guatemala) that fitted somewhat well with other 
experiences of colonialism referred in the conference (i.e. the role of Great Britain in 
India or Burma), reveals the contradictions that experts like Solow experienced and 
brings an element of nuance to the analysis of the role of experts and technocrats.  His 
position was also representative of the reformist social characterization of the relationship 
between housing and productivity; ―the goal of a decent life,‖ Solow argued, ―is easily 
visualized in the form of a decent house, and consequently housing improvement 
becomes a powerful motive towards productivity.‖
42
   A healthy and modern home 
located in neighborhoods furnished with collective facilities might bring a healthy 
worker, socialized within the values and behaviors of the modern world. This in turn, 
would contribute to decrease, for instance, absenteeism increasing the worker‘s 
productivity.  As I have mentioned in the previous section, this reformist position on 
housing and its relationship with productivity was already present in Latin America since 
the late 1930s and shows, both the continuities in the reformist thinking and the points of 
convergence between Latin American and US counterparts. Actually, many national 
delegations took this position in inter-American meetings showing evidencing the 
endorsement of political and economic elites in individual countries. For instance, the 
Argentine delegation at the Ad Hoc Committee took a nationalistic stand to confront the 
general gloomy depiction of the housing crisis in the final document by stressing Perón‘s 
socially-driven housing policies: ―According to the concept of social justice –which is the 
national doctrine of the Argentine people,‖ the Argentine delegation argued, ―housing 
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performs a highly social function with respect to the happiness of a people and the 
greatness of a country, insofar as it contributes to the dignity of mankind and the 
preservation of the physical and moral health of the population.‖ In a similar vain, argued 
Colombian representatives, ―housing suitable to the needs of the family is the keystone of 
a just and ordered society composed of families who are capable of respecting the divine 




The delegations agreed that inter-American cooperation was most useful and 
practical if it was directed toward training, research, and exchange of scientific 
information.  For that reason, the Ad Hoc committee called for the organization of inter-
American and regional technical meetings to increase the exchange of technical advances 
and the results of research and experiments and for the establishment of personal contacts 
to guide the work of technical institutions and the formulation of housing programs.  The 
First Inter-American Technical Meeting on Housing and Urban Planning was held in 
Bogotá in 1956 and two years later the second meeting in Humpaní, Peru.44  At the same 
time, the building industry also held their first inter-American meetings.
45
  The OAS also 
began to organized regional meetings, as it was the case in Central America and Panama.  
These meetings focused on technical aspects of housing, financial issues, construction 
techniques, and urban and regional planning, demonstrating the degree of specialization 
that the housing and urban question was reaching by the end of the decade.  
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At times, these encounters helped to new networks.  That was the case, for 
instance, of the Inter-American Society of Planners (Sociedad Interamericana de 
Planificadores; SIAP), which was created during the First Inter-American Meeting in 
Bogotá, and became one of the most active networks, contributing to the development of 
urban research in Latin America. Its history is also important because, together with 
CINVA, it was one of the central institutions that helped in the introduction of U.S. ideas 
on urban and regional planning.
46
  SIAP‘s, first president was Rafael Picó, a Puerto Rican 
geographer, whose experience in the United States and as director of the island‘s 
planning board got him acquainted with US notions of urban and regional planning, 
which he advocated later in Latin America.  Puerto Rico, in this way, became one of the 
bridges between the US and Latin America on these matters.  
The relationship between the US and Puerto Rico dated back from the times of 
President Roosevelt‘s New Deal Planning, as Peter Hall described the introduction of 
state-led integrated regional planning as one of the responses to the Great Depression.
47
  
There were a number of New Deal projects that later influenced Pan-American 
approaches to urban housing.  This included the organization of the Tennessee Valley 
Administration, which commissioned a vast comprehensive regional plan to overcome 
poverty in the Appalachian region; the construction of new suburban satellite cities -the 
Greenbelts- for white middle classes; and the planning for the industrialization and 
                                                 
46
 Luis Eduardo Camacho, "Sociedad Interamericana de Planificación, SIAP 50 años Vida institucional y 
programática," Revista Bitácora Urbano Territorial 1 (2007): 268-284 and Jorge Rivera ―Les Axes de la 
Question Urbaine et Régionale dans les Congrès de la Société Interaméricaine de Planification (SIAP), 
1956-1988,‖ (paper presented at the IX International Conference on Urban History, August 27-30, Lyon, 
France); Licia do Prado Valladares and Magda Prates Coelho, ―La investigación urbana en América Latina: 
tendencias actuales y recomendaciones,‖ Cadernos IPPUR X, no. 1 (1996): 111. 
47
 Peter Hall, Cities of Tomorrow: An Intellectual History of Urban Planning and Design in the Twentieth 
Century, 3
rd




economic development of Puerto Rico in the 1940s.48  The launching of Operation 
Bootstraps in Puerto Rico, a program for the rapid development and industrialization of 
the island based on federal and local tax exemptions, crafted by New Dealers together 
with governor Luis Muñoz Marín (1949-1965) was central.  Rexford Tugwell, one of the 
chief intellectual contributors of the New Deal and the mastermind in the construction of 
the Greenbelts in the US, was the person that Roosevelt chose to govern Puerto Rico.  He 
supported Muñoz Marín plans for the transformation of the country through an integral 
program of industrialization, and urban and regional development, based on the US 
experience. Aided self-help techniques and community development programs became 
available tools used in the area of housing.
49
  Rafael Picó occupied a central place as the 
director of Puerto Rico‘s Planning Board during Operation Bootstrap and in the following 
decades he took this knowledge towards similar experiences in Latin America.  
Furthermore, Puerto Rico‘s urban development and its housing programs became the 
showcase for the rest of Latin America, especially during the years of the Alliance for 
Progress.  Not in vain, President Kennedy appointed Teodoro Moscoso, the architect of 
Operation Bootstrap, as the first coordinator of the Alliance.  During his short tenure, 
Moscoso held up Puerto Rico as the example that Latin America should follow. 
The Centro Interamericano de la Vivienda (CINVA; Inter-American Housing and 
Planning Center), one of the most important housing agencies in the western hemisphere 
dedicated to urban and regional planning, low-income housing, community development, 
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and self-help programs.  In 1951, the OAS and the Colombian government agreed on the 
organization of the Center, a long-standing aspiration of Latin American countries since 
the First Pan-American Congress on Low-Cost Housing.50  Its main functions were 
professional education and training, research, scientific exchange, and consultation 
services on technical, economic, social, and administrative aspects of low-cost rural and 
urban housing, with stress on multidisciplinary work.  Research, for instance, included 
such topics as, construction techniques and experimentation with local building traditions 
and materials; planning and design of minimum dwellings in tropical areas; housing 
management, administration and financing, among many others.  The exchange program 
allowed Latin American architects, planners, engineers, housing administrator, 
economists, and social workers to travel to Bogotá and take courses taught at the Center 
by Latin American scholars and US.  Its publications circulated widely and became 
available in almost every national urban planning and housing agency of the region.  
As was the case during SIAP‘s early years, CINVA was a model of Pan-American 
cooperation and planning and served as a bridge with US notions on planning.  Not 
casually, many of the figures behind the formation of SIAP were either members or were 
strongly connected to CINVA: Picó, Solow, Venezuelan engineer and politician Luis 
Lander (formed in urban and regional planning at Harvard University), and Colombian 
Gabriel Andrade, and Peruvian Luis Dorich, among others.  The US influence can also be 
seen in in the personalities of US origin who directed, taught, and worked as consultants 
for the Center.  It‘s first director was Architect Leonard Currie, who had previously 
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worked in Central America where he joined a Carnegie Institute's archaeological 
expedition to Copan, Honduras and assisted Pan-Am Airways and the U.S. Government 
in the construction of airport facilities in Guatemala and Nicaragua in the early 1940s.  
Other directors included Eric Carlson and Walter Harris.  The latter, a Professor in City 
Planning at Yale University and a consultant and researcher all over the region– 
negotiated agreements between Yale, CINVA, and several member-states.
51
  During his 
tenure, Eric Carlson, who later replaced Weismann at the UN, strengthened the 
consulting role of the Center.  
The example of the agreement between CINVA and the Venezuelan government 
for an assessment of large-scale housing program in Caracas provides details to see the 
degree of interconnections and overlapping among institutions and personalities.  In 
1959, Carlson organized an interdisciplinary team of experts and professionals following 
a request of the Venezuelan government requested by Luis Lander.  That group included 
important sociologists, urban planners, social workers, that became very influential in the 
following years; among them Lloyd Rodwin, who had co-founded that same year the 
MIT-Harvard Joint Center for Urban Studies; Josefina Albano, a Brazilian social worker 
with experience in slum population; José Matos Mar, the Peruvian sociologist who 
presented his work on Lima‘s barriadas in the 1959 UNESCO meeting in Santiago.
52
  
Rodwin and the MIT-Harvard Joint Center later signed a contract with the Venezuelan 
government for the integrated planning and design of all phases of city and regional 
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development of a new, modernist city, Ciudad Guayana (founded in 1961), at the 
confluence of the Orinoco and Careen Rivers in southeastern Venezuela.
53
  Lander, on 
his side, strengthened its relations with Peru, especially through architect Eduardo Neira 
–whom he made consultant in Caracas in 1960, and Luis Fernando Belaunde and Dorich 
of SIAP.  Lander was also strongly connected with Chile where he supported the 
appointment of Jorge Ahumada in the direction of the Centro de Estudios Urbanos para el 
Desarrollo (CENDES) of the University of Venezuela. Ahumada, an economist 
connected to Raúl Prebisch of ECLA.
54
 
CINVA also embodied notions of aided-self help and community development 
programs in a similar way the UN was doing in Africa and Asia.  Jacob L. Crane from the 
HHFA lobbied Weissmann at the UN and also Solow at the OAS and CINVA.  Crane 
had helped, as the Assistant Director of the US Public Housing administration, in 
launching a housing program with the Housing Authority of Ponce, Puerto Rico.  A close 
relationship with Picó and Solow put him in a strategic position of influence to the point 
that CINVA incorporated the topics of community development and self-help in the 
course programming by 1961 and carried these sorts of experiences in rural areas of 
Colombia, Ecuador, or Guatemala, and Central America.55  In 1953, CINVA published 
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studies on self-help and mutual aid systems based on Puerto Rican experiences and also 
translated the Self-Help Manual in 1961.
56
  
These examples of ―contact zones‖ and intersections show the extent to which the 
1950s were years of the formation of spaces of expertise at a hemispheric scale on the 
issues of housing and urbanization.  Many of the personalities that appeared in one 
country advising a planning agency or crafting urban renewal plans, reappeared later, or 
even at the same time, in some other country helping in the institutionalization of a 
governmental agency, lecturing, or advising for an intergovernmental organism.  In so 
doing, they contributed in the transnational formation of a Pan-American understanding 
of the urban and housing problem.  
 
Building [in] the Alliance for Progress  
 
In the 1960s, fears of social revolutions and the spread of Communism, fueled by 
the decolonization struggles in the Third World, opened a scenario in which US dollars 
and foreign technical assistance in the field of housing arrived massively to the region at 
an unprecedented rate.  Housing policy became an important aspect of inter-American 
relations and foreign aid, of lesser proportions quantitatively in comparison to other areas 
but definitively important in the modernizing project for Latin America.  In the previous 
decade, conservative economic advisers of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations 
had convinced both presidents that Latin American modernization could and should rely 
on the private efforts of domestic and foreign entrepreneurs.  In those years, the region 
did not pose a sense of geopolitical threat for US military advisors.  US aid in the field of 
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housing during the 1950s, therefore, had consisted in few interventions, mainly technical 
advice for specific projects and loans for self-help programs in Santiago and Lima. 
It was Milton Eisenhower who recognized the urgent need to promote social 
reforms when he became aware of the strong Anti-American general feeling and social 
turmoil during a visit to the region in the late 1950s.  The president‘s brother used the 
specific example of housing and its potential positive impact in the heart and minds of 
Latin Americans, ―A man who has a decent house has something worth conserving, he is 
apt to be more moderate in his pursuit of other goals, more likely to favor democratic 
change rather than violent upheaval.‖
57
  Social reform, homeownership, and democracy 
became, according to Eisenhower, pillars for a new social order in a cold war context.  
But in Latin America, the lack of long-term, low-interest credit was the major 
problem to mobilize savings and stimulate private capital in low-cost housing.  Foreign 
credit, therefore, was seen as the only solution.  President Eisenhower began to review 
foreign aid policies, and timidly took the first steps to promote development plans 
through the creation of the Development Loan Fund (DLF), which years later became one 
a key tool of foreign aid.  The creation of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) 
in 1959 was also a decisive step in the agenda of hemispheric cooperation and the 
fulfillment of a long-standing demand of Latin American countries.  The US agreed to 
provide funds to the IDB for the constitution of the Social Progress Trust Fund (SPTF) to 
finance national projects with a proved social impact.  To receive assistance for social-
development programs in the area of housing, Milton Eisenhower wanted to condition 
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recipient countries to create of national agencies similar to the U.S. Federal Housing 
Authority but the Cuban Revolution speeded up the plans for economic assistance.
58
  
 In March 1961, President Kennedy launched the Alliance for Progress in a 
meeting with Latin American diplomats at the White House.  He defined the program as  
A vast cooperative effort, unparalleled in magnitude and nobility of purpose, to 
satisfy the basic needs of the American people for homes, work and land, health 
and school (…) a continent rich in resources and in the spiritual and cultural 
achievements of its people [where] millions of men and women suffer the daily 





In August 1961, Latin American nations gathered at the OAS IA-ECOSOC 
conference at Punta del Este, Uruguay –urged by the US to enforce the isolation of the 
Cuban revolutionary government- signed the Alliance for Progress.  The passing of the 
1961 Foreign Assistance Act reorganized the foreign assistance program absorbing the 
federal structure in charge of foreign aid created during the Truman and Eisenhower‘s 
administrations, especially the International Cooperation Administration and the DLF.
60
  
The Act created also the U.S. Agency of International Development (USAID).  The 
central notions behind the US foreign aid policy were ―planning‖ and ―self-help.‖ 
―Assistance from the United States,‖ said the Foreign Assistance Act, ―shall be used in 
support of, rather than substitution for, the self-help efforts that are essential to successful 
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development programs and shall be concentrated in those countries that take positive 
steps to help themselves.‖
61
  For the US, self-help meant that Latin American countries 
would have to commit to a series of reforms and efforts to fulfill the requirements to 
receiver assistance, instead of expecting a similar treatment as Europe did during the 
Marshall Plan.  In theory, this implied US support only to those countries that would 
organize national development programs after the assessment of each country‘s 
performance.  In practice, however, as Jeffrey Taffet has argued, the Alliance served the 
US as an instrument of foreign policy, as the most favored countries were those that 
represented a potential Communist threat: Brazil, Colombia, Chile, and Dominican 
Republic.  As Juan de Onís pointed out, there was an ―almost mystical belief in the power 
of planning to solve Latin America‘s problem, reform its social structures, and stimulate 
is economic growth.‖  This technical imagination defined the policies that affected low-
income housing in the region.   
 Surely, these notions of self-help and planning reproduced gendered depictions. 
As the feminist critique of modernization and dependency theory has pointed out, ―First 
World‖ diplomacy engendered social constructions of gender and racial differences in 
which ideals of ―progress,‖ ―modernity,‖ ―forward looking,‖ ―change,‖ and ―rationality,‖ 
and the reduction of human relationships to a series of impersonal market relations were 
built in opposition to feminized notions of  ―traditional,‖ ―backward,‖ ―household 
economy‖ identified with the ―underdeveloped world.‖
62
  Thus, lending countries self-
identified as providers and agents of change, introducers of technology and reason.  
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Through self-help, Latin American societies might learn to assume the responsibilities 
associated with a matured, modern, developed nation rather than being mere passive 
recipients of state welfare.  Responsibility, maturity, and agency, were all male attributes 
associated with modernization and development.  Thus, the role of the US was not only 
economically motivated but morally correct, a work of ―missionaries‖.  As Teodoro 
Moscoso, Director of the Alliance for Progress in 1961, put it, ―we must convince these 
[Latin American] peoples that through the Alliance they can really reach progress and 
happiness (…) We must evangelize them! (…) you must remember, this job is not just 
the administration of billions of dollars. It is a job of evangelizing.‖
63
 
Assistance for housing during the Alliance came from different sources and in 
every case the ultimate explanation was economic: the rapid and impressive growth of 
slum and squatter settlements was the result of people‘s inability to pay for conventional 
housing.  Any solution required state action to stabilize the different components of the 
housing market, including the constructive and financial aspects of low-income housing.  
As we have argued before, the formation of capital in Latin America was too slow to 
channel resources to housing.  Large-scale construction of affordable housing, because of 
its own nature, was an expensive investment with very low return, competing with other 
strategic areas of investment.  In addition, the expensive projects that had been already 
built by the public initiative served a small percentage of the needed population.  The 
private sector was not interested in undertaking risks with low return without getting 
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juicy contracts and opportunities from the state.
64
  Recurrent inflation and lack of 
confidence on the national financial institutions also contributed to the poor performance 
in the creation of domestic savings for housing purposes. 
This economic understanding of the problem was assumed that most of working-
class families were in conditions to pay for their homes and if they did not was because 
the lack of access to cheap credit.  As a report about housing conditions in Latin 
American of the Inter-American Program of the Civil Engineering Department at the 
MIT, sponsored by the Carnegie Foundation and USAID, pointed out in 1964, ―no matter 
how much production costs could be reduced, there is no doubt that the low-income 
groups would find it almost impossible to achieve ownership of an adequate house 
without long-term financing.‖
65
  The overgrowing presence of new settlements and slums 
showed that most families were in any capacity to pay monthly installments at any level 
and that in many cases homeownership was not even a top priority.  As a result, this 
assumption discriminated between those urban poor sectors who were actually in 
conditions to pay for their own home and those who were not.  Most of the policies of the 
Alliance aimed at the former group and left the latter with more precarious options, as we 
will see in the following chapters.  Therefore, housing policies also contributed in the 
formation of new landscapes of urban poverty.   
Cold war considerations were certainly behind this technical/financial approach.  
In 1962, the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Housing recognized that housing was central 
to ―the stability of the underdeveloped free nations of the world,‖ as ―social and political 
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unrest and communism are natural consequences of such conditions.  The actions of these 
large masses of underprivileged and ill-housed people can wipe out all the gains from 
economic assistance in these countries.‖
66
  The following year, the same committee 
affirmed in a document titled Study of International Housing, that ―aid to housing for 
people in less developed countries is an important instrument of U.S. foreign policy.‖
67
  
In the Cold War context, U.S. presence in the area of housing was central as ―the 
deplorable living conditions of the masses of people in friendly developing countries area 
at the root of the political and social unrest in these countries.‖
68
  In the same line argued 
a USAID report in 1962, this time emphasizing the social and political impact of 
homeownership,  
Arrangements which encourage homeownership (e.g., savings and loan 
institutions, self-help programs, cooperatives, etc.) may stimulate investment that 
may not otherwise take place (…) poor housing may be a significant factor in 
matters of health, family, stability, moral values, and political unrest. This is 
particular true in some urban slum areas where general economic and political 
discontent may be exacerbated by extremely low housing standards. Urgent social 
and political factors such as these should be considered … in determining the 




 Homeownership, therefore, was central to the modernizing project as the 
formalization and regularization of the urban poor would bring him into the 
responsibilities of the market economy and citizenship, deterring them from radical 
politics.  As Chapter 3 shows, USAID assistance in Rio de Janeiro was directly related to 
this Cold-War rationale, as it was also the case in Chile during Frei‘s administration in 
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Chile or Colombia with Lleras Camargo. Ultimately, housing and the landscapes of urban 
poverty were also spaces of cold-war politics.    
The main sources of foreign aid to Latin America housing were the OAS, the UN, 
ECLA, the U.S. government, the IDB, and private corporations -most of them from the 
US.
70
 (Table 2)  The role of the OAS, the UN, or ECLA, as we have seen, was mostly 
through training, teaching, consultations, and assistance in the craft of development plans.  
After the launching of the Alliance, the OAS sought to speed up the assessment of the 
housing crisis, the evaluation of available resources, the definition of fundamental goals, 
and formulation of realistic and workable programs.  To do so, PAU subdivided the 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs in two: Economic Affairs and Social Affairs. 
This latter, directed by Angel Palerm, was the one that, as Chapter 1 mentioned, 
undertook the Four Cities study, that included Gino Germani and Anthony Leeds.
71
  
Palerm organized in 1961, the OAS Advisory Committee on Housing in Latin America, 
held in Bogota, urged by the Alliance to come up with a research guide for a survey of 
housing in Latin America.
72
  Single countries were encouraged to adapt such Guide and 
define national goals and specific action programs.  The organization of another meeting 
in a series of similar encounters speaks about intricacies and difficulties to define a 
common research agenda and objectives at a Latin American scale.  At the same time, it 
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also shows how the initial impetus of the Alliance brought a sense of urgency to the come 
up with policy recommendations that would address and correct spatial inequalities.  
Financially, the IDB and USAID were the main lenders to housing projects in the 
region.  In the first case, the bank used its SPTF to finance large-scale works with a stated 
social impact.  The first allocation of funds to the IDB‘ SPTF came from the U.S. in the 
amount of $500 million after the signature of the Act of Bogotá in September, 1960, ―to 
meet the legitimate aspirations of the peoples of the Americas for a better life.‖  As rural 
and urban housing was a quick social investment with visible impact and in the capacity 
to boost employment, the US announced investments nearing $100 million already during 
the meeting at Punta del Este.
73
  The IDB was the administrative agency in the 
implementation of three different types of help: self-help housing; aid to savings and loan 
associations; and loans to public housing authorities.  The IDB also allocated funds for 
the modernization and update of basic infrastructure in rural and urban areas; in Rio de 
Janeiro, for instance, the Bank supported the extension of the water supply and sewerage 
systems, part of a broader program of urban renewal in the first half of the 1960s. By the 
same token, the IDB was the central lending organization in countries considered to have 
a relatively developed economy and did note fit entirely to the programs addressed by 
USAID, as Chapter 4 will show for the case of Buenos Aires.  Felipe Herrera, president 
of the IDB, explained the logic of the lending mechanism that also embodied the notion 
of self-help present in the Alliance rationale, 
… the bank does not pretend to act as a welfare institution offering a total 
solution to this (housing) problem. The Social Progress Trust Fund gives the 
Latin American countries their first opportunity to obtain international financing 
as a supplement to their public and domestic resources for their housing policies. 
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This is why we see our role as one of cooperating to establishing and 
strengthening savings and loan institutions, or encouraging self-help 




The Bank provided long-term credits at moderate interest rates and with a long 
amortization period set between 20 and 30 years. According to Stanley Baruch, chief of 
the IDB housing division, this meant an improvement from past lending practices in the 
region that offered five-year loans at a fifteen percent of interest a year.
75
  Between 1961 
and 1965, the IDB made housing loans to fourteen countries, allotting more than forty 
percent of the SPTF.  The IDB required Latin American nations to present detailed loan 
proposals for their low-income housing projects, previously endorsed by the national 
planning agency –an institutional requirement of the Alliance.  The plans had to mobilize 
domestic savings, mainly through the establishment of loan and savings institutions; 
provide minimal internal amenities for low-income families; be consistent with the 
priority of objectives of the country in the field of social development.  Self-help 
components, defined in this case as a ―maximum element of contribution by the borrower 
either as a direct part of the project or as a part of a national program of which the project 
is a component,‖ were key in order to be selected.
76
  In addition, the IDB demanded 
careful studies supporting countries loan proposals and required administrative reforms, 
legal sanctioning, and institutional developments (i.e. national or municipal housing 
agencies) that would support the legal and technical requirements for large-scale 
construction.  Regulation of land use, finance, rational of urban growth, and security of 
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tenure were prerequisites in order to receive funds.  The US-based Foundation for 
Cooperative Housing (FCH) worked for the IDB providing consulting services and 
assessing the feasibility of housing proposals, as it was the case in Buenos Aires with the 
evaluation of slums located in the site for the proposed urbanization of Parque Almirante 
Brown.
77
  In most cases, the IDB funded housing programs that aimed only at 
homeownership as the loans were considered ―seed capital‖ whose returns from the 
selling of the built units had to be reinvested in the construction of more dwellings.  
Meticulous accounting procedures, aimed at making the Bank successful in controlling 
the uses of funds to their original purpose. 
USAID was the other main actor in the provision of money and technical aid.  Its 
creation in 1961 made available, for the first time, DLF funds for housing purposes.  
Program and project loans as well as technical assistance to aided self-help and 
community development projects, the latter mainly in rural areas and urban slums, were 
the normal forms of aid.  From these, project loans became the most generalized form of 
assistance, designed to fund single specific efforts, such as the construction of schools, 
hospitals, roads, housing, water pants, and sewage facilities.
78
  Program loans, of larger 
proportions, were only disbursed to Chile, Brazil, Colombia, and Dominican Republic.  
The financial operatory was set in stages so that loans could be pay out according to 
partial assessments achievements, as Chapter 3 analyses with the example of Rio.  As 
Juan de Onís pointed out, and our study on the housing projects built in Rio confirms, the 
handclasp symbol of the Alliance was visible in almost every construction site funded by 
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the US agency.  US official delegations and visitors were also taken to these places as 
showcases of successful involvement in the area of housing.
79
  
USAID also administered funds in local currency provided by Public Law 480 
(PL-480) Agricultural Trade and Assistance Act of 1954 and the Cooley Amendment of 
July 1957.  The PL-480, which President Kennedy renamed ―Food for Peace,‖ 
established a mechanism that allowed friendly developing countries to sell internally 
surplus bulk food commodities purchased from the US.  The income generated in local 
currency was then invested in certain social programs in predetermined agreements 
between the US government and the recipient country.  The concessional terms were 
more favorable as it provided long-term credit, with no minimum repayment for ten 
years, and a grace period for repayment of up to five year at low interests.  The Cooley 
Amendment of 1957, established that a maximum of 25% of the currencies received from 
PL 480 agreements were to be made available to U.S. business firms for business 
development and trade expansion and for assistance in increasing the consumption of and 
markets for U.S. agricultural products. PL-480 and Cooley funds were granted to low-
cost housing projects in Lima, built by a Kansas-based construction firm owned by 
Willard Garvey of World Homes – a construction firm that, together with the 
Rockefeller‘s construction company, were deeply involved in construction in Latin 
America.
80
  The construction of Vila Aliança, Vila Kennedy, Vila Esperança, the first 
section of Cidade de Deus and other smaller interventions, part of the Guanabara 
Housing, were actually possible thanks to PL-480.  
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Bureaucratic and organizational problems within USAID created internal 
problems, upsetting members of the Senate who requested clarification on the uses of 
taxpayers‘ money.  According to Charles Abrams, actually the role of USAID and IDB 
was not always clear bringing confusion, overlapping, and a waist of resources.
81
  This 
led to the amendment of the Foreign Assistance Act in 1962, which expanded the funds 
for the USAID Housing Guaranty Program.  This program sought to channel US private 
resources, rather than public funds, guaranteeing investments in housing as a supplement 
to IDB funds.  The US Congress, thus, rapidly shift the Alliance as an instrument to favor 
private business by forcing Latin American countries to guarantee US investments 
against inflation and economic and social instability.   
To achieve the general goals of the Alliance, USAID established agreements with 
US federal agencies, labor organization, and private corporations.  For instance, the 
Rockefeller family owned the International Basic Economy Corporation (IBEC), which 
invested in different economic activities in the developing world. Its housing division, the 
IBEC Housing Corporation, participated in the world housing construction market, 
developing a standardized mass construction system tested in the United States and the 
Middle East and implemented in Puerto Rico, Brazil, Chile, and Peru.
82
  Rodman C. 
Rockefeller, son of Nelson and vice president of the company, claimed the US 
government to press Latin American countries to stabilize their economies, regarding 
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high inflation, and to pass laws guarantying private financing of housing construction.
83
  
Richard Foley, a former administrator of the HHFA and then a consultant for IBEC 
Housing Division, defined clearly the role of USAID in assisting US companies to invest 
in the region,  
Since it is universally true in the Latin American countries that there is no 
existing source from which house purchasers can borrow such a percentage of 
the cost of houses, some existing agency of the United States Government 
should stand ready to lend funds to existing organizations in the several 
countries for the purpose of buying mortgages at approved projects. The U.S. 
agency might be A.I.D. The organizations in the Latin American countries 
could be existing mortgages banks, governmental housing agencies or private 




 Provision of ―seed capital‖ to capitalize intermediate credit institutions as well as 
local currency loans to cover local costs of housing construction were central aspects of 
USAID policy.  Attempts at constituting savings and loans institutions and cooperatives 
to channel individual savings, rather than public funds, were a constant over the 1960s.  
For such projects, USAID established agreements with the HHFA for consultation, 
technical assistance, recruitment, and program training services.  For instance, HHFA had 
coordinated by 1963 savings and loan programs in Chile, Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela, and 
the Dominican Republic.
85
  Likewise, agreements with the American Institute for Free 
Labor Development (AIFLD) coordinated financial support for US friendly labor unions 
in Latin America, which had created cooperatives for their small-scale housing programs.  
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AIFLD was the joint project between the AFL-CIO, the US State Department, and US 
corporations, created as a cold war organization to coopt friendly‖ labor leaders in the US 
that, in turn, were expected to organize anti-leftist unions in their respective countries.
86
  
On March 1964, a technical team of AIFLD experts arrived to Argentina to investigate 
the architectural and development plans, labor and material costs for several low-cost 
housing projects agreed with four unions: FOECYT (Postal and Telegraph Workers‘ 
Federation), Luz y Fuerza (electricity), Railroad, and Municipal Workers. The financing 
for the ten million dollars for these projects were provided by a loan from the AFL-CIO, 
guaranteed by AID.  The plan contemplated the construction of two thousand homes, of 
three different types (single family units; three and four floor walks-ups ten to sixteen 
floor apartment buildings) erected on seventeen sites, twelve in Buenos Aires and five in 
neighboring cities.
87
 William C. Doherty, director of AIFLD‘s Social Projects 
Department and later general director, visited several housing programs in Latin 
America, including Vila Kennedy in August 1965.  AIFLD also participated in self-help 
housing projects in Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Mexico, Dominican Republic and São 
Paulo, Brazil.
88
  Although the impact of AIFLD assistance in housing was of small in 
terms of total built units, its involvement attests to the geopolitical implication of the 
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Alliance in Latin America and the extent in which housing was part of cold war 
strategies.  
Generally speaking, USAID and IDB principal attention to financing of S&L 
institutions or cooperatives and the promotion of US corporations aimed at lower middle-
classes.  The urban and rural poor received support but comparatively of a smaller scale, 
although not necessarily less important.  In the cases of slums and squatter settlements 
these organizations supported in the beginning large-scale housing projects and then 
moved the focus to self-help and community development programs.  In 1964, Charles 
Abrams criticized USAID and IDB for creating their universalizing approaches to 
situations of single characteristics, ―eagerness to produce quick results,‖ argued the 
progressive housing reformer, ―has tempted AID and IDB to propose universal remedies 
at the central source of policy and then press for the application on a continental or 
worldwide basis.‖  For him, cooperative housing, assistance to labor unions, and the 
capitalization of S&L associations was good for some countries but not for all and in 
each case it was central to identify the particular series of causes that determined the 
problem.
89
  Therefore, local economic and political considerations shaped the particular 
responses and outcomes, as the analysis of the role of USAID in Rio and the IDB in 
Buenos Aires will show.   
Conclusions 
 
In April 3, 1962, Teodoro Moscoso addressed a crowded audience of US and 
Latin American technical and political elites, gathered at the Housing Symposium 
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organized by the Chase Manhattan Bank.
90
  In front of ministers of economy, housing 
specialists, financers, and Nelson Rockefellers, Moscoso‘s discourse recounted his 
personal experience in the field of housing in Puerto Rico and how that experience took 
him to the team of experts that directed the modernization of the island.  That experience, 
initiated during the New Deal and the Good Neighbor Policy, was for Moscoso a 
showcase of what had to be done in the rest of Latin America with the Alliance for 
Progress.  The alliance, thus, was a sort of expansion of past policies undertaken in 
Puerto Rico that, according to him, probed the success of a country committed to help 




As a way of balance of the first year of the program, Moscoso highlighted the 
positive role of the US in sharing its techniques, which had led to extensive programs and 
had generated interest in aided self-help, as both ―a means of inculcating social values 
and as a method of decreasing construction costs.‖  In addition, governments of the 
region created or reoriented housing agencies; indigenous materials were tested and 
evaluated while planning and construction efficiency were enhanced.  Moscoso, however, 
was less generous when referring to what the US had learned from Latin America, ―in the 
process, we have learned a great deal about social structures and dynamics, housing 
needs, and savings potentials,‖ – a stingy assessment that evidenced the US self-
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representation in its unequal of relationship with Latin America.  By the 1960s, though, 
the U.S. policymakers reached the conclusion that they had learn enough to know that,  
The basic housing need in Latin America is financing, which means long-term 
mortgage credit at reasonable rates of interest, plus low down-payments. That 
must now be the major thrust of our aid. The need exists and the ability to pay 
for housing exists, once mortgage money is available. We must increase our 
efforts to stimulate local savings for housing, and this means inducing the 
peoples of Latin America to establish home savings institutions which can 
channel the accumulated capital of many small savers into long-term mortgage 
credit. 
 
This assessment became the cornerstone of the Alliance‘s policies that over the 
years emphasized a paradigm of efficiency whose concrete results benefitted less poor 
urban and rural sectors and more middle classes, US construction companies, and 
investors.   
As this chapter has shown, much of these actions in the area of urban planning 
and housing were not the outcome of just one year of Alliance policies but the result of 
years of inter-American exchanges and cooperation since the mid 1940s.  During those 
years, the influence of the United States in the field of urban planning and low-income 
housing was significant yet not total.  Nationalism and anti-Americanism feelings, the 
relative strength of some Latin American countries in the region, the presence of local 
architectural and urban planning traditions and languages, the growing shift of ECLA 
ideas toward dependency theory, and the own national and local political, economic, and 
social circumstances in a historical juncture of rapid transformation and instability.  Some 
countries were more dependent on US assistance than others and most of them tried to 
take advantage of the opportunities opened by the Alliance and take the most from the 
US to advance their own agenda.  But as the next chapters will show, the presence of 




progress of urban and housing programs.  The US also made available a set of repertories 
of urban planning and housing techniques –either construction or financing- that many 
Latin American countries received and adapted totally or partially according to their own 
understandings.  US attempts at assisting in the regulation of urban spatial inequalities 
were therefore mediated and conditioned by local and national contexts and varied from 
context to context.  And, in some cases, USAID actually reversed its own policies as they 
learned from the their own experiences, as it was the case in Rio de Janeiro.   
As chapter 1 has shown, as we move into the 1960s, Latin American urban 
experts became less optimistic about the forecasts of earlier modernization theory.  The 
growing ascendance of dependency theory, the influence of ECLA in the consolidation of 
research centers in Latin America, and the ever-increasing presence of slums in Latin 
American cities turned less on urban and regional planning and more on what came to be 
seen as the origin of all inequalities of the region –the dependent relationship and the 
―neocolonial‖ link with advanced nations.  During that decade, Latin America witnessed 
an increasing expansion of the field of urban studies in which the influence of ECLA 
structural thinking was critical.  As Licia Valladares and Magda Prates Coelho have 
pointed out, new research centers on urban issues evidenced the growing interest of Latin 
American scholarship and policymaking to influence the social and economic 
development of the region and the need to formulate a native conceptualization with a 
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For instance, the question about rural urban migration evolved from the formulation of 
the dualist theories on marginality and the uses of Oscar Lewis‘s ―culture of poverty‖ to 
the debunking anthropological works of Anthony Leeds, William Mangin, or Janice 
Perlman, as we have seen in Chapter 1.
93
  SIAP, for instance, reoriented its initial 
position on urban-regional planning backed by Picó and Lander to an emphasis on 
economic and social planning aiming at the transformation of the structural causes of 
inequality.  This latter position gained predominance when Argentine urban planner Jorge 
Enrique Hardoy became SIAP director. 
Also in the field of architecture, as Chapter 5 analyzes in more detail, the 1960s 
represented a re interpretation of the notion of aided self-help, especially through the 
work of John Turner in Peru and the ―freedom to build‖ movement.  As anthropological 
and sociological work in Latin America began to see slums not as problems but rather as 
solutions, also architects came to appraise dwellers control of the housing process.  As 
the work of Mangin, Leeds, or Matos Mar had been showing, and as Turner had also 
noted in his observations of Lima‘s slums over a long period of time, poor urban 
residents actually invested time and capital in the improvement of their homes and their 
built environment through time.  This led to the defense of poor urban residents‘ efforts, 
underlying their agency as well as the validation of their own understanding of what good 
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housing instead of, at least theoretically, the imposition of the urban planner.
94
  In the 
years that followed, Turner ideas became actually the official methodological and 
technical approach of the World Bank in the area of housing.  
Also in the field of architecture, other transnational flows arrived to Latin 
America and not necessarily from the United States.  In many countries, we have seen, 
local appropriations of the language of the modernist movement had paid specific 
attention to the subject of working-class housing.
95
  By the 1960s, modernism had given 
place to other languages and experiences in the field of housing.  As chapter 4 will show 
for the case of Buenos Aires, the architectural ideas of the Team X -the architectural 
movement that split from CIAM last congress-, the influence of pop, and also the 
structural turn in architecture, influenced the design of large-scale slab apartments built 
thanks to the financial support of the IDB. 
As a result, in the 1950s, the increasing ascendancy of the US in the field of urban 
planning and housing met previous experiences and languages. The transnationalization 
of the housing ―problem,‖ therefore, contemplated many possible intersections and 
influences, whose particular materializations depended upon single local configurations.  
The second part of the dissertation explores historical cases in Rio de Janeiro and Buenos 
Aires in which such contact occurred in specific housing programs. 
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Table 3 - Sources of International Assistance1 
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On Friday August 17, 1962, the governor of the State of Guanabara Carlos 
Lacerda escorted Teodoro Moscoso, the U.S. Coordinator of the Alliance for Progress, 
and Lincoln Gordon, the U.S. Ambassador to Brazil, to visit the progress in the 
construction of Vila Aliança, a housing development under construction in suburban Rio 
de Janeiro.
1
 The occasion was the first anniversary of the signing of the Alliance for 
Progress charter and Moscoso‘s official mission to Brazil. Vila Aliança was part of a key 
spatial restructuring launched by the local government of the State of Guanabara, 
working in concert with bilateral and multilateral development agencies based in the 
United States.
2
 [Figure 1-2] These efforts included the construction of a total of almost 
fifteen thousand housing units distributed in Vila Aliança (2187 units), Vila Kennedy -
formerly named Vila Progresso- (5069 units), Vila Esperança (464 units), and Cidade de 
Deus (originally 6658). These units were built to house some of the poor urban dwellers 
living in the shantytowns, known as favelas, that accounted for almost one fifth of Rio's 
total population. 
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The official delegation led by Lacerda first visited the Favela de Bom Jesús, a 
shantytown located in Botafogo, a middle-class neighborhood in South Rio, where 465 
families were to be relocated in V. Aliança. Speaking in front of the hovel that housed a 
school, governor Lacerda introduced the distinguished visitors as ―friends of Brazil‖ who 
were leaders of a program ―to help those who help themselves.‖ Then, the delegation left 
to the site of V. Aliança, but the people assembled around the school stayed and 
―expressed only objections and doubts‖ about the governor‘s slum clearance and 
relocation program, according to the New York Times’ reporter Juan de Onís. The events 
of that morning in Bom Jesús illustrated the dissonance between the harsh reality of the 
favelado population and the official rhetoric which recurrently used the ―self-help‖ trope 
to praise the commitment of the Alliance for Progress to assist poor Brazilians.  When 
later that day, reporters asked Moscoso about the complaints of the Bom Jesús‘ residents, 
he minimized them saying that he had encountered the same anxieties during his 
experience in Ponce Housing Authority and Puerto Rico‘s Operation Bootstrap.
3
 As 
Moscoso put it, ―they had been overcome in Puerto Rico and would be overcome here 
with hard work and political leadership.‖
4
 This connection that Moscoso made between 
State interventions into the spatial, social, and political configurations of Rio‘s favelas 
and previous experiences in this area in Latin America indicates that urban renewal and 
low-income housing programs in Rio were not just local, short-term attempts to respond 
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to particular situations but rather part of a transnational process. They were part of 
international conversations and programs that stressed the role of housing and the 
environment in modernizing the poor urban resident in a context of economic 
development and rapid social transformation.   
By the same token, the presence of the U.S. delegation in Bom Jesús and V. 
Aliança accompanying a local governor instead of national authorities contradicted the 
principles of the Alliance for Progress that mandated to only fund projects sponsored by 
national governments. This suggests that housing for the poor (as part of a broader 
investment in social reform) was part of the U.S. geopolitical interests in Brazil. In the 
political conjuncture of Brazil in 1962, U.S. assistance to right-of-center and pro-U.S. 
governor Lacerda was a way to counteract the leftist national administration of Brazilian 
president João Goulart, who U.S. Cold Warriors held in high suspicion.
5
  The favela of 
Bom Jesús was no stranger to this explosive political scenario, not at least under 
American eyes. Onís pointed out that ―outside agitators‖ linked with Leonel Brizola, the 
governor of the state of Rio Grande do Sul, were influencing the residents. Brizola was a 
left wing influential politician and Goulart‘s brother-in-law. According to Onís, Brizola, 
was ―an outspoken enemy of the Alliance for Progress,‖ whose political influence among 
Rio‘s favelas residents was strong enough to parlay into election to the federal legislature 
in the upcoming congressional elections scheduled for October 1962.
6
  
Housing, therefore, was not only a matter of physical and social development. 
Foreign assistance in the area of social welfare and the provision of modern shelter for a 
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mass of poor people living in harsh housing conditions were part of the agenda to build 
the foundations for social peace. In the minds of U.S. authorities and the ideologues of 
the Alliance for Progress at the height of the Cold War, new domestic residential life and 
homeownership could contribute to the integration of marginal people into society, mass 
consumption, and moderate politics and, in so doing, contributing to the formation of 
citizens.  
What follows is an analysis of the Guanabara Housing Program, the first large-
scale construction of low-income housing in Brazil to benefit from technical and 
economic aid from the United States. The literature on Rio‘s urban spatial 
reconfiguration under Lacerda has emphasized the governor‘s presidential aspirations, his 
technocratic administrative style, the influence of real estate interests to raze favelas, 
especially those located in increasingly expensive neighborhoods, and the lobby of the 
construction industry eager to take advantage of a massive public works program. In 
these accounts the U.S. presence is always taken for granted as either part of the 
governor‘s pro-U.S. ideology or the destabilizing efforts of the U.S. government against 
president Goulart. This chapter is the first historical account of the actual construction of 
three vilas —Aliança, Kennedy, Esperança- and the origins of Cidade de Deus.  The 
chapter will demonstrate how, at the junction of transnational development policy, the 
radicalization of national politics, and local urban crisis, urban and housing plans aimed 
at coping with the needs for housing and modern environment ended up organizing 






A History of Housing Policy in Rio de Janeiro  
 
Government actions toward squatter settlements and favelas dated back to the 
nineteenth century as a reaction to the overcrowding of tenements and boarding houses 
and the occupation of the hillsides [morros] of central Rio.
7
  During the late Brazilian 
Empire and the Old Republic, the housing question referred particularly to the presence 
of cortiços, casas de cõmodo, republicas in the city center. Equivalent to the American 
tenement, cortiços were the unsanitary option for shelter for free workers and self-
employed urban slaves (escravos de ganho) that made a living in Rio‘s downtown streets 
and port.
8
 The demolition of Cabeça de Porco in 1893, one of the biggest cortiços, during 
the municipal administration of Barata Ribeiro initiated a new era of social control 
through hygienist housing and eugenic social reforms.
9
 Displaced from cortiços and 
urged by their needs for shelter, poor people began to build their shacks in the morros 
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that surrounded the city.
10
 Other groups to turn to the hillsides included impoverished 
veterans returning from the Canudos War, who camped on the Morro da Favela, later 
named Morro da Providência, in 1897. Scholars have argued that the origins of the term 
favela comes from the name of that hill, which quickly became the universal name to 
describe informal settlements in Brazil, and specially in Rio de Janeiro.
11
  
Local governments, journalists, social reformers, and hygienists in Rio treated 
nascent clusters of tenements and shantytowns as sites of disease and moral decay. The 
extensive urban reforms of mayor Francisco Pereira Passos (1902-1906) –―Brazil‘s 
Hausmann‖- modernized the old colonial city to the standards of a modern capital and 
directed sanitary campaigns crafted by hygienists and sanitarists like Oswaldo Cruz.
12
 
Poor urban residents revolted against state disciplinizing attempts, as it happened with the 
vaccination campaigns in the Revolt of the Vaccine in 1904. By the turn of the century, 
the modernization of Rio‘s society and economy, growing social tensions, the political 
instability of the recently created Republic, and the infrastructural modernization and 
beautification of Rio de Janeiro, defined an aggressive official approach to the housing 
problem that combined repressive actions and an agenda of social engineering based on 
positivism and eugenics.   
As the Republic matured, Rio's urbanized housing stock rapidly expanded from 
the central core surrounding the port and adjacent beaches as well as the Santo Antonio 
and Castelo Hills to spread towards the suburbs. This spread incorporated new areas into 
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the city, including the burgeoning employment centers and transportation networks, 
ultimately consolidating the expanded urban network. Expansion, however, followed 
geographical factors that determined the settlement of favelas. Rio‘s topography includes 
numerous crests, hills, a large natural bay filled with small islands, freshwater rivers, 
saltwater lakes and mashes, a lagoon, and oceanfront.
13
  The large Tijuca Massif, 
occupying ninety-five square kilometers and containing hundreds of smaller hills and 
forests, bisects the city. To the south of the massif lies Copacabana, Ipanema, Leblon and 
further south Barra da Tijuca. To the north lies Vila Isabel, Tijuca, Mangueira, and 
further north Bonsucesso, Ramos, Penha, Duque de Caxias, and the Baixada Fluminense. 
As population and transportation needs grew, the topography of the city became a serious 
obstacle for the urban development of the city. Public works to open new ways for 
commuting and basic infrastructure as the expansion of the water and the sewage system 
were urgent. Prior to the expansion of the urban streetcar system, and later roadways and 
tunnels suitable for private cars and municipal bus lines, these two zones were largely 
isolated. The growing middle classes settled in Rio‘s southern zone while the north saw 
the establishment of industries and factories along with new residencies. Meanwhile, 
informal housing settlements dotted around the city and its suburbs, on the sides of Rio‘s 
hills, in marshy areas skirting the Bay of Guanabara, and surrounding the city. Working 
families who could not access the formal housing market settled in the favelas seeking 
proximity to their working places: construction or domestic work in Rio‘s neighborhoods 
to the south or the industries to the north.  
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Urban planners had been considered spaces of urban poverty as a horrifying 
presence already since the Pereira Passos reform. But it was the French urbanist Alfred 
Agache, linked with the city beautiful movement, who actually condemned their presence 
in his Master Plan for Rio de Janeiro, commissioned by major Antonio Prado Júnior in 
1927. The presence of favelas for in Agache‘s plan was not only a hygienic problem but 
also an aesthetic one. The solution was simple: they had to be demolished.
14
 And 
although the Agache Plan was never implemented (the Vargas administration shelved the 
project when it comes to power) its ―hierarchical and functionalist‖ understanding of poor 




In the following years, political elites assumed a newer, more expansive and 
conciliated politics of the favela and the favelado. In the late 1930s and 1940s public 
authorities first began to recognize favelas in official documents, beginning with the first 
Building Code of 1937. In those years, the city population grew as a result of the state-
induced industrialization, improved rates of infant mortality and life expectancy. So too 
did the authorities' concerns for housing the urban poor. The municipal authorities began 
to work in conjunction with the Vargas‘s federal government adopting a more vigorous 
but fragmented approach towards favelas, empowered by the political and social 
mobilization of the urban working class the Estado Novo.
16
  Mayor Pedro Ernesto (1931-
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34 and 1935-36) reached out to favelas to build political clienteles by incorporating local 
electoral bosses and leaders –figurões and chefes- into state politics and by financing, for 
instance, escolas de samba (samba‘s schools). As Marly Silva da Motta pointed out, these 
actions signaled a shifting understanding of poverty and favela as political and 
administrative problems that had to be put under state control. 
17
  
Mayor Henrique Dodsworth (1937-45) increased the state interventionist 
approach to areas of social concern, including housing. The Secretary General of Public 
Health commissioned Dr. Vítor Tavares de Moura -a recognized sanitarista who had 
served as head of the municipal Department for Social Assistance- the organization of a 
study of the favela problem, which he presented in 1940. This study suggested the 
construction of temporal housing complexes for poor families denominated Proletarian 
Parks. Between 1941 and 1943, Rio‘s municipality built Parques Proletarios No.1 Gávea, 
No.2 Cajú and No .3 Pinto, providing housing and a whole set of disciplinary measures to 
―reeducate‖ and bring into ―organized life‖ the seven to eight thousand favela residents 
eradicated from the slums of the homonymous neighborhoods.
18
 Each Parque had social 
centers and health posts, recreational spaces, daycare, and a police station. Residents had 
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to submit to a series of stipulated regulations about entry and exit times. They were 
required to carrying identification. Residents also had to sit through lessons on morale.
19
  
Consequently, there was a growing understanding of the favela as a social 
problem that required control and administration through a moral and disciplining official 
approach, congruent with the paternalistic character of Vargas‘s and Dodsworth‘s 
populist federal and local administrations.
20
 Diverse social and political actors including 
also the Catholic Church would also share this moralizing and assistencialist approach. 
Not surprisingly this particular characterization of the favela and urban poverty required, 
rather than mere police and medical action, a careful and more comprehensive 
assessment of the situation, as the study undertaken by Dr. Tavares de Moura Favelas do 
Distrito Federal (1943) seemed to prove.
21
 By the same token, the institutionalization of 
Social Work as a discipline for young women was part of this process. Field research 
work on favelas became a requirement to graduate as a Social Worker at the Social 
Institute of the General Secretary of Health and Welfare [Instituto Social of the Secretaria 
Geral de Saúde e Assistência].
22
 Actually, many of these works together with Dr. 
                                                 
19
 Yet, rather than temporary the parques proletários became permanent until they were bulldozed in the 
early 1970s. Already in 1950, the census of favelas described the proletarian park in Gávea as a favela, 
indicating that soon after its construction housing conditions worsened. 
20
 Valladares, 62. 
21
 In addition to the works of Valladares, Valla, and Leeds, see also Lídia Alice Medeiros, ―Atendimento à 
pobreza no Rio de Janeiro durante a Era Vargas - do Albergue da Boa Vontade aos Parques Proletários 
Provisórios: a atuação do Dr. Victor Tavares de Moura, 1935-1945‖ (MA. Diss. Universidade Estadual do 
Rio de Janeiro, 2002).  
22
 The Instituto Social later became part of the Pontifícia Universidade Católica (PUC) School of Social 
Work. The students –usually female- had to write a monograph based on their field research in a favela. 
See, For a description of the eradicated favelas see Maria Hortência do Nascimento e Silva, ―Impressões de 
uma assistente sobre o trabalho na favela‖ (MA. Diss., Instituto Social, Secretaria Geral de Saúde e 
Assistência, 1943). In the 1950s and 1960s, the Parques Proletários became objects of study in the 
research of the candidates; see for instance, Isaura Lembrugel Portugal, ―Favela, Problema Administrativo‖ 
(1956); Laura Bogado Torres, ―Parque Proletário Provisório No. 1,‖ (1958); Maria Célia Guimarães da 
Cunha, ―Repercussão do problema da habitação proletária na estabilidade familiar,‖ (1959); Maria Stella 
Bezerra Pacheco, ―Uma experiência de desenvolvimento e organização de comunidade no Parque 




Moura‘s study, the first scientific analysis of favelas. This was the case of Maria 
Hortência do Nascimento e Silva‘s Impressions of a Social Worker on the Work in the 
Alums [Impressões de uma assistente sobre o trabalho na favela]. These works preceded 
the more systematic studies, especially the favela census that began to appear since the 
late 1940s.  
Federal policies also had an impact in the area of housing. The expansion of the 
functions of the Retirement and Pension Institutes (Institutos de Aposentadorias e 
Pensões; IAPSs) included the construction of housing for their members.
23
 At the local 
level, the creation of the Public Housing Foundation (Fundação da Casa Popular) in 1946 
and the Municipal Department of Public Housing of the Federal District (Departamento 
de Habitação Popular da Prefeitura do Distrito Federal). In most of the cases, Vargas 
housing initiatives for the working class reproduced the hygienic concerns exposed in the 
Agache Plan.
24
 In addition, housing policy aimed at the formal segments of the working 




Meanwhile, population growth accelerated. The construction of the Rio-Bahia 
Highway in the 1940s contributed to the densification of Rio‘s industrial northern 
suburban zone. The railroad service expansion –Leopoldina, Rio D‘Ouro, and Linha 
Auxiliar- and the inauguration of Avenida Brasil that quickly became the busiest 
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thoroughfare in Rio, contributed to the settlement of industries in the Zona Norte 
According to Mauricio Abreu, new favelas sprung up in these areas, as labor followed 
employment opportunities. Ironically, many industries took advantage of the already 




According to the 1948 census –the first census on favelas- almost 139,000 people 
lived in 105 favelas of which 44% were located in the suburbs, 24% in the South Zone; 
22% in Centro-Tijuca. In terms of their place of origin, the census reported that 52% of 
favelados had come from the neighboring states of Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais, and 
Espírito Santo, and that only thirteen percent of them chose to live in a favela.
27
 The huge 
majority reportedly lived close to their workplace.
28
 In terms of occupation, 30% of the 
counted population worked in the secondary sector, 20% in construction, and 20% as 
domestic workers –mostly in construction and domestic service concentrated in southern 
Rio.
29
   
In this context of urban expansion, industrialization, and continuing growth of 
urban spaces of poverty, actors of the civil and political sphere such as the Catholic 
Church and the Brazilian Communist Party competed for leadership and ideological 
organization in favelas since the 1940s. With a strong moralist imprint, conservative 
sectors of the Catholic Church organized the Fundação Leão XIII (FLXIII) in 1947 – in 
reference to the Pope that authored the encyclical Rerum Novarum, ―to provide moral, 
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material, and religious assistance to the inhabitants of the hills of the Federal District.‖
30
 
From 1947 and 1954, the FLXIII had a strong presence in eight of the largest favelas and 
assisted thirty-four other slums by providing water and sewage services, light, and social 
assistance. Several scholars agreed on defining the creation of the FLXIII as a joint effort 
of the Church and the State to exert ideological control over the favelas through the 
Christianization of the residents and their vertical and coopted organization. This was a 
reaction to the potential threat posed by the Communist Party after the successful election 
for the city‘s Chamber of Councils in the 1945. Conservatives argued in those years, ―we 
must climb the hill before the Communist come down.‖
31
  
By the mid 1950s, social reformist sectors of the Church, later associated with the 
Second Vatican Council, launched the Cruzada São Sebastião, a housing project built in 
the coveted neighborhood of Leblon for the families living in the favela Praia do Pinto.
32
 
Under the leadership of D. Helder Câmara –a cleric whose commitments to social justice 
for favelados later earning him the title  ―Bishop of the Slums‖— the Cruzada organized 
the construction of a housing complex of ten pavilions (945 units) equipped with social 
facilities, including a health post, daycare center, running water, and sewage.
33
 This 
experience differed from the Parques in that the Cruzada offered permanent rather than 
temporary housing and sought to minimize the social and economic impact of spatial 
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dislocation by keeping a proximity to the favela’s location. In other words, this program 
represented an attempt to promote the social integration of the favela resident into his/her 
neighborhood and the involvement of the residents through community organizations.
34
 
As a result, the Cruzada recognized the favela inhabitants as true residents of the city and 
as social, cultural, political and economic actors instead of criminals or marginals.  
The municipal administration of Francisco Negrão de Lima (1956-57), chosen by 
president Juscelino Kubitschek (1956-61) shared this recognition of the favela as a 
legitimate social and political actor. Sociologist José Arthur Rios, a respected voice on 
the favela problem, became the head of the Special Office for the Recovery of Slums and 
Anti-Hygienic Housing (Serviço Especial de Recuperação de Favelas e Habitações Anti-
Higiênicas; SERFHA). The creation of SERPHA in 1956 sought to reorganize the many 
overlapping institutions that were in charge of substandard housing in the city.
35
 Rios 
knew the situation of Rio‘s slums from first hand. He directed the first systematic study 
of favelas as director of SEGMACS, the study organized by Father Lebret that we have 
analyzed in Chapter 1.
36
 The report looked into the social conditions that explained the 
existence of favelas as a consequence of the structural economic conditions. This 
characterization became official policy with the appointment of Rios as director of 
SERFHA. For the sociologist and policymaker, the only solution to the favela problem 
was to work together with the favelados, promoting the residents direct involvement in 
defining and solving their most urgent problems. The role of the government was to 
encourage favela‘s organization in cooperatives or neighborhood associations as a way to 
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promote the initiative and self-interest of the moradores (residents), a perspective very 
much in tune wit the notion of self-help that institutions like the United Nations and the 




The government recognized all forms of people‘s improvements into their built 
environment as an investment of time and capital. SERPHA‘s role was promoting the 
organization of neighborhoods associations and working cooperatives, the production and 
provision of building materials, and the establishment of training schools for unskilled 
workers.
38
 The neighborhood associations were, in turn, required to hold regular 
meetings, to prioritize urgent needs, and stay in touch with authorities to coordinate 
technical aspects of self-help projects, which could include the installation of power lines, 
water, sewage, stairs, paving roads, and garbage collection. In the first years, however, 
SERFHA‘s field of action was limited because of financial constrains but aimed at 
establishing links with those favelas that were not under the influence of the FLXIII.  
In 1960, Carlos Lacerda became the governor of the State of Guanabara and 
appointed José Arthur Rios as director of the Secretary of Social Services, from which 
the sociologist promote self-help and community development projects. In May 1962, 
however, Carlos Lacerda dismissed Rios, named Sandra Cavalcanti instead, and began a 
more repressive action toward favelas. In the next years, favela leaders praised Rios for 
having treated them with ―dignity‖ and his ability to solve and cope with their problems 
with a realistic approach. In the two years that Rios worked for Lacerda, their working 
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relation was tense, as their personal correspondence show.
39
 But rather than personal 
animosity, it was Lacerda‘s aspirations to be a presidential candidate in a political context 
defined by the fears of the spread of communism what made his urban policy in Rio a 
key aspect of his administration.  
 
Rio de Janeiro at the Local, National, and Transnational Conjuncture 
 
By 1960, the housing stock of Rio de Janeiro could hardly mirror that city deeply 
embedded in Rio‘s popular culture as the Marvelous City (Cidade Maravilhosa). Postwar 
economic fluctuation and political instability had hampered effective urban planning, 
exacerbating a difficult situation in which the demands of a growing population 
overwhelmed not merely the state's capacity to house the poor but the entire city's 
capacity to provide such basic services as clean water, trash removal, sewage treatment, 
health and education, and traffic engineering to all city residents, regardless of income. 
Rio de Janeiro was Brazil‘s most demographically concentrated area with a total 
population of 3,306,163 inhabitants in a territory of 1,356 square kilometers and a 
resulting density of 2824 square kilometers. The favela population grew almost threefold 




Economically speaking, the onset of heavy industrialization in and around the city 
of São Paulo imposed a serious restriction on Rio‘s own industrial development, whose 
participation in the national industrial production declined from 15.16% to 9.66% 
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between 1950 and 1960. Rio remained competitive in the production of consumer basics, 
textiles, and food as well as financial services, whereas heavy industrialization 
concentrated in the industrial parks of São Paulo and the centers of raw-material 
extraction in Minas and elsewhere.
41
 While still the country‘s second industrial city, 
Rio‘s productivity could not absorb the growing number of available workers who moved 
to the service and informal sector, such as street vendors and maids, and also swelled the 
ranks of the unemployed.
42
 While not all these workers lived in favelas, these sites of 
urban poverty were actually composed of working-class families.  
In addition to the problems caused by economic decline, demographic strain, and 
deficient urban infrastructure, Rio de Janeiro lost its administrative and political 
supremacy when Brasília was officially inaugurated as the new nation‘s capital in April 
1960. Rio had been the seat of the Portuguese viceroyalty after 1763, seat of the 
Portuguese empire between 1808 and 1821, and capital of an independent Brazil after 
1822. The city's fortunes were deeply tied to governing the empire, and remained so after 
1889, even as successive constitution of the republic provided for the construction of a 
new capital.
43
 When President Juscelino Kubitschek (1956-61) took office in 1956 he 
committed his administration to the building of a new capital city for Brazil. Kubitschek 
framed his government as a new era of development and modernization and wanted 
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Brasília to epitomize that ideal building it ex-nihilo in the country‘s Central Plateau and 
in a strict modernist urban conception.
44
  
Rio had been, until then, Brazil‘s showcase nationally and internationally. Its 
beauty had caught the attention of the world since the 1930s.
45
 As the country‘s capital 
city, Rio was the ground for political competition at both the local and the federal level, 
which fostered active political participation that differed in character from the experience 
of other states.
46
 What happened at the local level could have national implications. The 
city was thus a laboratory for political projects with national projection. This 
characterization of Rio‘s politics challenged the traditional vision that argued that the 
city‘s political elites never formed cohesive political parties capable of influencing 
national politics, as it was the case in São Paulo, Minas Gerais, or Rio Grande do Sul, due 
to Rio‘s subordination to federal politics.
47
 
For a city whose ―capitality‖ (capitalidade) was key to the Carioca identity, the 
transference of the federal administration to Brasília threatened Rio‘s traditional place as 
the core of national politics and put it in the awkward position of having to define its own 
administrative status.
48
 As Silva pointed out, the future of Rio was important giving its 
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quality as a ―sounding board‖ for national issues and it had a large political electorate, 
mainly urban and literate. Three options for Rio‘s future came up as clear in the debates 
of the late 1950s, one of each favoring different political configurations. The city of Rio 
could be a federal territory, an autonomous state, or a municipality of the existing state of 
Rio de Janeiro. Each option had its limitations: the first option was ambiguous and sought 
to freeze the potential disruptive politics of Rio at the federal level. In the second case, 
the debate was whether Rio would be one among other states or become a city-state. The 
third option held the potential to dilute the significance of Rio city in the larger politics of 
Rio state.
49
 Finally, the Law 3752, known as San Tiago Dantas Law, created the Estado 
da Guanabara –the second option- on April 12, 1960. From 1960 to 1975, the city of Rio 
de Janeiro became the State of Guanabara, an autonomous city-state with a similar 
character as that of the rest of the Brazilian states. Greater Rio, including the Baixada 
Fluminense, were annexed onto to the neighboring state of Rio de Janeiro. The 
arrangement as maintained until 1975, when Guanabara and Rio de Janeiro state were 
fused into an enlarged state of Rio de Janeiro whose capital was seated in the former 
federal capital. 
After the transfer of the capital to Brasilia, the citizens of the State of Guanabara –
former Rio- were allowed to elect for the first time their own governor and federal 
representatives, which added a complex element in the balance of power between 
national and local governments.
50
 When the right-of-center journalist Carlos Lacerda 
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became the first governor of the State of Guanabara on December 12, 1960, he framed 
his administration as a rupture with past practices associated with populism, personalism, 
corruption, and lack of administrative perspective, on the one hand, and as a deliverer of 
urban reform, on the other. Lacerda‘s renowned role in the opposition to the Vargas 
regime, his political confrontation with Kubitschek, and his well-known sympathies to 
the U.S. made him a model Cold-War politician for the fledgling Kennedy 
administration.  
From the beginning, Lacerda adopted a new model of political and administrative 
style that emphasized ―modern,‖ ―efficient,‖ and technocratic management to achieve a 
more dynamic and executive bureaucratic apparatus designed to accomplish his 
ambitious program of urban renewal. His authoritative political style was also congruent 
with the appointment of technocrat cadres to key areas of the public administration.
51
 By 
blaming the bureaucracy and its politicization, he sought to create the image of a diligent 
executive in charge of a troupe of rational technicians with the knowledge and expertise 
to solve Rio‘s urgent problems. To do so, Lacerda decentralized local administration to 
guarantee organizational autonomy in the decision-making process and created autarchic 
agencies charged with urban renewal. He did so by dividing the city into Administrative 
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Regions instead of traditional municipal wards, which guaranteed him control over his 
appointed administrators rather than have to deal directly with elected local leaders.  
During his term, Lacerda targeted the areas of education, water supply and 
sewage services, transportation, housing, and the construction of roadways, tunnels and 
overpasses as key areas of his administration.
52
 Large-scale projects like the Guandú 
water system, the construction of the tunnel Santa Bárbara, the beginnings of the 
Rebouças tunnel, the reclamation through landfill and development of the Aterro de 
Flamengo, the construction of freeways and overpasses, and the erection of a large 
number of schools were among the most celebrated public works undertaken during his 
tenure. These works were possible thanks to the restructuring of the administrative body, 
which involved the creation of new secretaries and autarchic joint state-private 
companies.
53
 This set of major public works with a definitive presence in the city 
coincided with the celebration of the four hundredth anniversary of Rio‘s founding, 
certainly promoting Lacerda‘s image as a deliverer.  
Lacerda was well aware of the character of Rio as a laboratory for national 
politics, especially within the unstable democracy of Brazil in the first half of the 1960s. 
In January 1961, Kubitschek handed the presidency to political opponent Jânio Quadros, 
a politician from the center-to-right União Democrática Nacional (UDN/National 
Democratic Union) who resigned eight months later in a failed political maneuver to 
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discipline Congress and the opposition. Vice-President Jõao Goulart, a varguista from the 
pro-Vargas Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (Brazilian Workers Party; PTB) in coalition 
with the Partido Social Democrata (Social Democrat Party; PSD) became president of 
Brazil in September 1961after sorting out a preventive coup orchestrated by an alliance 
of militaries and oppositional politicians, including Lacerda.
54
  Between 1961 and 1964, 
Goulart‘s administration was marked by the political strife over his leftist and pro-labor 
position in a Cold-War context where the specters of the Cuban Revolution tainted 
everyday politics. In 1964, a military coup backed by the United States overthrew 
Goulart and imposed a harsh military dictatorship (1964-1985). 
Lacerda nourished the anxieties about the communist threat and elaborated his 
presidential ambitions for the upcoming national election set for 1965. A successful 
government in Guanabara meant a launching platform for his presidential candidacy. 
During his appointment, the governor worked hard to keep the centrality of Rio de 
Janeiro within national politics. When Leonel Brizola (1922-2004) won the elections as 
Guanabara representative to Congress in 1962 for the PTB ticket, Lacerda publicized it as 
an attack to the city. For Lacerda, Brizola was the embodiment of Vargas‘s populism and 
clientelism. While governor of Rio Grande do Sul (1959-63) Brizola‘s leftist nationalism 
took him to the nationalization of the ITT Telephone Company, action that infuriated the 
US.  Brizola and ex-president Kubitschek loomed as Lacerda‘s political competitors for 
the presidential run. Yet, in order to become a national leader, the governor had to earn 
the national presidency of the UDN. Rio, therefore, was critical to Lacerda‘s aspirations.  
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The governor‘s inflammatory reactions and the agitation of the fear of 
communism was not mere political artillery, it was also the result of the turbulent 
political times and the social ferment. Poor urban residents accompanied this general 
mood dissatisfied by economic instability, inflation, production decline, increasing 
housing shortages, lack of substantive changes in the housing market, and as a reaction to 
repressive eradications. Political awareness led to the articulation of favelas’ 
organizations that by 1963 crystallized in the creation of the Guanabara Federation of 




The local government was conscious of the potential threat that people‘s unease 
represented. In order to reduce the real possibilities of food riots as a consequence of 
inflation and supply shortages, Lacerda launched a plan for the construction of five 
markets with U.S. funds in strategic areas of the suburbs. The official rationale read,  
The sense of justice and solidarity of governments and elites to the lower classes 
has been further pressured by the collective consciousness of the masses, which are 
beginning to agitate, fermented by the eternal profiteers of times of crisis, the 
propagandists of the far left. The communist agitators, before the dramatic supply 
crisis situation (…), foster intense propaganda and, finding favorable climate of 
righteous anguish and despair, lead the masses to demonstrations disrespectful of 
the authorities and the subversion of order, endangering our own democratic 




Lacerda‘s urban and housing policies were thus part of a delicate political game 
whose pieces moved back and forth between the local and the national level. Yet, as the 
example of the U.S. assistance to build supermarkets show, this political conjuncture also 
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involved the U.S., whose presence became fundamental not only in diplomatic and 
undercover military ways but also in key aspects of social life.   
Lacerda‘s credentials as a politician hostile to the heterodoxy of populism and the 
orthodoxy of the left embodied in the figures of Vargas or Kubitscheck, yet still 
committed to certain aspects of social reform, placed him in good stead with the Kennedy 
Administration. In the context of the Cold War, the U.S. saw Lacerda as a guarantor of 
order in comparison to what was seen as the radical politics of Goulart (characterized by 
the Department of State in a secret memo as ―childish and erratic‖) or Brizola.
57
 In a 
telegram to Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Thomas Mann, 
ambassador Lincoln Gordon described the governor of Guanabara as, ―one anti-commie. 
One of ablest in country. Brilliant. Was newspaper publisher. Good administrator. Would 
make good President—under attack for being pro-American.‖ The potential political 
liabilities of the close ties between the governor and the U.S. prompted Gordon to advise 
Lacerda to maintain some distance ―so obvious a public relationship as to make him 
appear a favorite son of U.S..‖
58
  
In March 1962, Lacerda traveled to New York and Washington to negotiate with 
the IDB and USAID different funds for urban renewal programs.
59
 Before meeting with 
President Kennedy on March 26, Lacerda handed a note to Kennedy‘s staff referring to 
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the housing crisis and the opportunity it represented, as according to him, building 
housing stock would be a huge boom for labor. In that note Lacerda wrote, ―my state is, 
and could be even more so, the showcase for democratic progress in Brazil. It is the main 
center of the Communist effort. Powder may lie in the Northeast of Brazil but the wick is 
in Rio.‖
60
 In this way, Guanabara‘s governor presented himself as a reliable executive, an 
astute anti-communist, and accomplished leader who could lead Brazil into a course of 
development coincidental to U.S. interests and values. And housing was one of these 
areas that Lacerda‘s invoked to prove his abilities.   
In cultivating the relationship with the White House, Lacerda established a 
preferential relationship that ultimately allowed the arrival of U.S. loans and technical 
assistance directly from USAID to Guanabara –bypassing the control of the federal 
administration.  In so doing, Lacerda limited negotiations with the Brazilian federal 
government –of which he was a strong opponent- and capitalized on the image of an 
efficient executive administrator. In lending to a governor, USAID waived the 
requirement of considering only proposals submitted by national governments that fulfill 
the requirement of being part of an integral development plan.  This was actually the 
argument that USAID used to deny aid to governors or municipal authorities in Latin 
America, as private conversations between U.S. Ambassadors and Brazilian and 
Argentinean local authorities had proven. The Guanabara Housing Program should be 
precisely understood within this interrelation of local, national, and international politics  
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The Guanabara Housing Program 
 
In 1962, the government of Guanabara turned to a more systematic approach to 
the favela problem launching a program of slum clearance, partial favela urbanization, 
and the construction of publicly financed low-income housing complexes [núcleos 
habitacionais] to house displaced favelados. With the dismissal of José Arthur Rios from 
the Secretary of Social Service the government put previous official action toward favela 
amelioration through self-help and community development projects in a secondary 
place. Mutirão projects did not necessarily cease to exist. These programs actually 
embedded the principles of self-improvement promoted by the Alliance for Progress and 
were always good hooks in the negotiations with lending agencies.
61
 The government 
considered, however, that most of the people living in favelas were actually in financial 
conditions to formalize their situation by buying their own housing if given the 
possibility to buy it in the long term with reasonable financing. 
The causes of Lacerda‘s change in housing policy were multiple. On the one side, 
there was a generalized perception among middle and upper class cariocas that favelas 
were sites of marginality and urban squalor, an obstacle to large-scale real-estate 
interests, and an uncomfortable presence in Rio‘s cityscape. The identification of poor 
living conditions with marginality and criminality, rather than as the outcome of more 
structural economic factors, created the idea that relocating favelados in new housing 
complexes might formalize the situation of thousands of poor families. This opinion was 
in tune with that of the government and international organisms. In addition, the general 
public and the government saw favelas as obstacles to the development of the city, 
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especially for those slums located in growing areas such as the coveted upper-middle to 
upper-class neighborhoods of Ipanema and Leblon as well as places of value for tourism 
such as the morro do Pasmado, with a scenic view to the Guanabara Bay. Liberating 
those lands from the presence of slums was part of Lacerda‘s spatial reorganization and 
modernization of Rio.  
Lacerda resorted to the Alliance for Progress for economic and technical 
assistance to launch his housing program giving the scarcity of domestic savings, 
growing inflation, and the multiplicity of large-scale projects that the government was 
undertaking. Conversations with foreign organizations had already begun in May 1961 
when Guanabara authorities applied to the IDB for a line of credit for the total amount of 
ten million dollars from the Social Progress Trust Fund.
62
 Philip Glaessner, the IDB 
representative in 1961, established the guiding principles for the feasibility of the housing 
program, which emphasized the construction of the maximum number of housing units in 
the allotted amounts as a way to maximize the impact of the program.
63
 In terms of 
planning, this program implied thorough rationalization of housing construction, from the 
conception to the execution. This principle present from the beginning of the 
conversations determined the spatial design of the homes and the neighborhoods through 
the serialization of housing layouts and the construction of minimum housing limited to 
the amount of Cr$200,000 per unit. The embryo-house, the construction of a ―core‖ from 
where the homeowner could expand as their own wish following a pre-established layout, 
was the key notion behind the conception of the housing complexes. These improvements 
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would include the expansion of square footage and new construction materials would 
promote consumption. In this way, ―development‖ and ―growth,‖ part of the 
developmentalist ethos of the era would be spatial as well as moral. Despite several 
negotiations, including the visit to Rio of a joint IDB-USAID technical mission leaded by 
Stanley Baruch to analyze the project, IDB withdrew from the project to prioritize 
financing the expansion of the water supply infrastructure.
64
  
Assistance came mainly from USAID. Between 1962 and 1966, the agency 
provided four different loans from Public Law of the Wheat Fund (PL 480) and program 
loan counterpart Cruzeiros (the local currency) for almost the equivalent of U.S. dollar 
$4,500,000 (approximately 6.75 billion Cruzeiros).
65
 These funds were for costs 
associated with the construction of a handful of housing complexes in Rio‘s periphery: 
Vila Aliança in Bangú (2,183 units), Vila Kennedy in Senador Camará (originally named 
Vila Progresso; 5,069 units), Vila Esperança (464 units) in Vigário Geral, and Cidade de 
Deus in Jacarepaguá (6,658 units).
66
 In the first two cases, the original names –Alliance 
and Progress- paid tribute to the program of inter-American cooperation. After the 
assassination of the president of the United States, the government renamed Vila 
Progresso as Vila Kennedy. [Figure 3-10] 
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According to the loan proposal that the Guanabara government submitted to U.S. 
authorities, almost a third of Rio‘s population of 3.5 million were living in substandard 
housing. The housing shortage was estimated in 200,000 units with an increase of the 
housing deficit estimated at 11,500 units annually. The private construction and financial 
market did not attend this segment of the population because of the small revenue 
expected, especially in a moment of good profits with the construction of middle and 
upper classes residences, especially in the beach neighborhoods of Zona Sul, the close-in 
neighborhoods of the Zona Norte.
67
 But the government estimated that most of the people 
living in favelas were actually financially able to buy their own house in monthly 
installments by allotting, according to official estimations, between fifteen to eighteen 
(but no to exceed twenty-five) percent of their minimum wage. Rafael de Almeida 
Magalhães, Guanabara vice-governor, argued that that figure was close to the amount 
people paid to the birosqueiro, in charge of informal renting in the favela, for a shack in 
the hill.
68
 With these numbers in mind, the government initiated a housing program 
which residential units would be sold in monthly installments over a period of ten years.  
In this backdrop, the state assumed with urgency the direct construction of the 
new neighborhoods, the financing of the whole operation, and the relocation of the 
people of the favela. State action had to be fast but Guanabara‘s domestic resources for 
housing were insufficient as the government was undertaking so many expensive and 
large-scale public. As the loan proposal indicated, ―It is precisely in the first years of 
operation of the scheme, when the state still cannot count on substantial re-flow of funds 
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received in the past that we are expecting the credit assistance from the Alliance for 
Progress.‖ Paraphrasing W.W. Rostow, the document indicated that, ―foreign aid will aim 
to accelerate the take off of the housing program.‖
69
 U.S. assistance was thus central to 
launch the housing program in a time of dwelling shortages and electoral anxieties.
70
  
On the U.S. side, official experts regarded the program as promising. Upon its 
completion, there were going to be 8,747 new dwelling-units, with a total capacity for 
47,800 residents. These estimates included provisions for water, gas, and electricity 
hook-ups as well as access to healthcare, educational, commercial, and community 
facilities. The works were expected to provide 3,000 new jobs. Equally important, 
USAID considered the housing program as a pilot project that could set national 
guidelines for a national housing plan. The U.S. agency also saw its role as contributing 
to the development of self-sustaining state institutions, a guiding principle of the Alliance 
for Progress. U.S. funds, released upon the achievement of set program goals, were 
considered ―seed capital‖ whose returns had to be re-invested in the construction and 
finance of more residencies. The U.S. agreed to fund eleven percent of the total 
investment and the State of Guanabara the rest. According to Rafael de Almeida the deal 
with USAID established a repayment period of forty years with an interest rate of 2.75% 
with a seven-year initial grace period at the beginning of the program. The State agreed to 
allocate all the returns and inputs from down payments, mortgage repayments, and other 
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benefits to this end.
71
 This was exactly the kind of operations that international lending 
organizations promoted along the region in the 1960s.  
The constitution of the state of Guanabara, made official in December 1962, 
reorganized the administrative body. Article 66, in particular, created COHAB 
(Companhia de Habitação Popular), the State Popular Housing Company.
72
 COHAB was 
a joint venture between private and state capital (the State of Guanabara subscribed 51% 
of the stocks), which gave the company an autarchic status and relative autonomy from 
the state.
73
 The state established the mandatory investment of the three per cent of the 
state tax revenue to finance its share of COHAB.
74
 The agency‘s main functions were the 
study of the problem of popular housing, planning and execution of housing complexes, 
building of temporary housing for relocated residents, and favela urbanization. Since the 
beginning it was clearly stated that it was the state‘s mission to establish a plan for slum 
clearance.
75
 The vice-governor emphasized Lacerda‘s interest in making the company ―a 
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Lacerda and his vice-governor considered the favela problem more in economic 
than in social terms. Its solution was to formalize the poor urban resident by making them 
homeowners. The rule of thumb was that a family income had to be equal 25% of the 
minimum salary, i.e., a family of four had to earn at least one minimum salary, a family 
of five at least one-and-a-quarter minimum salaries. The housing program envisioned that 
at the end of a ten-year period the new homeowner would have paid for urbanization, 
construction, and financial costs. In a context of galloping inflation, the government 
stipulated periodical readjustments to avoid speculation or the decrease in the loans‘ 
value. No down payment was required. Proprietorship, therefore, was the key to the 
government initiative for most of the favela population –at least to those that the 
government identified as able to afford their own houses. As Lacerda put it bluntly years 
later, ―we are not going to give anything for free except for the miserable, the indigent. 
The poor can always pay something, within reach of their poverty ... these slum-dwellers 
may have lost hope… but they can be sure they haven‘t lost their shame not wanting to 
give up the freedom and honor."
77
   
This selection based on income created a spatial segregation, as people with the 
ability to pay would live in privately owned houses built by the state and served with 
urban and social services. Those families that could not meet those standards, however, 
were relocated in temporary housing, denominated triage areas, that lacked most of the 
fundamental social infrastructure. Interestingly enough, the term triage [that comes from 
trier, ―separate out] has an origin in the military system of assessing the wounded on the 
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não havia outra alternativa na linha de solução,‖ Rafael de Almeida Magalhães, O problema das favelas 
cariocas e sua solução, 12. 
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battlefield. This temporary housing in many cases later became permanent, new favelas 
plagued with negative stereotypes and vulnerable to violence and crime.
78
  
In June 1962, USAID provided the first one billion cruzeiro loan (about US$1.6 
million) for the construction of V. Aliança and V. Esperança, the urbanization of a favela 
in Vila de Penha, and the construction of a large hospital in Madureira.
79
 The State of 
Guanabara, represented by the Fundação Leão XIII (FLXIII), the Special Commission for 
Agricultural Commodities Agreements (CEAPA) and the U.S. Government, represented 
by USAID/Brazil, signed the first agreement on June 12, 1962, approved by the Brazilian 
Government Coordinator for Point IV.
80
 USAID assumed co-responsibility for continued 
analysis of the economic capability of the slum occupants, and their ability to repay 
loans. The FLXIII was responsible for initial suitability and feasibility studies, evaluation 
of social and physical needs of the soon to be eradicated families. The agency was the 
main authority in organizing and executing the project but, as an organism involved in 
social assistance activities, it was not organizationally or functionally capable of 
administering the new program. When the state legislature formalized COHAB in March 
1963, the housing company took over the responsibilities and duties of the FLXIII. The 
latter remained engaged in social work activities in slums.
81
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The original agreement, for which the first loan was given, comprised five sub-
projects being the construction of new housing complexes for the relocation of qualified 
residents from the eradicated slums.
82
 The other sub-projects included the urbanization of 
the favela Vila da Penha, partial improvements to a number of favelas spread over Rio, 
including community development and self-help programs, and the construction of the 
Madureira Health Center, located in a highly populated area district. The housing 
program differentiated between favelas that were suitable for urbanization, either total or 
partial, and those that had to be eradicated. The official rationale argued issues of health 
and safety in most cases as favelas were presented as unhealthy given their lack of piped 
water and sewerage, garbage collection. In many cases, their locations were far from 
hospitals and health centers. Other settlements were situated in dangerous zones, either in 
hillsides that could collapse with heavy rains and landslides or built on stilts on the water 
over the Guanabara bay. Some other favelas, however, were in valuable lands either 
sorrounding the Rodrigo de Freitas Lagoon, close to the coveted neighborhoods of 
Leblon and Ipanema, or the Morro do Pasmado, where a favela occupied a site with a 
view of the Guanabara Bay. In these latter cases, the local authorities argued that the 
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privatization of such spaces would provide the government with funds to expand the 
construction of affordable housing.  
The urbanization of favelas usually begun with aerial-photographic and 
topographic surveys; a socio-economic study of the residents and their built 
infrastructure. Then came the sanitation works, landfills and, eventually, zoning and land 
use specifications. Works usually included the construction of pedestrian and, when 
geography allowed, vehicular aceess; basic urban infrastructure, including water, sanitary 
and storm sewerage, electricity, and garbage collection. If considered necessary, 
communal facilities were also provided, including schools, markets, health and police 
posts, churches, recreational areas, or bus stops. The improvement of individual 
dwellings consisted on some –or all- of the following steps: basic sanitary inftrastructure 
(kitchen, toilet, shower), floors and ceiling, and the building of additional rooms. The 
construction of new housing units in urbanized favelas involved a number of options 
where the degree of involvement between the state and the occupand varied. For instance, 
the State could assume the total or partial construction of the unit. In the latter case, the 
dweller was responsible for its completion. For the option of self-construction, the 
government promised to supply materials, technical assistance, or long-term financing. In 
most of the cases, the program emphasized the importance of the ―integration‖ of the 
favela into self-help and community development activities, including the organization 
and participation in neighborhhood associations. In this sense, the Operação Mutirão 
approach that J.A. Rios had inaugurated continued in fifty-two favelas had by 1962 
83
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In the case of the Favela da Vila Penha, more than 40,000 people lived in the 
4,000 dwellings that covered the hill. This working class neigborhood of northern Rio did 
not occupy lands of significant value for the city, as it was the case with other favelas, so 
urbanization was economically more rational than eradication. Works were, in general, of 
the same kind of those described above and some families who lived in areas affected by 
the reforms were offered a place in the vilas. In a visit to the site in September 1964, Bill 
Williams, a top USAID/Housing and Urban Development Office (HUDO) expert, 
commented the positive impact of the works.  For the U.S. official, the Vila da Penha 
―has the appearance of a stable, working-class community, in sharp contrast to other 
favela areas that have gone unattended.‖
84
 Urbanization per se, for Williams as for urban 
planners, policymakers, and urban experts in those years was synonym of stability. 
The construction of the Madureira Health Center (Centro Médico Sanitário 
Alberto Borgerth), which began on April 5, 1963, responded to a pressing need to 
provide health services to the almost 80,000 people living in a densely-populated area 
that included twenty-one favelas. The incidence of communicable diseases, such as 
typhoid and tuberculosis, was high, and the rate of infant mortality distressing. The 
construction of the hospital is a good example of the degree of involvement of U.S. 
officials in the projects in which the funds and name of the Alliance was at stake. Internal 
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memos and conversations between COHAB and USAID authorities show concern even 
for minor details. The COHAB architects, for instance, requested authorization to USAID 
experts in order to modify the original project to build a dining room instead of a laundry 
in the second floor. USAID, however, denied the change arguing that a sanitary and 
controlled laundry was more important.
85
 In the end, the construction of the hospital 
received good reviews from USAID inspectors, who praised the quality of the building.
86
  
Undoubtedly, the construction of the Vilas- was the most important aspect of 
COHAB‘s housing plan in terms of scale and resources employed. It involved a number 
of operations including buying the terrains, levelling and urbanization works, building the 
dwellings and communal facilities, implementing the eradication and relocation process, 
and supervising the new neighborhoods. COHAB‘s looked for areas of considerable size 
to build several thousand units, easily accessible by paved highway or rail service, and 
with the capacity to offer sufficient job opportunities.
87
 Rio‘s periphery to the Western 
and North, where large, inexpensive tracts of land were available became the choice. 
Railroads such as the Estrada de Ferro da Central do Brasil and higways like the Brazil 
Ave served those areas, expecially the Western zone.  
This choice complemented Lacerda‘s plans to bolster Rio‘s battered economy. 
The Guanabara State created the Company for the Progress of Guanabara (Companhia de 
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Progresso da Guanabara; COPEG) to promote the formation of an industrial pole via state 
tax exemptions and subventions as a way to counter São Paulo‘s competence. Lacerda 
organized COPEG following the example of the Puerto Rico Industrial Development 
Company, created during Operation Bootstrap under Moscoso‘s direction. In Rio, 
COPEG had been in courting foreign lenders to fianance the establishment of a steel 
company, COSIGUA, in the Santa Cruz district.
88
 Vila Kennedy, and to a lesser extent 
Vila Aliança, built in the proximities of that industrial pole, were to provide an already 
settled and disciplined labor force.
89
 There is another element that might have influenced 
the location. USAID rules prevented real-estate speculation, leading to the selection of 
less-valuable land at a further remove from the city center. The head of the 
USAID/HUDO referred to this reason when he had to respond, years later, to internal 
investigations sparked by criticism of the poor conditions at V. Kennedy. While it is 
difficult to assess the influence of USAID in determining the location of the Vilas it 
nevertheless indicates the type of negotiations and considerations behind its decision.  
Construction in V. Aliança began in 1962 in an area of 43.1 hectares (106.5 acres) 
in Bangú Administrative Region, close to the railway station of the same name.
90
 As the 
first of the residential developments, V. Aliança had an experimental character in terms 
of urban and housing design. The site was divided in three different sections (glebas) and 
constructions developed in stages. Work included the leveling of the terrain, urbanization, 
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and the installation of basic urban infrastructure (water, sewage, and electricity).
91
 
Between 1962 and March 1963, the FLXIII built 400 units [see Appendix 1] in the first 
section and had initiated works for 1,357 units and infrastructure in the second. When 
COHAB was formalized took over the project it built 430 more units in the third section. 
By that time, families had been already relocated to the neighborhood, although the 
health and police posts, the community center, and the main square equipped with 
recreational facilities and playgrounds were yet to be built. By the end of 1965, families 
displaced during the eradication of the favelas Pasmado, Brás de Pina, Bom Jesús, and 
Getúlio Vargas occupied most of these houses (See Table 1). 
The construction of V. Kennedy begun in December 1962, in Senador Camará, 
also in the Bangú Regional Administration. Originally named Vila Progresso (Progress), 
it was renamed after Kennedy's assassination. USAID officials touted this action in 
internal reports, praising the ―people of Rio and the State of Guanabara, [who] out of 
deep love and respect for a man they cherished as a personal friend, spontaneously 
renamed the project Vila Kennedy and erected at its entrance a miniature model of the 
U.S. Statue of Liberty.‖ COHAB indeed placed an original of Bartholdi‘s sketch of the 
Statue in Plaza Miami, Vila Kennedy‘s main square.
92
 The new residents came mainly 
from two large favelas, Esqueleto (800 families; 4,400 inhabitants), and Pasmado (911 
families; 4828 inhabitants) and from others of smaller size, including Maria Angú, 
Macedo Sobrinho, Marquês de São Vicente, Ladeira dos Funcionários, and Av. 24 de 
Maio. [See Table 1]   
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Construction works also occurred in stages in three different sections. The first 




(3,633,433.31 sq.ft) the second section consisted of 1,934 units for 9,630 people, with 
construction beginning in January 1964. Work in the third section was possible thanks to 
the second release of funds, whose agreement had been signed on October 16, 1964.
93
 
Finally, a third USAID release on April 30, 1965, complemented this time with federal 
funds, allowed for further extension at V. Kennedy and the beginning of Cidade de 
Deus.
94
 Between May 1965 and December 1966, with Lacerda already gone, USAID 
contributed to the construction of 2,620 new units for 13,672 people while state and 
national funds allowed 513 additional units for 1,488 people, all located in the second and 
third section.  
The third sector incorporated a number of community facilities important for the 
everyday life that the previous two sections lacked. These were, the V.K. Social 
Educational and Sport Center (CESE) and two cooperatives, COPARO (Clothing Factory 
Coop; Cooperativa de Fábrica de Roupas) and COARTE (Crafts Coop; Cooperativo de 
Artesanato).
95
 CESE included a club house, a much-needed primary school with 
playground, an administrative office, a health post, a police sub-station, a community 
                                                 
93
 Sandra Cavalcanti, who in 1964 left the Secretary of Social Services to become the first president of the 
recently created National Housing Bank. Although the BNH existed only in paper and did not have funds it 
did not financially participate in that phase of the Guanabara housing program. Still, Cavalcanti was 
instrumental in arranging the release; ―Marcado para a semana que vem o início da construção de casas na 
segunda gleba da Vile Kennedy,‖ O’Globo, 24 October 1964, 7. 
94
 The State and the BNH loan-request of January 28, 1965, authorized by COCAP, was signed on April 30, 
1965 between the USAID Deputy Director and the Brazilian Minister of Planning and Economic 
Coordination. It released NCr$4 million (4 billion old cruzeiros), equivalent to us$ 2,150,537, from june 
23, 1964 program loan counterpart funds, Layton F, MacNichol to Bill J. Williams, 11 December 1968, 
project 512-11-830-264-1, national housing bank, low cost housing – Guanabara, entry 400, brazil subj/proj 
56-73; acc # 75-0162, box 25, RG 286, NACP. [103_2647] 
95
 Bill J. Williams to Layton P. Mac Nichol, Chief USAID/HUDO, Memorandum ―History of USAID-
Assisted Guanabara Low-Cost Housing and Slum Clearance Program,‖ 11 December 1968; project 512-11-
830-264-1, national housing bank, low cost housing – Guanabara, entry 400, brazil subj/proj 56-73; acc # 




center, a family education center, a large public park, and a soccer field. COARTE and 
COPARO were consumer/worker (mixed) cooperatives. They produced souvenirs and 
uniforms for the employees of the Secretary of Social Services. COPARO also worked as 
a vocational training center in textile and garment industry for unskilled female residents.  
These small cooperatives had been the creation of ATOPI, the Plan of Technical 
and Socio-Economic Assistance to Workers and Small Industries (Ajuda Técnico e 
Econômico Social ao Operário e Pequena Indústria) –an entity established by the Lacerda 
Administration designed to deliver training programs for workers and to stimulate small 
industry.
96
 The creation of ATOPI –of which COHAB took over by the end of 1964— 
responded to the limited job opportunities for the new residents. USAID provided 
technical assistance to ATOPI in organizing and establishing the by-laws and formal 
applications for the cooperatives. USAID, through ATOPI, also assisted in the creation of 
the bakeries –and the bread- of V. Aliança and V. Kennedy supplying the ovens and the 
flour from the Food for Peace program.
97
 The bakery ―Illinois‖ read at the entrance 
―COHAB/USAID agreement.‖ As the vilas became the object of criticism and the name 
and prestige of the Alliance for Progress was at stake, the U.S. authorities became more 
involved in projects like ATOPI and the bakeries. [Figures 11-12] 
V. Esperança was the third and smallest complex. Different from the previous two 
experiences, V. Esperança was not considered a neighborhood unit in itself but rather a 
smaller development attached to neighboring Vigário Geral. Construction begun almost 
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simultaneously with V. Kennedy in lands donated by the Cruzada São Sebastião.
98
 Its 
design did not include community facilities or the expansion of urban services and, as a 
result, the 464 units were connected to the infrastructure of Vigário Geral, taxing the 
infrastructure of the existing neighborhood.   
Cidade de Deus, the last of the neighborhoods conceived in the Guanabara 
Housing Program, was planned on a state-owned site in the Administrative Region of 
Jacarepaguá. Cidade de Deus was not part of the original plan crafted in 1962. Works on 
the site began in November 1964, but USAID became involved in it after the approval of 
the third loan on April 1965.
99
 By that time, the military dictatorship has been in power 
and created the National Housing Bank (BNH), contributing funds for these projects. The 
agreement for the third loan stipulated that half of the total investment had to come from 
the federak government, 33% from the State, and 17% from USAID. 
The the original plan envisisoned 16,000 housing units. For this reason the 
construction of Cidade de Deus involved a larger constructive and organizational 
effort.
100
 Community facilities, for instance, were to include an adminsitrative center, a 
field office, a medical post, a police sub-station, two primary schools, a kindergarten for 
200 children, a day nursery for 60 infants, a social center with library, two large public 
parks, five playgrounds, four sports fields, a large movie theatre, a multi-unit commercial 
center, a bakery, a self-service supermarket, and almost two hundred commercial-
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residential shops. These original plans for Cidade de Deus changed drastically in January 
1966 and then again in February 1967 as a consequence of the dramatic natural disasters. 
Heavy storms flooded the city causing landslides and the partial collapse of many 
hillsides, including the Morro da Providência in downtown. The bad weather paralized 
city services. More than 2,000 slum occupants perished, and another 20,000 people were 
left without shelter or belongings. USAID diverted counterpart funds originally meant for 
housing construction to the ―disaster relief program‖ in the amount of NCr$3 million. 
The Negrão de Lima administration, that followed Lacerda‘s, used those funds to repare 
the damage in Cidade de Deus and building emergency housing for 1,300 families.  
The chaotic situation and the degree of emergency created a situation where the 
government located more than two hundred families in a place that was still under 
construction, in unfinished houses that lacked connection to the public water and sewage 
system, in vacants buildings and tents.
101
 A cruel irony, premature occupancy reproduced 
the living conditions of the favela, worsened by the sudden displacement and 
consequential rupture of social, familiar, and economic links. This sad story partially 
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The Embryo-model and the spatial design  
 
The idea behind the physical design of the complexes, except for the case of V. 
Esperança, was the neighborhood unit. The construction of integrated communities 
served with communal facilities emphasized an ideal of community life and civil life. 
Early advocates of this concet, like urban planners Clarence Perry, saw the community 
center as a way to promote public life, providing meeting places for discussion and 
community activities.
103
 The strict separation between pedestrian and vehicular traffic 
sought to create a friendly, organized space complemented by open plazas and 
recreational areas. Neighborhood units were also seen as the best way to design, build, 
and manage communities in an economical way. For COHAB‘s architects and experts, 
the neighborhood unit represented a way to formalize and integrate the illegal resident 
into the community through homeownership and the provision of an urban environment 
furnished with all the elements of modern infrastructure and life. Neighborhood units also 
allowed for spatial descentralization, which in Lacerda‘s urban plans implied 
descongesting favelas and fixing the original population in the vilas of the periphery.  
The layouts of V. Aliança, V. Kennedy (except for Section 3), and V.Esperança, 
showed a spatial design that emphasized long street corridors [―grande rua corredor‖] in 
which long rows of single-family houses displayed in a flat areas created a serialized, 
sanitized residential space. This aspect reinforced a sense of closure, monotony, and 
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repetition (as contemporary pictures, layouts, and blueprints show) that differed from the 
more spontaneous and disorderly arrangement of the favela. Built in suburban and for the 
most part rural areas, the vilas also contrasted greatly with their surroundings. COHAB 
architects recognized this fact and came up with a different pattern of design. The 
introduction of the ―quadra-padrão,‖ the repetition of the same block pattern, which was 
first implemented in V. Kennedy‘s third section and later in Cidade de Deus [Figure 14] 
offered a more varied landscape through the construction of pedestrian walkways 
separated from vehicular traffic, introduction of green areas inside the blocks, assorted 
distribution of lots, introduction of color, and better road distribution.  
The Guanabara Housing Program offered the same series of housing designs for 
all the complexes. Even before the selection of the neighborhoods‘ locations, the 
government had conceived the dwelling types following the suggestions about costs and 
size that campe up during the conversations with the IDB, first, and then with USAID 
experts.
104
 The notion of social housing attached to this developments thus represented 
the experts‘ a prioristic understanding of what shelter for low-income populations should 
be rather the outcome of a careful study about the social and living necesities of the 
favela residents who were to be eradicated. That low-income housing had to be cheap in 
costs and cover minimum livable spatial requirements was already part of the debate 
among modernist architects since the late 1920s and by the 1960s was already part of the 
common sense among experts. In the case of the vilas, this rationalizing perspective was, 
from the get-go, part of the conversations between the local authorities and the 
international lending organisms. This, however, did not imply an inflexible position 
especially when the architects had to deal with the reality of the ground and the users‘ 
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real housing needs rather than with the comfort of the blueprint. As an experimental 
program, COHAB architects tried several types until reaching a convenient design.  
The central piece of the architectural program was the ―embryo-type‖ scheme, a 
house built from a core of clay bricks and cement blocks of  3.5 by five meters, a room, 
kitchen, and bathroom, with a simple finishing.
105
 The embryo-type rested on the premise 
that a family, with little additional work, might move into the house immediately and 
expand the house subsequently as time and funds allowed.
106
 [See Figure 15] COHAB 
developed different typologies of embryo-houses, including the two-room embryo that 
could expand horizontally; the duplex (vertical expansion); the row houses [casas 
geminadas]; and the front an rear house.  
The blueprints of individual houses came already with a planned layout for  the 
expansion. The basic assumption behind this plan was that as a resident-driven process, it 
created an opportunity to unleash individual and collective potentials and to empower 
low-income families through self-help programs. It also envisioned a future consumer of 
building materials. One of the advantages of this design was that it could be mass-
produced on-site at a considerable savings and it did not necessarilly involve extensive or 
complex supervision. In terms of operations, it basically required the piece of land and 
the basic utilities, after which the cores could be built on one mass step. In other words, 
while the physical program of the complexes was somewhat schematic in nature, the 
embryo-model allowed for certain flexibility whose ultimately responsibility was the 
owner‘s. In this sense, the Guanabara housing program was not a rigid final product but a 
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flexible one that had room for improvement. The program and the embryo-type solution 
responded to the notion of self-help that the United Nations, the OAS, and USAID 
promoted in their low-income housing programs in the ―Third World.‖  
COHAB architects proved different typological solutions from one neighborhood 
to the next, and within sections of the same project which confirms the experimental 
nature of the whole Guanabara Housing Project. Annex 1 shows the evolution of 
typologies in each neighborhood. In V. Aliança‘s first section (the first of all), COHAB 
begun building mostly Type A houses but they stop using it in later sections and 
developments. The spatial arrangements of these small units did not meet the architects‘ 
and the new residents‘ expectations because it led to overcrowding and confusing layout. 
The predominant designs in the four vilas were type-F (2353 units) and type-G (1634 
units), the result of the experimentation process.
107
 These two models were especially 
convenient for displaced families of up to five and nine members, respectively, which 
was more representative of the size of the families in the favelas. Other built designs 
included duplex units, also called ―embryo of vertical development‖ (embrião de 
desenvolvimento vertical), to increase density in a given space, as it was the case in V. 
Kennedy. Finally, commercial residences sought to provide a formal space to those 
commercial activities that in the favelas remained within informal circuits (the birosque). 
Cidade de Deus, conceived at a later stage, sought to capitalize the lessons learned 
previously during the construction of the vilas.
108
 At the beginning of the project experts 
pointed out that they had conceived the new neighborhhod integrally in advance. 
According to the planners, this would led them to take full advantage of available lands 
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and to better accommodate the different needs of the diverse population that it was 
intended to serve. Cidade de Deus, for instance, incorporated the block-pattern, as it was 
the case with V. Kennedy‘s third section. In addition, the complex combined single-
family residencies (3,865 units); 1,600 apartments, and 1,193 temporary units allowing 
for a more textured physical and social landscape.
109
    
 In more general terms, COHAB designs meant a rupture with the past experience 
of low-income housing built by the Department of Popular Housing of the Federal 
District (Departamento de Habitação Popular do Distrito Federal). Under the architectural 
direction of the modernist Affonso Eduardo Reidy (1909-1964), a disciple of Le 
Corbusier and part of the brilliant generation of Brazilian architects that included Lúcio 
Costa and Oscar Niemayer, the Department of Popular Housing built several working-
class projects in international style.
110
 In his projects, Reidy applied the principles of 
modernist architecture of the CIAM, including as the radical simplification of form, the 
adoption of industrialized mass-production techniques, and the use of glass, steel, and 
concrete as materials of preference. The Pedregulhos Complex (328 units), completed in 
1951 to house government employes of the then federal city, revealed the concern for 
formal solutions to the the control of light, ventilation, circulation and functional spatial 
rationalization.
111
 This complex was part of other materpieces of Brazilian modernism, 
                                                 
109
 Licia do Prado Valladares, Passa-se uma casa: análise do programa de remoção de favelas do Rio de 
Janeiro (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 1978), 24. 
110
 Carmen Portinho, Reidy long-life parter directed the Department o Popular Housing of the Federal 
Distrcit. See, Nabil Bonduki, Origens da habitação social no Brasil: arquitetura moderna, lei do 
inquilinato e difusão da casa própria (São Paulo:FAPESP, 1998); Carmen Portinho and Nabil Bonduki, 
Affonso Eduardo Reidy, (Editions Blau, 2000). On modernism and the national cultural renewal during the 
Vargas Era, see Daryle Williams, Culture Wars in Brazil: the First Vargas Regime, 1930-1945 (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2001), 13-89. 
111
 The Pedregulho Complex also followed the principle of the neighborhood unit, and included a 
residential block and common service areas: daycare, primary school, laundry, a market, a health center, 




including the headquarters of the Ministery of Education and Health, and many of the 
working-class housing complexes for built durign the Vargas era through the IAPs in 
addition to Pedregulhos, Realengo (concluded in 1943; Carlos Frederico Ferreira), or 
Penha (Roberto Brothers), among others. In this way, modernism was the architectural 
style associated with Vargas and the Estado Novo, and the symbolism around the creation 
of the estadonovista worker. Affordable housing had to be transformative of the worker‘s 
status, and it had to be financed and produced by the state.
112
 
Why, then, the rupture with this style for which Brazilian architecture was praised 
worldwide? One possibility is that Lacerda wanted to differentiate Rio de Janeiro from 
Brasília -the modernists' crown jewel- conceived and planned as a symbol of Brasil‘s 
modernity and development by Kubitschek, the governor‘s political rival. Lacerda 
actually had a long history as an oponent of Brasília and he might not wanted to use an 
architectural language that he associated with the populism and clientelism, which he so 
profoundly opposed. On the contrary, single-family homes reminded more the suburban 
house of the white, middle class family. Both architectural aestetics had also ideological 
and political connotations. During the debates of the first Pan-American Congress on 
Popular Housing (Buenos Aires, 1939), technical groups associated with the Catholic 
Church defended the single-family home as the most suitable environment for family life. 
They opposed what thet considered socialistic consequences of modernists apartment 
buildings that encouraged socialization of residents. We can speculate that Lacerda and 
even Sandra Cavalcanti‘s links with conservative sectors and the Church could have 
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influenced the idea of a neighborhood built of detached homes where families could 
share the amenities of family life. As Chapter 5 will show, COHAB‘s vilas certainly 
reflected a consertvative stance toward public housing.  
In any case, and despite the fame of Brazilian modernist architecture, low-income 
housing complexes built between 1930 and 1964 in Brazil were extremely diverse 
typologically, including modernist pavillions and multifamily buildings as well as single-
family residences. As Nabil Bonduki and Flavia Brito de Nascimento point out, CIAM 
ideals, garden-cities, and American town planning coexisted in Brazil as architects tried 
different solutions.
113
 In this sense, the aesthetic language of the vilas was already 
available to be used in oposition to the highly symbolical modernist style. Finally, it is 
also true that the modernist movement, despite having built Brasília, its hegemony was 
certainly disputed in the 1960s criticized by groups like the TEAM X or the Situationists. 
In Rio, this criticism had also reached to complexes like Pedregulhos.
114
 Another 
demonstration that Lacerda was not interested in modernist architecture was his hiring of 




The Department of Public Housing dissapeard with the creation of COHAB, 
which finished some of the projects that had begun during the previous adminsitration. A 
report from COHAB pointed out that modernist housing complexes like the Marquês de 
São Vicente in Gávea –planned by Reiddy and similar in conception to Pedregulhos- 
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were a legacy of the past and its housing concepts had been overtaken.
116
 Lacerda 
modified the original program of the São Vicente Complex and eliminated a series of 
buildings that had never been built and whose land was later given to the Catholic 
University. Reiddy, who at that moment was directing the construction of the complex 
quit his job and retired from the public activity. According to Carmen Portinho, the 
modernist architect was committed to a social agenda of public housing that differed, 
according to her, from the governor‘s vision.
117
 Reiddy died in 1964.  
 
The eradication process 
 
From 1962 to 1967, the Lacerda administration displaced 8,078 families, almost 
42,000 favela residents from more than thirty two favelas –ranging from tiny settlements 
with few shacks to highly populated slums like Pasmado or Esqueleto. [See Table 1] The 
eradication process involved several steps before final relocation in the vilas or the 
parques proletários or ―triage areas.‖ In some cases the process was peaceful, but in 
others residents resisted the removal and the use of police coercion added more trauma to 
an already difficult process. The study of the eradication of Favela do Esqueleto, whose 
residents were relocated to V. Kennedy and the parques proletarios, provides a well 
documented case. 
The Favela do Esqueleto, also known as Vila São Jorge, was located in Rio's 
Nothern Zone, right next to the Maracanã Stadium, on public federal lands.
118
 The site 
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provided good access to workplaces as it was close to main avenues and right in front of 
the Mangueira train station.
119
 The favela proximity to the world's largest sporting 
stadium, inaugurated in 1950 to host the World Cup, provided ready access to job 
opportunities on match days. Its origins of the favela dated back to the 1930s when 
Mayor Pedro Ernesto began the construction of a health clinic, which was never finished. 
According to COHAB‘s reports, the workers employed in the construction of both the 
hospital and the Maracanã Stadium (works began in 1948) occupied the site around the 
hospital‘s skeleton frame (esqueleto in Portuguese), which gave the name to the favela. 
New contingent arrived to Esqueleto when an ice-cream manufacturing plant (Kibon) 
settled in neighboring Mangueira displacing the residents living in that squatter 
settlement. By the time of Esqueleto‘s eradication, there were 15,635 people living in its 
118,520 square meters, mostly in houses made of wood and stucco served with illegal 
connections to the water distribution system and electricity. Almost a third of the 
dwellings were made of masonry, a fact the government interpreted as evidence of the 
resident‘s purchasing power.  
The government argued environmental and sanitary reasons for the relocation. In 
addition, the government has plans to build the "campus" of the Universidade do Estado 
da Guanabara (today's Universidade Estadual do Rio de Janeiro) close to the Pedro 
Ernesto Hospital, which became the university's hospital facility.
120
 Simbolically, 
COHAB‘s experts associated the favela with the populist and clientelistic practices of 
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Varguismo, which might have, allegedly, overlook the occupation of the site and the use 
of construction materials from the stadium to build their shacks in exchange for votes. 
When accused of promoting real-estate interests in the eradication of favelas many years 
later, Lacerda used the argument that he had actually began the construction of a public 
university campus, which denied, to him, the economic argument. In any case, the 
construction of the university was part of the massive program of public works that 
fostered the building industry. 
The eradication demanded a rationalized and well-planned procedure to 
coordinate the different areas involved, including social workers, engineers, architects, 
lawyers, workers and supervisors, among others. The process began with a socio-
economic survey of the favela and a strict accounting of the residents of the favelas.  
Social workers from the FLXIII and COHAB visited the place and gathered information 
on the residents‘ socioeconomic status and living conditions, including family size, 
income, marital status as a well as a record of their surrounding amenities. The data 
gathered should contribute in the construction of the vilas by providing a description of 
the housing and living needs of the future residents. Social workers also explained the 
purpose of the program, provided details about life in the new housing complexes, and 
showed (for the most part a female audience) sketches of their new houses. In the 
previous eradications of Bom Jesús and Pasmado, the department of Social Services had 
taken women to visit the vilas during while they were being built. They did so as a way to 
make them convince their husbands. The assumption was that women, as housewives and 
mothers, were more inclined to move to a better place, while men were more resilient to 




Internal communications shows that the agency requesting their social worker prudence 
when dealing with the favela residents in an effort to minimize social tensions in an 
already stressful process. Social workers and supervisors had to respond to every 
question with delicacy and with ―simple and clear‖ answers, evidencing the rather 
conflictive nature of the whole operation in a context of political dissatisfaction.  
Then, COHAB engineers subdivided the favela into twelve areas in order to 
facilitate fieldwork and the removal process; avenues, creeks, and streets facilitated the 
demarcation of the subzone. This made the eradication faster and allowed COHAB to 
spend on average three days to move the people, bulldoze the shacks, and clean the area. 
An architect or an engineer served as a field coordinator supervising the removal and 
transportation of the residents, and the bulldozing of the area. His tasks usually involved 
the organization of the foremen and the gathering of the families to be removed following 
the lists that the FLXII crafted in advance. Then, the social workers assigned the families 
to the vans (kombies), checking that the residents were in possession of a moving card 
(cartão de mudança) with their name, date, and destination. This step was very important 
to avoid speculation and the selling of the moving card among favelados. Soon to be ex-
residents were allowed to take those materials that might be of use in their new homes 
(i.e. tiles, framing timber, bricks, mosaics, floor boards, galvanized pipes, iron rods, and 
toilet frames). These materials were then loaded in company trucks and moved to either 
the Vilas or the parques. Informal transactions of any type between the residents and 
COHAB workers, e.g. trading construction materials or alcohol, were forbidden. [Figures 
21-24] Then followed the bulldozing of the area and the leveling the terrain. By the end 




the same time, that particular subsection of the favela was cleared of any reminiscence of 
the people who had lived there.  
The selection of the resident's destination was the responsibility of the social 
worker and COHAB‘s administrators, who determined the household‘s income, 
composition, and occupations to establish the number of families in condition to pay (or 
not) for their new houses. Those families that were able to meet those standards were sent 
to the Parques or triage zone; a few families decided to move to their own piece of land 
that some favelados had in the periphery or for which had negotiated with COHAB; the 
poorest inhabitants of Esqueleto who were not in condition to pay for their home were 
sent to the Parques Nova Holanda, SERFHA, Manguinos, Cajú, and São José.  But the 
vast majority of Esqueleto residents went to V. Kennedy. The destination of the 
inhabitants of Esqueleto subsection ―G‖ helps to illustrate this point. From a total of 419 
relocated families, 312 went to V. Kennedy, 21 to SERFHA, 19 to Nova Holanda, 19 to 
owned property located in the outskirts, and 13 to Cajú.
121
  
As mentioned later, this selection created a spatial segregation, as COHAB‘s 
methodology to determine income and destination in effect skimmed poverty, assigning 
one area for those working families with a slightly higher income while allocating the 
poorest people to another area. In so doing, the spatial structuration of Rio‘s periphery –
or at least of those areas and its surrounding‘s affected by COHAB‘s policy- followed a 
previous administrative structuration of social classes. In other words, the state created 
spatial difference through administrative criteria and, in so doing, helped reconstitute new 
landscapes  
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The assignment of the units was by lottery. Still, personal favors and perhaps 
corruption also intervened in the allocation of families: evidence in Lacerda‘s archive 
suggests that the governor made personal requirements to accommodate individual 
requests. Luiz Carlos de Moraes Vital, the State Secretary of Social Services by 1965, for 
instance, diligently responded to the governor‘s request in written notes when a 
beneficiary was located in a house.
122
 It is certainly difficult to establish the extent in 
number of these requests. But it is nevertheless indicative of how personalism and 
clientelistic practices were very much part of the resources at hand for his governor who 
liked to introduce himself as the epitome of technocracy and efficiency. Perhaps more 
interesting, though, is to recognize that many people actually requested the governor for 
homes in the vilas. In this way, the possibility to own a home, even in places isolated 
from the city‘s center, or even leaving the residence in a favela behind was certainly that 
many people wished to the extent of making personal requests to the governor. 
Once arrived in V. Kennedy, the moradores had to sign the deed of purchase and 
sale commitment after a quick explanation of payment modalities and responsibility. In 
cases where signature was not possible, residents were asked to do so at the agency's 
local office; the notarization of the signature, however, was ratified five months later to 
establish the effective occupation of the dwelling unit. COHAB set this procedure to 
avoid informal commercial transferences from the original beneficiary to potential 
buyers. In later days, social workers oriented the new residents on how to expand their 
embryo unit, but for the most part this orientation was brief and incomplete because of 
lack of personnel. Unfortunately, the research does not allow us to know how the new 
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residents reacted when they saw their houses. We know, though, that many families 
complained vehemently because they alleged COHAB had not fulfill original promises 
regarding, for instance, the number of rooms or the lack of detached homes. COHAB 
actually admitted having poorly planned the number of homes and recreational areas to 
reproduce the social and cultural life of the favelas, including the organization of social 





Resistance to eradication begun early when the residents of Esqueleto heard about 
the official plans by late November 1964. The leader of the neighborhood association 
Associação dos Amigos da Vila São Jorge denied to the press the argument of the 
Secretary of Social Services that seventy percent of the families had agreed to move to V. 
Kennedy. The association took an undersigned petition to the O Globo‘s newsroom 
calling, instead, for the urbanization of the favela.
123
 Families argued that dislocation 
would alienate them from labor, social and cultural networks. Commuting distance was 
another concern. For families that struggled to make a minimum income and spent most 
of it in food and transportation, with little left for clothing and almost none for rent, an 
increase in commuting costs meant a huge burden. 
Most important, the active resistance to eradication in the favelas Pasmado and 
Brás de Pina, another favela who called the attention of the press because of its 
organization and resistance, showed the degree of political organization reached by the 
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favelado movement by the end of 1964.
124
 The Federation of Favela Associations of the 
State of Guanabara (FAFEG) held the First Favelado Congress in October to oppose 
favela clearance. At the Congress, celebrated in Morro da Liberdade, representatives of 
almost a hundred favelas debated about their situation. The violent and traumatic 
eradication of Pasmado, the first large eradicated favela whose remains the government 
set on fire immediately to avoid re-occupation, triggered the alarms among poor residents 
and sympathetic sectors, including progressive Catholic groups, leftist organizations, and 
the Communist Party. Sandra Cavalcanti and Lacerda complained about the politicization 
of the favelas, the presence of political agitators, and legitimized the use of police 
violence as a way to guarantee eradications. The political climate in Brazil during the 
first months of the dictatorship was uncertain and anxiety about the favela problem grew. 
The concern was that the authoritarian regime would opt for massive repressive 
eradications.  
The conclusions of the First Favelado Congress opposed any attempt at 
eradication, and proclaimed in favor of favela urbanization and rehabilitation, 
construction of schools, and creation of worker workshops to teach skills demanded by 
the market. In addition, FAFEG claimed the recognition of the figure of the ―favelado 
citizen‖ (cidadão favelado) as a way to guarantee the favelados rights to the city as 
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legitimate members of the Brazilian and Carioca society. In so doing, the residents 
sought to overcome the negative stereotypes associated with favela.
125
  
 Resistance in Brás de Pina was key. The favela had already suffered a previous 
eradication and in 1964, Lacerda sought to clear the whole area. The residents organized 
in three different neighborhood associations unified against eradication and were joined 
by a number of parish priests linked with the group Catholic Action. The governor went 
to the favela with his technicians and armed police to initiate the removal, but the 
organized favelados together with fifty priests waited for him. Cardinal Camêra, 
conservative and anti-communist, unsuccessfully tried to mediate. When Camêra decided 
to leave the scene, the governor, true to his political style, got involved in a personal 
verbal outburst against the priests that confronted him. Local and national press covering 
the event showed Lacerda as an angry politician yelling and threatening priests who were 
working with the poor, and turned the public opinion against the eradication of Brás de 
Pina.
126
 At the end, some families gave up to the pressure of the governor and moved out, 
a decision amplified by the media. But for the most part, Brás de Pina remained 
untouched. The political experience and the defense of the favela rehabilitation was 
central few years later in the organization of the Community Development Company 
(CODESCO), the local agency that governor Negrão de Lima created for the urbanization 
of Rio's favelas, a move that of Lacerda‘s program.
127
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 And although the experience of Brás de Pina did not stop the eradication of other 
favelas, like Esqueleto, it emerged as a symbol of the struggle of poor Brazilian urban 
residents who claimed for better living and social condition as favelados. In the political 
conjuncture marked by the end of the Lacerda administration at the local level and the 
anxieties opened by the military coup at the federal, the debate between favela 
eradication and urbanization became political artillery.  
 The confrontation between the governor and Rio‘s poor residents was indicative 
of the climate of political radicalization that began to grow since the mid 1960s. Faith in 
the forces of development to promote an orderly path to social peace, as well as the 
constructive role of U.S. assistance to that process began to dim in Rio, in Brazil, and in 
the rest of Latin America. Slum residents became caught between the eradication or 
urban renewal policies. Authoritarian regimes empowered through military dictatorships 
undertook the eradication approach while democratic governments and progressive 
sectors defended an urbanization policy. As a result, the history of resistances to favela 
eradication and the support that leftist and progressive sectors gave to the rehabilitation 
program, as well as the authoritarian attempts to eradicate them, was also part of broader 
transnational trends marked by the increasing radicalization of the political conflict in 
Latin American societies. Spaces of urban poverty thus were also one of the where of the 
social and political conflict unfolded since the late 1960s. In the Brazilian case, 
neighborhoods associations and grassroot movements will emerged as important 







The cover page of the Wall Street Journal on Monday, March 20, 1967, told the U.S. 
public about the harsh conditions found in V. Kennedy. ―This community of 30,000,‖ 
wrote the reporter ―is a place that U.S. foreign administrators would just as soon forget 
about.‖ According to the correspondent, V. Kennedy was planned ―as a showcase for the 
American effort to aid Brazil, a must stop on the tour of any visiting VIP,‖ although he 
advised against taking President Johnson there in his visit to South America. Still, V. 
Kennedy was worthwhile to see for one particular reason: ―what has gone wrong here 
tells a great deal about what can -and often does- go wrong in America‘s massive foreign 
aid program.‖ In other words, ―the basic lesson of Vila Kennedy‖ –the reporter pointed 
out- ―seems to be that much more thoughtful planning often is required before taxpayers‘ 
dollars are shelled out for any new project.‖
128
  
The actual construction and occupation of V. Kennedy failed to meet this lofty 
goal. As the new housing development emerged in a flat area in the Western Zone of the 
city, the planned industrial park in Santa Cruz failed to materialize. Transportation 
services to other parts of the city remained notoriously poor. In 1966, a USAID mission 
led by Bernard Wagner, David McVoy, and Gordon Edwards -the ―Wagner report‖- 
echoed these complaints, which were confirmed that same year in an ethnographic study 
that a young anthropologist, Lawrence Salmen, conducted in V. Kennedy for the 
Brazilian Institute of Applied Economy (IPEA).
129
 Spatial isolation, ruptures of 
traditional economic, social, and cultural linkages were the problems that residents most 
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 Even Sandra Cavalcanti, Lacerda‘s secretary of social services, 
recognized privately shortcoming in the planning of V. Kennedy in a personal letter to 
the miliary president Castelo Branco when negotiating his incorporation to the federal 
government as president of the newly created National Housing Bank (BNH). ―Mr. 
President,‖  Cavalcanti pointed out in her letter, ―there is no point in making large 
complexes where there is no water, electricity, sewer, police and transportation. At Vila 
Kennedy I had to provide the bus line.‖
131
 For Cavalcanti, who took the local experience 
of COHAB to the federal level, the military government needed ―to act vigorously with 
the masses‖ as the housing crisis was mounting social discontent.  
To make things worst, the irregular occupation of vacant homes in the vilas and 
the high rate of financial delinquency compromised the revolving funds and failed to 
provide for reinvestment to build more units. Unpaved streets, irregularity of garbage 
collection, and insecurity were some of the main problems of the new neighborhoods. 
The Brazilian newspaper Journal do Brasil, illustrated the contrast between the original 
expectations of the plan and the reality of the ground in V. Kennedy, characterizing the 
neighborhood as ―a new ghetto.‖
132
 In 1969, the director of the BNH, Mario Trindade 
(1966-1971), pointed out that V. Kennedy was an example of what not to do 
urbanistically, as ―it had been scheduled to be done in a broader context surrounded with 
small and medium industries. These industries have not been installed and there was no 
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job market, getting those people in difficulty even to pay (…) These errors must all be 
taken into consideration to prevent to repeat them again.‖
133 
 
The disapproval of outcomes in V. Kennedy and V. Aliança, evidenced in the cover 
of the WSJ, was already mounting in the United States and in Brazil. USAID internal 
reports fed U.S. Senators complaints about the costs of foreign aid.
134
 Those reports 
echoed Lacerda‘s accusation of negligence and abandonment of the Vilas of the Negrão 
de Lima administration. Negrão, in turn, capitalized on the bad reputation of V. Kennedy 
and V. Aliança to promote his own housing policy and did little to improve the situation 
of the thousands of inhabitants in the vilas.
135
 During his administration, Negrão favored 
the urbanization option, creating CODESCO. This position had found increasing support 
not only among Brazilian social scientists and progressive urban planners and architects, 
but also among USAID members. The USAID Wegner report actually supported the 
rehabilitation option. But the military government reacted to Negrão‘s independence and 
his rehabilitation policies creating the Coordenação de Habitação de Interesse Social da 
Área Metropolitana do Grande Rio (CHISAM; Coordination Agency for Housing of 
Social Interest of the Greater Rio Metropolotian area) in charge of favela eradication.  
But despite the criticism, some residents in V. Kennedy pointed out positive 
aspects of their new built environment to U.S. scholar Lawrence Salmen during his 
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ethnographic work. Neighbors liked their houses, all built of solid material in solid 
grounds and served with water, sewage, and electricity, which they did not have before; 
security of tenure offered a good alternative to the fragile situation in the favelas. 
Furthermore, the residents of V. Kennedy expressed gratification for getting rid of the 
negative connotations of living in favelas and the fact that they could also become part –
at least in their self-representations- of Rio‘s middle class.
136
 Geographer Iná Elias de 
Castro, evaluated positively the experience of V. Kennedy and pointed out many of the 
arguments that some residents raised with Salmen. Castro‘s survey suggested that most of 
the relocated families in Vila Kennedy still lived there twenty years later. Three main 
reasons explained this for the geographer: the location far from the city‘s downtown –
clearly one of the most criticized factors pointed out by the detractors of the housing 
developments- might have protected the residents from the rising prices of the housing 
market; the spatial characteristics of the housing units, which allowed for further 
expansion, and finally the triumph of the ideal of homeownership.
137
   
As a pilot program, the experience of the Guanabara Housing Program served as a 
guide in the crafting of new national housing legislation, especially after the creation of 
the BNH in 1964, which brought in Sandra Cavalcanti as the first president. The literature 
on the origins of the BNH points out that the growing economic crisis, caused by 
inflation, speculation and the decline of the construction industry, led to a distress of the 
real estate sector between 1960 and 1964 causing a severe housing shortage.
138
 In this 
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sense, the federal state intervention in the low-income housing market was a way to 
reactivate the market and the construction sector.
139
 But as favelas became increasingly 
seen as potential focus of social unrest, the BNH also served as an instrument of political 
and social control. In any case, the federal authorities fashioned the BNH according to the 
lessons learned from the Guanabara Housing Program and state COHAB agencies began 
to operate around the country.  
By the late 1960s the local, national, and international situation had changed 
greatly. As we have mentioned, Brazil was under a harsh military dictatorship that 
suspended national elections wrecking Lacerda‘s presidential ambitions. The federal 
executive initiated a centralized housing policy and generalized the experience of the 
COHAB to most of the Brazilian, opening several COHAB agencies. The State of 
Guanabara finally lost the little of the relative political autonomy that had kept after the 
transference of the capital city and eliminated the political bargaining power of slums 
associations. The Alliance for Progress was, by then, winding down. Fiscally 
conservative house representatives and Senators strongly criticized the use of public 
funds for projects like the Guanabara Housing Program and took advantage of every trip 
and every negative article in the newspapers. In addition, the military dictatorship proved 
to the U.S. that their geopolitical interests in the region and the goals of the Alliance for 
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Progress (economic development and political stability) were better achieved by military 
regimes than by a highly polarized democratic process.  
In May 1969, William A. Ellis, director of USAID/HUDO wrote a letter to 
Governor Negrão de Lima letting him know that his office considered the Project 
agreement for the Guanabara Housing Program terminated as the project was completed. 
Between June 1962, and January 1966, USAID made available NCr$8.45 million (8.45 
billion old cruzeiros) and by mid-1969 more than 45,000 inhabitants were occupying 
9,000 houses in V. Aliança, Esperanza, Kennedy, and Cidade de Deus. Considering that 
its assistance in the area of low-income housing had served its purpose and that the 
Guanabara projects were completed, USAID closed its Housing and Urban Development 
Office in June 30, 1969.
140
 The urban residential dwelling in Rio at the end of the era of 
modernization nevertheless failed to be the rationalized, commoditized, and democratized 
space that early postwar planners had envisioned: wondrous apartment buildings and 
planned worker housing developments stood alongside new chaotic land invasions and 
squatter settlements. 
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Figure 1 - Teodoro Moscoso, Lincoln Gordon, and Carlos Lacerda visiting the progress of works 
at Vila Aliança; August 17, 1962; Visão (Rio de Janeiro), 31 August 1962 
 
 
Figure 2 - Governor Lacerda and U.S. Ambassador Lincoln Gordon signing the PL 480 
agreement between the Guanabara State and USAID; Estado da Guanabara-COHAB, Plano de 












Figure 4 - Vila Aliança - General View; Companhia de Habitação Popular, A COHAB através de 











Figure 5 - Vila Aliança - Detail of the main square; Companhia de Habitação Popular, A COHAB 





Figure 6  - Vila Kennedy - General View; Companhia de Habitação Popular, A COHAB através 







Figure 7 - Vila Kennedy - General View; Companhia de Habitação Popular, A COHAB através de 





Figure 8 - Vila Esperança - General View; Companhia de Habitação Popular, A COHAB através 







Figure 9 - Cidade de Deus; Companhia de Habitação Popular, A COHAB através de números e 
imagenss, (mimeo), c. 1965.  
 
 
Figure 10 - Cidade de Deus - General View; Companhia de Habitação Popular, A COHAB 






Figure 11 - Vila Kennedy - Panificio Illinois; Companhia de Habitação Popular, Relatório, 




Figure 12 - Vila Kennedy - Cooperativa COFARO; Companhia de Habitação Popular, Relatório, 





Figure 13 - Vila Kennedy – 1
st
 Section (Gleba) is South to Brazil Ave, 2
nd
 Section is north, and 
3
rd
 Section is right next to the 1
st
 on the right. In this latter case, the long corridors are eliminated 
and COHAB experimented with the quadra-padrão; Companhia de Habitação Popular, Relatório, 
(mimeo), c. 1967. 
 
 
Figure 14 - Quadra-padrão – example – This design sought to stimulate social life wihin the core 






Figure 15 - Embryo House Type A and F. As an experimental project, COHAB modified the 
typologies according to the needs and evaluation conducted during the construction process; 
Companhia de Habitação Popular, Relatório, (mimeo), c. 1967. 
 
 
Figure 16 - A Social Workers doing a house demonstration in Favela de Bom Jesús, eradicated to 
Vila Aliança; Estado da Guanabara-COHAB, Plano de recuperação de favelas e de habitações de 






Figure 17 - House demonstration in Bom Jesús; Estado da Guanabara-COHAB, Plano de 






“TO ENTER INTO THE PRESENT:” HOUSING POLICY IN BUENOS AIRES 





During his official visit to Washington, DC, in December 1961, Argentine 
Minister of Economy Roberto T. Alemann (b.1922) met Teodoro Moscoso (1910-1992), 
the director of the Alliance for Progress to talk about plans for US assistance under the 
Alliance. Alemann was representing Arturo Frondizi (1908-1995) the first civilian 
president after the military coup that ousted President Perón in 1955. Frondizi‘s 
desarrollista administration (1958-1962) sought the rapid structural transformation of the 
country‘s economy through an agenda of industrial integration, self-sufficiency in basic 
and strategic inputs, and the modernization of the productive infrastructure. Access to 
foreign credit and the availability of international funds was key to the developmentalist 
program in a context marked by insufficient domestic savings, economic instability, and 
high inflation.  
During the meeting, Alemann stressed that Argentina differed from most of other 
Latin American countries in that the country‘s problems were not of a social nature, as 
measured by social development indicators, but of credit. To underline how advanced 
Argentina was for the standards of the Alliance, Alemann commented on the progress his 
government had made in terms of institutional modernization and administrative 




Office in charge of national programming. Before this evidence, Moscoso conformity 
with the great amount of ―self-help‖ that, according to him, had been already 
accomplished in Argentina, reaffirmed that the country was probably the republic of the 
hemisphere that had complied with the basic tenets of the Charter of Punta del Este. 
―Then,‖ he added, ―you are ready for the take-off according to the Rostow theory‖ in 




The problem of housing in Argentina was an important part of the conversation 
on development, modernization, and US assistance between both officials. According to 
the minister, the country‘s most urgent social problem was with the middle and lower 
middle classes who, allegedly, suffered the most. For that the Argentine government was 
focusing on the institutionalization and capitalization of the mortgage market which 
would channel domestic resources into the production and consumption of housing, 
easing the dramatic shortages of dwellings. Alemann‘s official visit to the US was 
actually to speed up negotiations for two loan requests (one with the Inter-American 
Development Bank and another with the Development Loan Fund) intended for the 
creation and regulation of the housing financial market. Housing, therefore, was part of 
inter-American dialogues and of the political and social agenda of the Alliance for 
Progress during the 1960s.  
In this chapter, I explore the modernization of the housing problem in Buenos 
Aires during the developmentalist era. I look particularly at the way in which foreign 
economic and technical assistance as well as aesthetic languages arrived in Buenos Aires 
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in a historical moment marked by a major spatial restructuration of the city. As the 
administrations that followed the ouster of Perón addressed the problem of housing as a 
departure from Perón‘s social justice approach, they sought to organize the financial, 
institutional, and legal structure that would guarantee the functioning of the mortgage 
market andencourage domestic savings through the formation of a savings and loan 
system. Housing became the territory of economic and technical decisions that targeted 
mostly the middle and lower-middle classes. At the same time, local and international 
authorities and experts understood that a relatively smaller but socially and politically 
important social sector was not able to acquire housing through traditional market 
channels. To address that necessity, local governments proposed the construction of 
publically financed low-income housing complexes.  
The chapter analyzes the formation of the mortgage market and the construction 
of low-income housing complexes in Buenos Aires during the 1960s. I am interested in 
exploring why and how real estate and finance capital–including USAID, AIFLD, US 
private corporations, and the IDB—arrived to Argentina and what the Alliance for 
Progress actions meant in Buenos Aires, especially in comparison to Rio de Janeiro. In 
particulary, I explore the construction of two housing complexes, Villa Lugano 1-2 (VL1-
2) and Ciudad General Belgrano (CGB) that were built thanks to a loan from the IDB 
framed within the rationale of the Alliance or Progress. These housing complexes, I 
propose, can be understood as ―contact zones‖ as the point of encounter between local, 
national, and international flows of power, capital, aesthetics, and expectations about the 
modernization of the working masses of Latin America. In this way, the chapter pays 




experts, US companies and authorities, and their Argentine counterparts. This approach, 
however, does not neglect other kind of transnational flows. As the history of the design 
of VL1-2 will show, the aesthetic language used in the project was in dialogue with 
contemporary debates within the modernist movement in the field of architecture in 
Europe. In this way, I seek to offer a more nuanced picture without denying the centrality 
of US-Latin American relations in these particular years.  
Finally, in studying two housing complexes built in the southwest of Buenos 
Aires, I seek to shed light on an area that remained largely underexplored in the 
Argentine urban historiography. Most of the literature on Buenos Aires in the 1960s pays 
more attention to the modernization of city from the perspective of consumption, cultural 
renovation, and cospomolitanism. Yet, the southwest of Buenos Aires, originally a trash-
filled swampland often flooded by the Matanza River, became one of the locations that 
concentrated slums within the city limits. Such lack of academic attention to the area is 
symptomatic of the more general lack of interest of the porteño population that usually 
imagines this area as the cradle of crime, drug trafficking, and illegal immigration. Many 
of the social problems that the poor residents of this area  suffer nowadays have their 
roots in the historical moment under consideration in this chapter.  
In the following pages, I will briefly describe the growth of Buenos Aires and the 
emergence of villas miserias since the late nineteenth century. That analysis will pay 
particular attention to the unprecedented state attention to housing during the peronista 
administration (1946-1955) and the significance of the social and political mobilization 
of the working class in Buenos Aires, that new urban ―other.‖ Then, I will focus on how 




tried to solve the housing problem. I pay particular attention to the role of foreign 
organizations in defining the problem and their field of intervention in the area of housing 
according to US geopolitical and hegemonic interests.  Next is the analysis of the 
formation of the savings and loan system and the involvement of the US labor movement 
(AFL-CIO) and US real estate and construction corporations in the field of housing in 
Argentina. Finally, I study the history of Villa Lugano I-II and Ciudad General Belgrano 
within the spatial restructuration of the Parque Almirante Brown. In this case, the of the 
architectural design of the projects will seek to offer a more nuance understanding of the 
transnational flows that converged in these housing complexes, as mentioned above.  
 
Buenos Aires: Growth and Contrasts 
 
By the mid 1950s, national authorities were alarmed with the deficit of housing 
stock for middle- and low-income classes, the number of families and individuals living 
in substandard dwellings (including overcrowded boarding houses, hotels, and slums), 
and the number of obsolete homes. The context was particularly alarming given the 
impressive growth and rapid social transformation of Buenos Aires. This scenario was 
certainly not new in Argentina. In the late nineteenth century, the Argentine export-
driven economy and massive European immigration altered the social and physical 
composition of the city as population grew from 239,000 to 2,035,000 between 1869 and 
1914.
2
 When confronted by episodes including the outbreak of yellow fever in 1871, 
which decimated the city‘s population, and the tenants‘ strike in 1907, the city‘s ruling 
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elites and social engineers circumscribed the housing problem to issues of eugenics and 
social control. During the 1930s, protectionism and incipient state-led import-substitution 
industrialization prompted a new moment of expansion.
3 
The city‘s population grew 
again from 3,457,000 in 1936; 4,724,000 in 1947; 6,739,000 in 1960; and 8,353,000 in 
1970.
4
 As table 1 shows, the population of the city of Buenos Aires reached its peak by 
1947, while laterexpansion occurred mostly toward the suburbs, in the counties (partidos) 
of Greater Buenos Aires (GBA), in a process that consolidated the metropolitan region.
5
 
Such an impressive increase was the result of a second wave of migrants, this time 
coming from the countryside instead of from overseas, especially Europe. These 
percentages are impressive but this considerable growth was moderate in comparison 
with the explosion of urbanization rates in other Latin American cities (e.g. México City 
and São Paulo) in this same time. The production of affordable housing, however, did not 
grow accordingly.  
New neighborhoods and squatter settlements appeared in proximity to industrial 
jobs, while existing working-class areas kept growing as new contingents of workers 
arrived.
6
 Two areas of the city concentrated most of the slums: Retiro, close to the port 
and one of the main train terminals, and the southwest area, including the area known as 
the Bañado de Flores that would become the Parque Almirante Brown.
7
  In 1956, the 
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recently created National Housing Commission (Comisión Nacional de la Vivienda), 
undertook the first census of slums in the Federal Capital, which counted a total of 
112,350 people living in villas (1.9 percent of the total population) of which 33,920 
people lived in the villas of Federal Capital (1.1 percent).
8
 These figures were relatively 
low compared with other cities like Rio de Janeiro but numbers doubled in the following 
decade. As a result, what many had initially regarded as temporary housing was 
becoming a permanent aspect of the city, at least until 1976 when the military 





Table 4 - Population of Buenos Aires (Capital Federal, Greater Buenos Aires) (Source: Argentine 
national censuses)  
 
  
After decades in which housing was mostly the matter of private initiatives, 
President Perón made it part of his welfare state. After 1946 housing was defined, for the 
first time, as a problem of social justice. The right of every worker to a home became a 
social right in the Constitutional Amendment in 1949. The government intervened in this 
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pulation of the villas of Buenos Aires fell from almost 280,000 in 1978 to almost 19,000 few years 
later. The repressive eradication, dislocated those residents who re-settled in a vast majority in the slums 
and squatter settlements of Greater Buenos Aires. In the context of the return of the democratic regime in 
1983 and the consequences of the economic recession during the 1980s and the desindustrialization of the 
neoliberal created a new context for the multiplication and densification of villas miserias in the city and its 
suburbs.  
1869 1895 1914 1947 1960 1970 1980 1991
Federal Capital 187,346 663,854 1,576,597 2,982,580 2,966,634 2,972,453 2,922,829 2,955,002
Greater Buenos Aires 42,374 117,763 458,217 1,741,338 3,772,411 5,380,447 6,823,175 7,926,379
Metropolitan Area (FC+GBA) 229,720 781,617 2,034,814 4,723,918 6,739,045 8,352,900 9,746,004 10,881,381
Argentine Population 1,737,076 3,954,911 7,885,237 15,893,827 20,013,793 23,364,431 27,064,000 32,370,298
Metropolitan Area / Total (%) 13.2 19.8 25.8 29.7 33.7 35.8 36.0 33.6




area in several directions. Direct actions included the construction of several housing 
complexes for unionized state employees and industrial workers. Indirect actions 
included the loosening of lending regulations and injections of public funds through the 
National Housing Bank (BHN), an unprecedented provision of funds for housing and for 
the regulation of the rent market through freezing rents and prohibiting evictions.  Perón 
also sanctioned the Horizontal Property Law in 1949 that allowed the subdivision of 
property in apartment buildings.
10
  
This more active role of the state in the area of affordable housing allowed many 
working-class families to achieve homeownership for the first time. Yet, as was the case 
in Brazil with Getúlio Vargas, Perón‘s housing policies aimed at unionized workers and 
state employees but left unattended a growing sector of informal workers. In many cases, 
the state responded to these sectors by providing temporary housing in available public 
lands, as happened in the first settlements of the Bañado de Flores (Barrio Lacarra). 
Difficulties and poor housing for many working families, even with a pro-labor 
government such as the Peronist one, became portrayed in literature, plastic arts, and 
films.
11
 Indeed, the origin of the term ―villa miseria‖ came from Bernardo Verbitsky‘s 
book Villa Miseria también es América (1957).
12
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Slums and urban spaces poverty were becoming more and more an uncomfortable 
presence for most of the governments, both civic and military, that governed Argentina in 
the decades to follow. The modernization of the industrial sector (predominantly oriented 
to conspicuous consumption) broadened the social distance between a new (middle) class 
of professionals and managers joined by a smaller but important qualified, skilled 
working class, on the one hand, and the traditional industrial working class whose 
participation in the distribution of wealth decline significantly. The latter could  not 
afford homeownership and found in the villas miserias, informal settlements, and 
overcrowded hotels and boarding homes a solution to the problem of shelter.  
The first official recognition came in 1955 when the government of the so-called 
Revolución Libertadora created the Comisión Nacional de la Vivienda (CNV), which 
commissioned social surveys of the city‘s slums for the preparation of both an emergency 
and a long-term housing plan that called for the eradication of the villas.
13
 Despite the 
short existence of this organism–itself a good evidence of the inconsistency of official 
policies characteristic of the decade—it was nevertheless the first time that the state 
explicitly recognized the slums, produced data and guidelines, and recommended 
eradication. 
Still, acknowledgment of slums was not a concession from the top. By the end of 
the 1950s, the villa population began to organize against the threat of eradication policies 
and to push their own social demands for certain improvements. The Federación de 
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Villas Miseria (c. 1958) became a political actor with bargaining power, particularly in 
those (democratic) administrations more open to dialogue with (non-Peronist) popular 




Housing Policy and Developmentalism during the Alliance for Progress  
 
With the military coup that ousted Perón in 1955, state actions toward housing 
departed from the social justice approach. As the country had limited domestic resources, 
developmentalists and economic liberal elites in the late 1950s and early 1960s agreed 
that spending in social programs was unproductive. Developmentalists in particular 
wanted to concentrate the energies on the structural transformation of the economy 
through the development and verticalization of the industrial sector, which required 
extensive, thus expensive, investment in basic infrastructure.
15
 Major debates concerned 
whether housing was to be a tool of economic development or not. Giving its specific 
nature, housing is an expensive commodity in comparison to other areas of social 
spending, although it can be a quick source of employment and economic stimulus.
16
 
While housing could help to ease social tensions by creating jobs and dwellings, most of 
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the governments from 1955 to 1973, with the exception of Illia‘s administration, 
considered public spending in housing a deviation from more productive forms of 
investment. These administrations considered that development policies and good 
planning would lead to more productivity and, therefore, to a growing national wealth. 
More productivity, ultimately, was expected to improve the living standards and the 
purchasing capacity of the general population solving most of the structural problems 
associated with underdevelopment. 
As Alvaro Alsogaray—the economic liberal and US allied minister that Frondizi 
had to put in charge of the economy as part of the stabilization program negotiated with 
the International Monetary Found in 1959—put it, ―the intention is to establish a regime 
that is accessible to all who are willing to save and make a sacrifice to procure their own 
home. Building neighborhoods or buildings made by the State, and the distribution of 
units at prices and terms away from economic reality, are procedures usually more 
associated with political and propagandistic ends than with a real governmental action to 
improve housing conditions."
17
 Emphasizing sacrifice and discipline rather than waiting 
for the paternalitic state to provide for shelter, ―It is necessary to understand that the State 
cannot and should not give away housing, neither establish a conduct that could mean, in 
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Public housing policies in the 1960s thus followed two main courses according to 
the definition of the problem and the identification of the social sectors affected by it. 
First, as Alemann pointed out to Moscoso, there were the middle classes that had been 
suffering the most. The assumption was that most of the people in need of housing 
actually had the means to afford it, and if they did not do so was because of the lack of 
credit. As a result, state efforts focused in the creation of the administrative, institutional, 
and financial framework to channel domestic savings into the production and 
consumption of dwellings. The middle classes, those in a position to save for housing and 
access the financial market, became thus the main targets of the official policies.  
On the other hand, the growing presence of slums and other substandard housing 
arrangements began to be explained as an undesirable consequence of Argentina‘s 
economic modernization.
19
 In addition, working-class neighborhoods and slums could 
easily become a ground for social and political discontent, especially considering that the 
Peronist Party was banned and therefore the expression of the political identity of the 
working class officially denied.
20
 Therefore, the state assumed, at least in theory, the need 
to provide some kind of solution to these families and built a limited number of low-
income housing in several complexes.  
The formation of the market conditions for housing for the middle and lower 
middle-classes and the construction of low-income housing for the most poor were 
partially possible, to a large extent, thanks to the availability of funds from the US States 
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and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). The Alliance for Progress was the 
umbrella organization that channeled a series of old and new lending programs to Latin 
America. It also provided a common language and a relative sense of mission framed by 
cold war expectations, fears, and anxieties about the development of Latin American 
nations. The analysis of the US approach to Argentina during the Alliance will help to 
understand the context in which aid for housing was provided.  
The role of the Alliance in Argentina differed from the experience in countries 
like Brazil, Chile, Colombia, or the Dominican Republic.
21
 This was the result of the 
different geopolitical priorities in the region. In the early 1960s, Argentina was for the US 
an advanced country, located ―‗in-between‘ the fully industrialized countries and the third 
world of those less-developed countries which lack institutions and infrastructure as well 
as the human, financial and, in some cases, the natural resources for establishing a 
continued rate of growth and progress.‖ Using as criteria indicators such as per capita 
income, access to formal education, urbanization, and industrialization Argentina was 
―already the most advanced nation in Latin America,‖ which was largely in line with 
Argentines‘ national self-image. For Gino Germani, the dilemma of whether Argentina 
was a ―modern, European, progressive country‖ or an ―underdeveloped, dependent, 
almost colonial one,‖ was a false dichotomy. According to him, the country showed a 
significant imbalance between indicators on development and on modernization. ―Birth 
rate and life expectancy,‖ noted Germani, ―show levels close to those of developed 
countries. The same show demographic concentration, literacy, and the number of 
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students in higher education. The two images could translate into this: we are a socially 
advanced country, but less developed economically.‖
22
 
Differing from the Brazilian case, where US actors were more concerned with 
trade unionism and the leftist policies of President Goulart, USAID agents in Argentina 
were in fact analyzing in 1961 whether a continued presence in the country was justified. 
In a letter to US Ambassador to Argentina, Ruy Rubottom, a US State Department 
official responded to the confidential question whether it was recommendable to keep 
Argentina ―economically dependent on the US.‖ ―This idea, is one of which I entertain 
because I have reservations, as you know, about the course which US-Argentine 
economic relations may take whenever our Argentine friends are less tied to us 
economically than their present situation requires. I hope that I am not being too hard on 
them, but I do think that we must maintain a realistic attitude toward a country as 
basically self-centered and tenacious in defense of its own interests above everything else 
as my long association with Argentina has convinced me the Argentines are.‖
 23
 In the 
early 1960s, the US was less concerned with the possibility of social unrest in Argentina 
and more with the degree of the country‘s autonomy and reliability for US interests in the 
Southern Cone. 
It was perhaps Everett Hagen, Professor of Political Science and Economics at the 
MIT‘s Center for International Studies and himself a modernization theorist, who gave a 
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crude perspective about Argentina.
24
 Hagen, an expert on the relationship between social 
change, behavior and personality, traveled to Argentina in an official mission to assess its 
economic and political situation and the implications for US policy. In a confidential 
memo to Moscoso and W.W. Rostow presenting his study, the economist put it bluntly, 
―Argentina, I may borrow a phrase originally used in quite a different context, is sick, 
sick, sick.‖ To Hagen, the country suffered from inadequate political leadership and a 
strong sense of proud, nationalism, and anti-Americanism that might lead any attempt to 
influence the country into failure. The ―blindness of present leaders‖ on the top was the 
source of the public‘s general mistrust to their authorities, a symptom of social 
disintegration.
25
  One of the examples Hagen used to support his argument was his brief 
experience in an unspecified shantytown on the outskirts of Buenos Aires. The economist 
commented that what impressed him the most ―was not the low quality of the housing, 
bad though that was, but that with a few thousand dollars it would have been possible to 
grade the dirt streets to eliminate the year-round pools of water, to add to the 17 water 
taps in a village of 45,000, and to provide a sewer or two (the drainage canal being across 
the street at a lower level), and that no political leader had had the elementary cunning to 
appeal for votes in this inexpensive way.‖
26
  
Hagen was skeptical about the possibility of influencing Argentine leaders. 
Hence, he suggested proceeding with a ―policy of cool detachment, not one of hostility,‖ 
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adopting a formally correct but less cordial stance toward present political and military 
leaders as a way to avoid giving the impression to the Argentine public that the US 
supported any particular government. Housing, in this scenario, was an area in which the 
US could assist.
27
  Buildings new housing units and providing most needed collective 
facilities was a way to reduce social pressure. Hagen, therefore, recommended offering 
seed funds to unions, housing cooperatives, savings and loan associations, and some aid 
lo low-cost housing to be built by the state. Local authorities were expected to do ―the 
inexpensive simple things so conspicuously necessary‖ such street improvement, water 
pipes, and sewers in present shantytowns.
28
 For the MIT economist, actions in the field 
housing could contribute in creating an ―appearance of social responsibility in many 
varied aspects of the functioning of government.‖ He supported the idea of money being 
absorbed in housing construction projects, but here he recommended caution by making 
clear that the US share was going to be small in relation to total costs and contingent to 
the ―satisfactory continuing execution of related measures and of the program itself by 
Argentine authorities.‖Hagen was certainly skeptical about the real impact of any housing 
program in the short term, but he recognized that some small contribution could pay back 
in the future,  
The space which I have devoted to aid to housing might make it seem that I 
regard this program as of especially great promise. I do not. If the basic causes of 
social discontent continue, social disruption would be little reduced even by a 
well-executed housing program-and the program might not get at because 
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Argentine authorities might not in fact execute their part of the program. 
However, I think that a program can be developed and a basket of aid offered 
such that the offer will rebound to the benefit of the United States, and will be 
accepted by some future more responsible government if not by the present one or 
its immediate successor. (my emphasis) 
 
In a memorandum to Douglas Dillon, US secretary of Treasure, in September 
1961, the ex- Minister of Economy Alvaro Alsogaray wrote a section titled ―the housing 
problem‖ in which he defined it as a social as well as a political issue. The lack of homes 
was, according to the report, ―really critical in relation to the standard of living the 
argentines are used to [and] constitutes a serious center of social tensions.‖ But US 
authorities recognized that the situation could be relatively easy to solve if local 
authorities give it proper attention, as ―at the same time it is the only center of this nature 
that exists. In the precise moment that this problem begins to be solved, all social 
tensions will disappear and this will contribute great to the political stability.‖
29
 The 
report did not specify whether social discontent could arise from the middle or the lower 
classes, but in any case, frustration among middle classes could be a source of social 
apathy or hostility toward the government while working class dissatisfaction, in a 
context of institutionalized anti-Peronism, could become the breeding ground for social 
and political unrest.   
Minister Alsogaray also made the connection between the housing issue, social 
discontent, and political turmoil in a conversation with US Ambassador that took place in 
June, 1960. ―In spite of Argentina‘s noteworthy economic recovery,‖ said Alsogaray, 
―the housing situation remains critical and is the most glaring example which 
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Communists can use to bring home to the people their criticism of the free enterprise 
system pursued by the Argentine Government.‖ To Alsogaray, a fierce anti-Communist, 
―the solution to the housing problem (…) would go a long way toward solving great 
social problems in which Communist propaganda is having growing success. 
Contrariwise, all of the basic industrial programs now progressing in Argentina would be 
fruitless unless the social problems arising from inadequate and unsatisfactory housing 
are eliminated.‖
30
 It is hard to determine whether Alsogaray was really worried about the 
situation he described or he was playing the US authorities with Communist anxiety to 
commit them to release financial aid for housing. Yet, the minister‘s comments were not 
necessarily unfounded but overstated for effect. As we have mentioned, many slums 
residents began to organize politically and formed the Federación de Villas Miserias de 
Buenos Aires in 1958 to support the immediate demands of the villero population. At that 
time, the Federation had links with the Argentine Communist Party.  
It is in this backdrop that the expansion of the domestic mortgage market became 
a priority for Argentine authorities with the support and requirements of the US. Key to 
that project was the laying of the financial, legal and administrative foundations for the 
formalization of a savings and loan system, which except for a brief experience was 
absent in the country.
31
 By the early 1960 housing financial operations were for the most 
                                                 
30
 Memorandum of conversation between Álvaro Alsogaray and Raymond G. Leddy, Counselor of 
Embassy, June 20, 1961, entry 3167, Records related to Argentina, Box 3, RG 59, NACP. 
31
 In Argentina, the first savings organizations dated back from 1935 and they operated in a framework of 
disorganization and legal and administrative confusion until 1949 when the Peronist government decreed 
the nationalization of the banking system. According to José Ramón Martin, the system suffered from 
adequate legislations, control, and technical guidance that led to appearance of several organizations that 
were not in a capacity to survive. The state did not guarantee the savings. Still, during those years, Martin 
accounted the system financed the construction of twenty thousand units. Martin was an expert in this field 
and the founder of ARCA, one of the first S&L institutions in 1935. In 1964, USAID invited him to study 
the US S&L system as part of the technical ccoperation program of the Alliance for Progress; see José 




part channeled directly through the National Housing Bank (Banco Hipotecario Nacional; 
BHN).
32
  But inflation and conservative public spending policies decreased the 
availability of funds. The basic rationale was that capital for housing had to come not 
from the state but from the effort of those who wanted to become homeowners. The 
savings and loan system, then, was to guarantee and regulate the capitalization of a 
mortgage market that would be invested in the construction of homes for the middle and 
lower-middle classes. In broad terms, this system organizes a series of associations and/or 
financial institutions that can receive savings deposits and give mortgage and other loans. 
The associations are often mutually held which means that depositors and borrowers are 
members with voting rights and with managerial decisions. Originally, the system sought 
to stimulate the formation of ―intermediary institutions‖ such as mutual aid associations, 
cooperatives, unions, banks, or public organisms interested in building houses for their 
members.   
In the context of modernization and developmentalism of Argentina, the 
formation of the savings and loan system had several symbolic implications. It 
represented a departure from the populist practices of the past and from the definition of 
housing as a social right to be regulated and ―given‖ by the state. Housing was no longer 
a right but a consumer item that people had to earn with their sacrifice, effort, and 
responsibly in a free market capitalist system. The role of the state was to guarantee, in a 
context of high inflation and economic instability, the relative normal functioning of the 
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housing market. This also implied a more classic liberal definition of citizenship, in 
which the individual was accountable for himself instead of the social justice conception 
in which the whole society was responsible for the general welfare. Savings, therefore, 
implied an economic behavior in which short-term sacrifice would redound to a personal 
improvement, homeownership in this case. This notion was certainly a counterpoint to 
what liberal sectors saw as the manipulation and creation of a mass of passive citizens 
who expected the state, or its leader, to fulfill their needs.  In this sense, the 
modernization of the mortgage market was consistent with the expectations of 
modernization theorists (embedded in the Alliance for Progress) about the formation of a 
middle class of proprietors in a context of modern capitalism.  
In practice, successive Argentine governments during the first half of the 1960s 
focused on the formation of what came to be the Caja Federal de Ahorro y Préstamos 
para la Vivienda (―la Caja‖; a Central Housing Bank) in 1965. The first steps to its 
formation began in 1960, when the Frondizi Administration created the Federal Housing 
Fund and the Federal Housing Administration. The object was to regulate the mortgage 
market, capitalize a central fund, and providing state insurance to private savings –key to 
build confidence in an economy where inflation was higher that interest rates. Plans 
aimed at intermediary institutions, including unions, cooperatives, mutual aid 
associations, consortium of owners, banks with mortgage‘s sections, and public 
organizations. To obtain the loans, these intermediary actors had to present building plans 




with USAID for a seed loan from the Development Loan Fund ($12.5 million dollars) 
and the IDB ($37.5 million dollars) began immediately.
33
  
US authorities and experts in the field, including representatives of the Housing 
and Home Finance Agency (HHFA), were interested in promoting a system that was 
considered successful since the aftermath of the Great Depression. The depression had 
begun with the burst of a real estate bubble, which caused the collapse of the banking 
system and caused a spike in the number of foreclosures. The New Deal organized the 
savings and loan system under President Franklin D. Roosevelt with the sanction of the 
National Housing Act in 1934, creating the Federal Home Loan Bank, which guaranteed 
loans by authorized banks and agencies and regulated rates of interest and the terms of 
mortgages. The Federal Housing Authority (FHA) was actually the result of such 
restructuration and a model that US authorities sought to export abroad.  
Following the reports and recommendations of their official missions to the 
country, the Kennedy administration was committed to the seed loans very early on in the 
conversations. Yet they did not become effective until 1964 with the sanctioning of Law-
Decree 9004 (sanctioned in late 1963) that created the Caja Federal para las Entidades 
de Ahorro y Préstamo de la Vivienda, a mixed-economy society. The reasons for the 
delay in its implementation were multiple. Political and economic instability (three 
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governments and a larger quantity of finance ministers succeeded in those years) was not 
the best context to have permanent legislations approved by the Argentine Congress. 
There were also discussions whether the Central Bank or the National Housing Bank 
were the most suitable monetary and credit control agent in Argentina.
34
 By that time, US 
experts also realized that the implementation of a system inspired in the American 
experience was not going to work as ―Argentina could not afford the kind of competition 
which prevailed between the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and the Federal Reserve 
Board in the Unites States.‖ In many occasions, the Argentine government also 
complained about what they considered burdensome demands.
35
 A US report 
summarized the reasons of the delay ―due to a misunderstanding regarding the disposition 
of Argentine officials to accept and institute a savings and loan system in Argentina, a 
concept which AID seeks to promote through the loan to the Central Housing Bank (…) 
Although the GOA [Government of Argentina] as in response to our prodding issued 
decree-laws laying a bare legal and organizational foundation for a savings and loan 
system, the loan will not be signed until the loan team presently in Buenos Aires is 
satisfied that the GOA has taken the steps to meet additional legal and organization 
requirements sufficient to permit signature.‖
36
  
It was not until the Illia administration accepted the condition to organize a 
Central Housing Bank that US funds become available. That is why housing programs 
under the regulation of La Caja begun just in 1964 under the administration of President 
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Arturo Illia (1964-1966) who was also able to renegotiate the terms of the agreement and 
prolonged the deadlines to subscribe housing initiatives.
37
 [Figure 1]  
USAID‘s interest in the formation of a mortgage market in Argentina was 
consistent with the more conservative direction that the US government sought to give to 
the Alliance for Progress in terms of promoting the mobilization of private capital rather 
than taxpayers‘ money. Pressure to create a centralizing institutions such as La Caja and 
securing the compromise of the Argentine state to guarantee the investment was a way to 
stimulate US private investors into the area of housing. High inflation was certainly one 
of the main causes that deterred US developers and investors, who pushed the US 
government to pass a Housing Investment Guaranty program, as hearings before the US 
senate demonstrates.
38
 Those hearings reflected the frustration of US developers such as 
the Rockefeller family and Williard Garvey of World Homes Co.
39
  
Rodman Rockefeller, for instance, represented IBEC Housing Corporation, an 
affiliate of the Rockefeller-sponsored International Basic Economy Corporation 
(IBEC).
40
 In Latin America, the company participated in the construction industry 
applying their own prefabrication method in Puerto Rico, Chile, and Peru, that they had 
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tested before in the United States and in some other areas of the world, including 
Lebanon, Iran, and Israel. In addition, the company and the Inter-American Housing 
Center (CINVA) established a contract for the manufacturing and commercialization of 
CINVA‘s brick machinery, the CINVA-RAM, which the Center had developed to 
cheapen material costs for aided self-help projects in rural areas. But as construction was 
certainly a complex endeavor, the company diversified its interests in housing by also 
paying attention to financial services. In a letter to Moscoso, Rodman Rockefeller 
explained the plans the company had in Chile, Peru, and Argentina after their experience 
building 9,000 units in Puerto Rico. Rockefeller explained that such a good opportunity 
for investment was a result of the rise in the income levels of the Puerto Rican middle 
and lower-middle classes and because of the availability of FHA mortgages insurance 
and savings and loans mortgages. ―We are convinced that the first factor exist throughout 
most of South America,‖ said Rockefeller, ―We are equally convinced that it is essential 
that our Government and our private economy provide the means for the second to 
become effective throughout Latin America.‖  
As we can see, the Alliance for Progress was an instrument for the profit of US 
companies in Latin America. The alliance between US foreign policies and the role of the 
private sector was seen as mutually beneficial for both. As Rockefeller pointed out, ―We 
feel that we can offer to our government our capacity and experience in building in Latin 
America, so that I may become part of the National Effort towards our Alliance for 
Progress. Our government can be of immense assistance in furthering our efforts by 
making it possible for us to maintain our investments through the new all risk investment 






  Interestingly enough, IBEC was considering its commercial 
involvement in a housing project in Buenos Aires in the early 1960s and wanted to speed 
up the creation of the Municipal Housing Fund being negotiated then by Alsogaray. 
Internal memos show the capacity of lobby that a company like the Rockefeller‘s had. 
Talking about the support the Argentine Central Bank could have in guaranteeing the 
investment, W.B. Dixon, an IBEC representative, said that negotiations had to be 
conducted directly with Julio González del Solar, vice president of the Central Bank, 
―who is known by and is friendly to IBEC.‖ One of the questions that had to be asked to 
del Solar was ―whether the Argentine government will guarantee to allow us to take it out 
[remittances] and what attitude would be taken regarding remittance of profits.‖
42
 
The Alliance for Progress, therefore, represented an economic opportunity for 
profit to US developers while furthering geopolitical interests in the cold war era. Both 
objectives informed the interest of the American Institute for Free Labor Development 
(AIFLD), founded by the AFL-CIO in 1962, to act in the western hemisphere US labor 
movement, including the financing of housing in Latin America.  The purpose of AIFLD, 
as stated by Berent Friele to Nelson A. Rockefeller, ―is to assist democratic labor unions 
in the Western Hemisphere in their struggle to remain free and resist communist 
domination.‖
43
 The institution represented an interesting effort in which labor and 
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government joined hands with business and industry not only to stem ―the danger of 
Communist take-overs in Latin America‖ but also ―to defend our free enterprise 
system.‖
44
 In 1962, the US government granted $350,000 to AIFLD through USAID to 
fund its training program the Social Projects Department, created at the suggestion of the 
Labor Advisory Committee for the Alliance for Progress. AIFLD sought to support in 
Latin American ―projects sponsored by the free labor movement, such as trade union 
educational centers, training schools for skilled mechanics, worker‘s housing 
cooperatives, credit unions and similar institutions that will give labor an opportunity to 
contribute effectively to the attainment o social economic goals of the Alliance.‖
45
  
By the early 1960s, the AFL-CIO was studying the possibility of investing 
pensions funds in federally insured mortgages within the U.S. and abroad. By then, 
almost nine percent of its general pension fund was invested in mortgages from the 
FHA.
46
  The idea was to advise affiliated units who intended to invest their pension funds 
in housing mortgages guaranteed by the US government. Therefore, AFL-CIO used its 
financial resources to capitalize housing as a way to diversify institutional investment.
47
  
In 1962, George Meany, the AFL-CIO director, charged William C. Doherty, director of 
AIFLD‘s Social Projects Department, to explore financing opportunities in the field of 
housing abroad. In 1963, AIFLD sent a team of experts to study and organize major 
housing cooperatives under trade union sponsorship in Argentina, Chile, Peru, Ecuador, 
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 In April of that year, AIFLD presented a proposal to the IDB for a pilot 
housing cooperative in Argentina. The organism approved an ―only loan earmarking 
trade union participation for Argentina,‖ to supply six million US dollars in AFL-CIO 
affiliated union welfare funds, guaranteed by the AID Investment Guaranty Program, to 
be added to six million dollars from the IDB Social Progress Trust Funds. It was expected 
that local Argentine unions would match funds for the creation of a major pilot 
program.
49
 Four unions applied for AIFLD financing: the Postal and Telegraph Workers‘ 
Federation (FOECyT); Light and Power (Luz y Fuerza), Railroad Workers (Unión 
Ferroviaria), and Municipal Workers (UOEM; Unión Obreros y Empleados 
Municipales). As in Argentina the working class supported Perón and held a strong anti-
American feeling, AIFLD supported those unions that were disputing the leadership of 
the General Labor Confederation (Peronist).
50
   
In actuality, the impact of AIFLD- backed financing of housing was more 
significant in symbolic terms than in the total amount of built units. The evidence is 
incomplete but estimates indicate that the total amount of houses erected was around 
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 In making credit and housing more accessible to union members, AIFLD 
expected to boost the image and attraction of US-friendly unions while also providing an 
economic profit for AFL-CIO.
52
 The relationship between housing and cold war, in this 
case, had a more clear expression. Furthermore, it is indicative of how the Alliance for 
Progress really encompassed a mosaic of financial sources and programs that included 
USAID, IDB, AIFLD, and US private developers.  
Urban Renewal and Low-Income Housing in the second half of the 1960s  
 
More significant was the assistance the IDB provided within the framework of the 
Alliance for Progress to the Municipality of Buenos Aires (MCBA) for the construction 
of three housing complexes at a total produced of 12,500 new housing units. This 
operation was part of a major urban expansion that the city of Buenos Aires underwent 




By the middle of the twentieth century, Buenos Aires was one of the largest cities 
in Latin America. Demographically, however, population growth in the city had reached 
a limit. Since the city grew to the suburbs of Greater Buenos Aires (GBA). The 
expansion of consumption for the middle classes associated with the modernization of the 
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industrial sector and the arrival of foreign capital in the 1960s left an imprint in the city. 
New international corporations transformed and internationalized the city‘s skyline with 
skyscrapers that loomed in the city‘s downtown. imposing a new, cosmopolitan presence. 
New commercial galleries offered trendy clothes and appliances for the modern man and 
woman. The massification of the cultural industry responded to a new era of mass society 
that was eager to consume the latest books, films, and music produced locally and 
internationally. In few blocks of Buenos Aires‘ downtown—the ―Crazy Block‖ (la 
Manzana Loca)--contained the University of Buenos Aires, the Di Tella Institute (famous 
for its vanguardist art center), bookstores and cafés, concentrating the bohemia, the 
intellectual elite, and avant-garde artists and giving the city a stunning vibe of 
cosmopolitanism.
54
 Buenos Aires was, as Laura Podalsky called it, the ―specular city.‖
55
 
But that same modernization of Buenos Aires had many contrasts. As early as 
1948, several of the key urban issues had been identified in El estudio para el Plan de 
Buenos Aires (EPBA), a document drafted by a group of modernist architects who had 
been working with Le Corbusier. Problems identified in the EPBA included excessive 
concentration of commercial, residential, and industrial functions in the city‘s downtown, 
a lack of adequate zoning, the overwhelming demographic imbalance between an 
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overpopulated North and an underdeveloped South, a deficient traffic circulation system, 
limited green and recreational areas, and a general housing shortage.
56
  
Animated by the problems identified in the EPBA, Buenos Aires‘ Mayor Horacio 
Giralt, Frondizi‘s mayor, organized the Organización del Plan Regulador para la Ciudad 
de Buenos Aires (OPRBA) in 1958 to draft a master plan for the city. This Master Plan, 
approved in 1962 as the Plan Director para Capital y lineamientos estructurales para el 
area metropolitana (Master Plan for the Capital and Structural Guidelines for the 
Metropolitan Area), was inspired after London‘s postwar urban planning crafted by Sir 
Patrick Abercrombie and Great Britain ―New Towns.‖ In Argentina, the study offered an 
innovative understanding of the city as not an isolated jurisdictional unit but as part a 
more complex network within the whole metropolitan region, including the surrounding 
counties administratively under the jurisdiction of the Province of Buenos Aires. Urban 
planner Odilia Suárez, member of OPRBA, defined the Plan as perhaps ―the first and 
more complete [analysis] ever conducted.‖ The quality and skills of the body of 
technicians and professionals gathered at OPRBA was indicative of the degree of 
legitimacy that planning, science, and technical expertise had reached in the 1960s.
57
 The 
plan innovated in redefining the urban space at three different levels: the city in itself, the 
metropolitan district (within a range of 30kms), and the regional area (within a range of 
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 In addition, the plan sought to establish a series of hierarchies in the planning 
agenda that included long-term reforms as well as programs of immediate impact.  
One of the most ambitious programs of the master plan was the incorporation and 
urbanization of a vast area of approximately 1434 hectares (3543 acres), equal to nine 
percent of the city‘s total surface, located in the southwestern corner of Buenos Aires, 
which was still a relatively underpopulated swampland. Known as the Bañado de Flores, 
the region was an inhospitable rural low-lying area prone to flooding by the waters of the 
Matanza River and its tributaries. The city‘s incinerator furnaces were also located there, 
as were the shacks of many working class families who worked either in nearby 
industries or, more probable, in the municipal trash dumps. This part of the city was a site 
of continued illegal settlement, together with the area around the train terminals in Retiro.  
The contrast between the neglected south, especially the Bañado de Flores, and 
the overpopulated residential North was already indicated officially in the Proyecto 
orgánico para la urbanización del Municipio of the Municipality‘s Comisión de Estética 
Edilicia, between 1923-25.
59
 That Plan, influenced by French architect Forestier and 
inspired by the City Beautiful movement, proposed the urbanization of the Bañado as a 
park and suggested the construction of housing for the working class, an industrial area, 
and recreational facilities, including a convention center. In 1936, Socialist representative 
Manuel González Maseda presented his project for the ―Gran Parque Sud de la Ciudad de 
Buenos Aires.” [Figure 2] In his project, which repeated many of the functional spatial 
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characteristics defined in the previous project, Maseda offered a description of the area. 
In contrast with the north, where “everything is beauty,” in the south an “open field, 
ravines, swamps, and wasteland that appear there as a unique demonstration of the 
existence of the city, a category that despite appearances, is there. We have to transform 
this ugly, low-laying area plenty of nitrate, with low edification of poor value, into a large 
and beautiful park that could be, doubtless, the largest and most beautiful park in the city. 
An unforgivable mistake is to forget that the these lands constitute the largest tract of 
land, free of construction, that is left in Buenos Aires...”60 Maseda’a project emphasized 
the construction of housing and an industrial area, in addition to a municipal convention 
center and, interestingly, an airport for the city. The project was never built but in the 
following years there were partial interventions that slowly sought to regulate the space, 
including the works to regulate the Matanza River (denominated Riachuelo) and the 
construction of key transportation arteries, projected in 1939 and inaugurated in 1942.  
By the mid 1940s, the area of the Bajo Flores gained renovated interest.
61
 
According to Anahí Ballent, the Peronista government operated a symbolical re-
orientation of Buenos Aires, one that looked to the countryside rather than to Río de la 
Plata. This represented the country-oriented operation as a reaction to the city that had 
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grown looking at the river, abroad-oriented, that represented the liberal project of the 
Argentine oligarchy and liberal elites. Central to that operation was the construction of 
the International Airport Ministro Pistarini, recreational areas for the popular classes, and 
Ciudad Evita (a city garden planned community) located in Greater Buenos Aires to the 
west. A highway connected Buenos Aires with these two places. Cutting across that 
corridor was the area of the Bajo Flores. As Ballent pointed out, “the new way would pass 
through this almost empty area in terms of edification, structuring the new projects, and 
turning a rural landscape into a suburban one; in effect, the freeway was designed to go 
over a green space, among a group of low and scattered buildings…”62 
An integral part of this program was the project for the construction of the “Barrio 
Parque de los Trabajadores,” planned by modernist architects Ítala Fulva Villa and 
Horacio Nazar.
63
  [Figure 3 to 5]  The project recognized the lack of planning and 
regulation that led to the unbalanced growth of the city and sought to regulate, develop, 
and incorporate this neglected area to the benefit of the city, in general, and the working 
class, in particular. Following a strict modernist design and functional zoning, which 
separated residential, working, recreational, and commuting areas, the plan envisioned 
the urbanization of the area through the canalization of the Cildañez Creek and a series of 
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major works to control the floods of the Matanza River. It included the closing of the 
city’s incinerator and the end of garbage dumping in the area. It also established the 
development of a convention center, a stadium, and a series of recreational areas for the 
city. Even though the project was never built, many of its features were present almost 
two decades later when the works for the urbanization of the Parque Almirante Brown 
began. Among those features was the rupture of the traditional grid, an artifact that, as 
Gorelik has pointed out, represented the republican ideas for the democratization of space 
and Argentine society since the late nineteenth century. The program for the Bañanado de 
Flores designed by modernist architects Villa and Nazar showed the extent in which the 
arrival of modernism as a tool of urbanism implied the end of that era of republicanism.  
In the following years, federal and municipal authorities passed different laws and 
ordinances authorizing expropriations and purchasing of lands for the construction of 
low-income housing, ordering the drainage of the area, leveling of the terrain, opening 
and paving of roads, and the expansion of the city’s sewage system and that cut across the 
Bañado. In 1957, a decree-law transferred the expropriated terrain to the Municipality of 
Buenos Aires. Landscaping work also included the planting of more than thirty thousand 
trees, increasing city’s green spaces from 8 to 15 percent.64  
It was also in the 1940s when the first illegal settlements appeared in the Bañado 
de Flores. In 1948, a presidential decree authorized the construction of sixty temporary 
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houses for displaced families affected by urban renewal works, particular the widening of 
a central artery (Belgrano Ave). New families arrived occupying the surrounding public 
spaces, building their homes of plywood and their roofs of tarred cardboard. This 
settlement was the origin of Barrio Lacarra or Villa de Emergencia #2, according to the 
official municipal denomination.
65
 [Figure 6] That same year began the occupation of the 
Villa de Emergencia #20 with the original establishment of 120 homes that later grew 
thanks to new occupations and subdivisions.  In those years, the Bañado de Flores also 
became a trash dump, attracting poor unskilled workers that made their living removing, 
selecting, and commercializing recovering elements from the trash. This activity is called 
cirujeo [trash grubbing]  The 1942 project for the urbanization of the Bañado de Flores, 
mentioned above, described the difficult situation of the inhabitants of the area, “There, 
housing alternates with trash dumps, dropped by the Municipality in what has become the 
local industry. Among clouds of flies and breathing a miasma atmosphere, is growing a 
generation of young people of uncertain future and with a dismal present: ‗the little 
grubber‖ (el pequeño ciruja). We understand that the authorities should not keep their 
eyes close towards such an unpleasant spectacle and should get involved but providing 
the opportunity to improve this sector of the population in human conditions.‖
66
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Landfilling and the levelling of the terrain allowed for the settlements of these workers, 
giving origin to the Villa de Emergencia #3 also called, by then, Villa Nuestra Señora de 
Fátima.  
In 1955, the government of the Revolución Libertadora built Barrio Rivadavia, a 
neighborhood for low-income families which was one of several small housing complex 
the BHN built after the ouster of Perón.
67
 At the same time many of the slums affected by 
periodical flooding were relocated in available lands between Barrio Rivadavia and the 
Perito Moreno Ave, which was the access to the city from the west. This is the origin of 
the slum complex Villa 1-11-14, integrated by the Villa #1 (Medio Caño), #11 
(Bonorino), and #14 (Villa 9 de Julio).
68
 Easier access to water taps and better 
accessibility increased the density of these slums and by 1957 gave also birth to the 
Villas 13a and 13b. There, the Frondizi administration provided pre-fabricated homes 
which were famous for their half-pipe shape. Mocking the poor quality of the homes, the 
residents called their villa “medio-caño”.  In 1955, the Villa #12 (Villa Piolín) followed 
the establishment of sheds built for the storage and classification of waste and rubbish. 
The precarious shacks built in its surroundings were mostly populated by Bolivian 
immigrants, and gave origin to the most emblematic neighborhood mostly composed of 
families from the neighboring country.
69
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Finally, in the northern extreme of the Bañado, next to the highway that connects 
the international airport with the city, were located villas #5, 6, and 18. Construction 
workers of the highway built villa #5 in a construction site where they used materials to 
assemble their shacks.
70
 These slums are important to us, because the first housing 
complexes the MCBA built as part of the construction of PAB were in these locations. 
They were also the subjects of the Pilot Plan for the Eradication of Slums, launched 
during the Illia administration.  
 
Centro Urbano Integrado Parque Almirante Brown  
 
It was the Pilot Plan for the Parque Almirante Brown (PAB) of the Organización 
del Plan Regulador that established a program for the Bañado de Flores and the 
incorporation of that neglected part of the city into the urban fabric. The OPRBA focused 
on ―the promotion of urban rehabilitation of those terrains in which present-day use is 
inadequate to the level of development reached by the city‖ and specified the 
urbanization of residential and recreational zones in the city‘s south.
71
  The development 
of this area, which became known as Centro Urbano Integrado Parque Almirante Brown 
(PAB), was the most important program of urban development in terms of dimensions, 
social implications, applied organizational and technical skills, and capital investment.
72
  




 The increasing activity that trash brought to the area and the arrival and the people that arrived to the 
place on the weekends to play soccer in the spontaneously built field contributed to the expansion of the 
site and the origin of villa #6 (Cildañez) and #18 predominantly occupied by Paraguayan immigrants. The 
growth of the Cildañez villa was so rapid that municipal ordinances during the Frondizi administration 
ordered the construction of a school. Yujnovsky, 121. 
71
 Organización del Plan Regulador, Descripción Sintética del Plan Regulador (Buenos Aires; 
Municipalidad de Buenos Aires, 1968), 56.  
72
 Besides the Parque Almirante Brown, the plan indicated the creation of residential areas in ―Casa 




Presidential Decree 8717 of 1962 authorized the definitive urbanization of the 
Parque, envisioning a large-scale, multiyear program of public works that included the 
cleaning up (saneamiento) of the area, the recovery of lands by leveling the terrains, 
drainage and wetlands, flood control measures (through the tubing of the Cildañez Creek 
and the construction of artificial lakes to regulate high water), creation of green areas, and 
the construction of recreational spaces. The plan conceived a careful zoning of the area, 
divided in housing and community facilities (348 ha), recreational and green spaces (769 
ha), a small industrial park for light industries (43 ha), and roads (247 ha) [Figure 7-10]. 
Among the urban amenities prescribed in the plan for development and modernization 
were a zoological garden, an area set aside for sports (including tennis courts, soccer and 
softball fields, polo fields and riding areas), a cultural center, museums, a metropolitan 
theater, and a commercial and entertainment center.
73
 There were also plans for the 
construction of a university campus.
74
 Therefore, the urbanization of such a significant 
amount of land represented a major spatial restructuration of the city and significant 
opportunity to bring about solutions for most of the urban problems.  
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inhabitants); Plano Director del Plan Regulador, 3-4. 
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Housing for low-income families was a central part of the pilot program.
75
 These 
plans included housing for working families that could afford monthly installments. Two 
complexes were built by the MCBA right next to the highway (Dellepiane Ave) that 
linked the international airport. Most ambitious were the plans to build two separate 
neighborhood units for a total of 50,000 housing units to accommodate 250,000 people in 
Villa Lugano and Villa Soldatti.
76
 [Figure 9] Conceived as pilot programs to be built in 
stages in a period of twelve years, these neighborhoods were to provide a major solution 
to the lack of housing for low-income sectors.
77
 Villa Lugano, the plans indicated, might 
have six sections and Villa Soldati five. Conceived as neighborhood units, as it was the 
case with the vilas in Rio, the plan was to build self-contained integrated urban centers 
serviced with collective facilities including schools, health posts, day-care, schools, 
commercial center, playgrounds, a church, and public offices. Envisaging the progressive 
development of the neighborhood, the urbanization of the area also implied heavy 
investment in complex and basic infrastructure like running sewerage and water systems 
–including the channeling of the Cildañez Creek, connection to gas and electric power, 
and telephone services. [Figures 10] 
When the mayor of Buenos Aires, Francisco Rabanal, turned to the IDB with a 
loan request in December 1965, the preparations for urbanization in PAB were 
proceeding at steady pace. Most of the grading, the storm drains, the lakes, and roads 
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were well in advance. The incorporation and urbanization of the area demanded the 
federal and local government become involved with local planning through the creation 
and execution of urban renewal legislation and the institutionalization of the bureaucratic 
and technical apparatus in charge of urban reform. The MCBA assumed technical and 
financial control of the basic infrastructure and created two institutions in charge of 
coordinating the complex operation that included public national and municipal agencies, 
public utility companies, and a huge number of private contractors. These agencies were 
the Comité de Ejecución y Desarrollo para las Obras del Parque Almirante Brown 
(CEDOPAB) and the Municipal Housing Commission (CMV; Comisión Municipal de la 
Vivienda). The latter was responsible for the execution of the housing program and 
became, in the following decades, a key institutional actor in the area of housing.  
The MCBA executed and financed all the infrastructural works at Parque 
Almirante Brown and the construction of two housing complexes in Richhieri, right next 
to the highway to the International Airport. But to speed up the construction of more 
housing units, the MCBA requested a loan to the IDB‘s for the Social Progress Trust 
Fund for the construction of 6,440 units in apartment buildings in Villa Lugano, the 
eradication of four little Villas de Emergencia, as well as the construction of 3,024 single-
family houses in Ciudad General Belgrano in Greater Buenos Aires, for the people to be 
cleared from the slums. For this latter development, the Municipality of Buenos Aires 
bought an area of 90 hectares (222 acres) in Greater Buenos Aires, six kilometers from 
PAB.
78
 [figure 11]  
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Housing of social interest and the promise of providing a new built environment 
for slum residents were central in the considerations of the IDB it fitted the social 
purposes of the international organization and the core principles of the Alliance for 
Progress. In his letter to Felipe Herrera, the IDB director, Major Rabanal closed his 
supporting statement for the loan proposal by framing the project within the spirit of the 
Alliance for Progress, ―Once completed the works for the development program of the 
Parque Almirante Brown, they [the works] will become a living and dynamic example of 
the value of inter-American cooperation within the framework of the Alliance for 
Progress whose philosophy, briefly, does not purse another objective than the welfare of 




In March 1965, the MCBA sent a letter of application to the IDB for funds to the 
urbanization of PAB and the eradication of nearby slums. Between July and August 1965, 
an IDB mission headed by Ecuadorian architect Sixto Durán Ballen visited Buenos Aires 
for the first time.
80
 Between August and September of that same year, USAID had sent 
Albert L. Wilson, Director of Research and Development of the Foundation for 
Cooperative Housing‘s (FCH), to analyze the socio-economic situation of PAB‘s slum 
dwellers. In this case, USAID involvement was only in the form of technical assistance 
for feasibility studies. Wilson, sharing the optimistic expectations of the Alliance about 
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the role of technical assistance in contributing to local developmental efforts, expressed, 
―it is my deepest hope that this information and analysis may contribute to a fresh, 
positive and creative understanding between the people of Gran Buenos Aires and the 
residents of the Villas, resulting in a re-location and community development project 
which will be only the dawn of an era of accelerating social and economic progress and 
an exemplary model for the other cities of this hemisphere of ours.‖
81
  
In December 1965, the MCBA with the support, of the national government 
through the Ministry of Economy and the Council for National Development 
(CONADE), requested the IDB for a loan on the total amount of $34 million dollars for a 
partial funding of housing of social interest in PAB. Argentine authorities estimated the 
total cost of the program in $163 million dollars of which the MCBA had already 
invested almost $45 million dollars. The plan calculated that the housing deficit by the 
end of 1965 was 1,350,000 housing units plus more than 500,000 obsolete dwellings 
(total of 1,860,000).
82
 It also showed the significant decrease in public participation in the 
housing sector which fell from 48% in 1955 to 0.6% in 1962.
83
 Albert L. Wilson, the 
USAID housing expert estimated the city‘s housing deficit of 600,000 homes and the 
number of slum dwellers in 150,000, one third living in PAB. In his study of the villas 
#5, 6, and 18, Wilson found out that most of the population was actually employed and 
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had some sort of income. With a high level of employment, the US expert agreed with 
local authorities that more than four fifths of this population were capable of purchasing 
their homes if given access to properties and credit. The IDB also estimated that the 
program was going to provide a net return of 16,660,323 in thirty years in terms of 
repayment of loans. Allotted funds would thus become seed capital for a self-sufficient 
program that included the construction of the next stages in Lugano and Villa Soldati.   
After careful consideration and revisions, the IDB agreed to fund the housing 
program but demanded a series of institutional developments as well as modifications to 
the design of the housing complexes. As in most of the projects or programs funded by 
international organisms, one of the preconditions for the disbursement of funds was the 
modernization and rationalization of state bureaucracy. This was part of the public 
administration ethos of the 1960s in which planning and technical expertise increasingly 
defined the language and the competence of the state in economic and social areas of 
interest. In Argentina, such faith in the role of applied science and technology to the 
planning of development was evident in the creation of several institutions and the strong 
support to the scientific renovation, particularly the Universidad de Buenos Aires.
84
 
Among the institutional developments that IDB requested was the consolidation 
and strengthening of the CMV.
85
  The IDB wanted a semi-autonomous housing agency 
with management capacity and operational efficiency to undertake the many complex 
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responsibilities it had to assume.
86
 The first mission that visited Argentina in March 1965, 
was impressed during the first mission to Argentina with the quality of the people 
working at the CMV, under the direction of architect Maximo Vázquez Llona.
87
 They 
considered the personnel of high technical quality, devoted, and efficient but the agency 
they noted, needed more personnel and better salaries. As a result the CMV increased its 
staff and, giving its semi-autonomous status, increased salaries beyond the scale allowed 
for public municipal officials, bringing people from the private sector.
88
 By 1969 the 
CMV had thirty-three architects, thirty engineers, five sociologists, five economists, five 
land surveyors, and seventy-six technicians.
89
 According to architect Heriberto Allende, 
head of the CMV‘s Studies and Projects Divisions, the efficiency of the agency as well as 
the good relationship they had with the IDB guaranteed the continuity of the project and 
personnel despite the military coup that ousted President Illia. As chapter 5 will show, 
these conditions lasted until t the conclusion and inauguration of the first stage of VL1-2 
in 1970. In the following years, the CMV got caught within the politization of public 
administration by the time Perón was preparing his return to national politics.  
 Heriberto Allende recalls the relationship with IDB being very cordial, supporting 
but at the same time very demanding. In the first two years, which were mostly the years 
of the design of the project and works of urbanization of the area, the IDB not only 
required the MCBA to secure support with the nation and the consolidation of the CMV, 
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but it also influenced the guiding principles of the housing program. During the 
construction‘s stage (1968-1970), the IDB mission also visited the CMV‘s offices and the 
construction sites regularly, once or twice a year, the organism also assigned permanent 
supervisors and technical assistants in charge of studying and analyzing technical data, 
agreements among participant agencies, blueprints, specifications, procedures for public 
bids, adjudication of contracts, supervision of construction sites.
90
 It is, then, time to see 
the design of the housing complexes. 
 
 
The design of Villa Lugano and Ciudad General Belgrano 
VL1-2 and CGB represented an incredible opportunity not only to build housing 
for low-income residents but, perhaps more important, it was also the challenge to build 
the city [―hacer ciudad‖]. According to the original plan, VL1-2 was going to be the first 
stage of a longer plan to provide more than 50,000 housing units to 250,000 people in the 
span of 12 years. Villa Lugano (1-5) and Villa Soldatti (1-5) were going to be built in an 
area that few years prior had been a rural desolated swamp and a trash dump. That 
landscape was to receive urban services, including the expansion of the water and sewage 
system, electricity, gas, as well as the opening and pavement of the central traffic arteries 
(Roca Ave, Larrazabal, Cruz, Blanco Escalada).  The project, in addition, meant a 
planned and audacious break with the city‘s traditional urban grid of Buenos Aires. If 
such grid represented, according to Adrián Gorelik, the republican reformism of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century, this new intervention offered a new and different 
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progressive pattern of city to the urban fabric. It is in this sense, that for the architects of 
the CMV, this was the opportunity to ―hacer ciudad.‖ 
91
  
The design of Villa Lugano was very innovative and visionary. The construction 
of Lugano‘s first stage consisted in high-density towers of apartment residences placed in 
two main strips of 14-story brutalist slab blocks made of reinforced concrete, located in 
two superblocks, forming a long street corridor. [Figures 12-18] It covered about sixty-
seven hectares and included 6,440 apartments, and a commercial and civic center. The 
first phase, built between 1968 and 1970, consisted of sixty-eight towers with a total of 
3,808 apartments (2,464 one-bedroom and 1,344 two-bedroom), fifteen daycares and 264 
commercial stores. There are 56 apartments in each building. That first stage also 
included a community center, a social and sport club, a health and a policy post, a postal 
agency, magistrate‘s court (juzgado de paz), a bank, a Catholic church, four schools, and 
a kindergarten. The second stage included the construction of fourty-seven additional 
buildings (of similar characteristics as the first stage) with a total of 2,632 apartments. A 
landscaped green area surrounded the flats.
92
 
The main feature of the project was that it established a strict differentiation 
between vehicular and pedestrian traffic, locating each on different levels to avoid 
―mutual interference.‖ [Figures 15-17] Pedestrians shopping streets, for instance, were 
situated along an elevated sidewalk at the level of the first floor of the buildings and a 
system of bridges connected the towers, allowing for the creation of spaces of circulation 
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and sociability. This ―obsession‖ with a dynamic use of space and communication among 
buildings was part of the recent trends in architecture, as we will see. The set of drawings 
and blueprints attached to the loan proposal imagined a warm spatial arrangement in 




The individual apartments were of a fine quality. The proportion of housing types 
was consistent with the distribution of families according to the 1960 census: 60% of 
one-bedroom apartments [dos dormitorios] (families of three to five members), 35% of 
two-bedroom (families of five to seven), and 5% of three bedroom (families of seven or 
more). In terms of the floor plan, the design represented a simple, rationalized solution to 
optimize the use of space. All the interiors in Lugano were tiled, kitchens had ovens and 
water heater (a difference with Ciudad General Belgrano were residents were expected to 
do the finishing). Telephone connections were set. In addition, each tower had a set of 
automated elevators and trash incinerators. Manuals for the users explained with the uses 
of these facilities. In every case, all homeowners were subject to Argentina‘s horizontal 
property regime (Law 13,152/1948) that states that each owner and proportionally co-
owner are responsible for the whole building and collective facilities, as in a co-op.  
The architectural design was innovative for Buenos Aires and incorporated the 
contemporary ideas and discussions of the Team X, a group of European architects that 
challenged the Modernist conception of the city.  By the early 1950s, began a crisis 
within the modern movement that gave place to a moment of huge renovation in 
architecture. Informed by, but also as a reaction against the work of architects like Le 
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Corbusier and his Unité d‘Habitation, the Team X criticized the modernist conception of 
the housing residence for not having considered the relationship between the housing 
complex and the city at a human scale. Modernism had built wonderful residential 
buildings and had liberated the land for social and public use. Yet the modernist pavilions 
became isolated pieces, displaced in a scale that was simply too excessive for a 
comfortable urban life. The Team X gathered in 1953 during the Ninth Congress of 
CIAM and formalized a schism within the Modernist Movement.
94
 In January 1954, Peter 
Smithson, John Voelcker, Jacob Bakema, Also Van Eyck, George Candilis, and others 
that formed (the Doorn group), issued a collective ―Statement on Habitat‖ that criticized 
the modernist movement affirming that ―Urbanism considered and developed in the terms 
of the Chartre d‗Athenes [the architectural modernist manifesto] tends to produce ‗towns‘ 
in which vital human associations are inadequately expressed. To comprehend these 
human associations we must consider every community as a particular total complex.‖
95
 
The functional hierarchy of the Athens Charter, the Smithsons would say, had to be 
replaced with an architecture that could serve as an expression of community.  
The argentine architects looked at the project that Alice and Peter Smithson 
submitted for the Golden Lane Housing competition in 1952, or the work of Georges 
Candilis, Alexis Josic, and Shadrach Woods in Toulouse Le Mirail, in France (1961-
1971). The proposal was to build housing complexes, but instead of creating and isolated 
modernist pavilions, they wanted to connect them, articulate them, in a way that would 
facilitate pedestrian traffic and a more dynamic human use of the space. They 
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emphasized the relation among spaces and spatial uses, in opposition to the strict zoning 
of the modernist movement. Or, as architect Manfredo Tafuri put it, ―Here the structure 
of the Siedlungen of Weimar Germany is vastly improved and made part of a theoretical 
continuum.‖
96
 These were the ―streets in the sky‖ the concept of the Smithsons came up 
with to connect buildings by broad aerial walkways, as they did years later in Robin 
Hood Gardens in Poplar, London. This strict separation between vehicular and terrestrial 
traffic had been also explored before in the work of Jo van den Broek and Jacob Bakema 
for the reconstruction of the main shopping street of Rotterdam, the Lijnbaan, destroyed 
during the war. Between 1949 and 1954, these architects built ―an integrated complex of 
shops along two intersecting pedestrian thoroughfares and adjoined by ten-story slab like 
apartment houses facing compact green areas. A number of commercial buildings around 
the complex link it with the surrounding urban area.‖
97
  
Although the design of VL1-2 was inspired in the discussions in Europe, the IDB 
also established certain guiding principles which affected important decisions regarding 
design, adding to the idea of Lugano as this space of encounter.  Concern with the 
maximization of the social impact of the housing plan, the IDB demanded a very high 
density of 1,000 inhabitants per hectare for a total area of 50 ha that would serve to 
50,000 residents.
98
 The non-negotiable issue of density influenced the decision to build 
the tall slab towers. Any other spatial distribution would have been impossible (especially 
for single-family homes). It also affected the original plan to provide every apartment 
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with a view to the surrounding green area. This would have impeded a more rationalized 
use of space. Likewise, the original project planned some variations in the total height of 
the towers, especially at both ends of the strips to give a more diverse and textured 
landscape or, better said, skyline. But the IDB also opposed this reform of the design as it 
would also impact negatively in density. In addition, aesthetic choices that could increase 
costs were also rejected. As a result, we can say that the Alliance for Progress did not 
impose any particular aesthetic language but rather enforced certain aspirations such as 
economy of space and resources in post of a larger number of built units.   
Prefabrication is another element that can shed light about the intersections of 
transnational ideas and local conceptions. According to Heliberto Allende, international 
organisms involved in urban renewal or housing projects put pressure in local authorities 
to the importation of building materials as a stimulus to the lending country, especially 
the United States.
99
 But most of the required materials, according to Allende, were locally 
produced. Still, IDB insisted in the use of prefabricated systems as a way to reduce costs 
and stimulate the participation of foreign firms. As the 1960s was a key decade in the 
production of low-income housing in the third world, rationalization, standardization, 
serialization of construction systems, and the mass production of building components 
became a key topic. International organisms like the UN, USAID, and IDB sought to 
advise planners, engineers, and architects from developing countries with methods to 
achieve systematic solutions to building requirements. Serialization and mass production, 
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the example in Europe and the US seemed to demonstrate, became a central paradigm to 
lower construction costs. 
In 1967, the United Nations organized a meeting in Denmark for Latin American 
American experts, which included representatives from the OAS, IDB, and the UN, on 
capacitation in prefabrication methods. Heriberto Allende participated in that trip. After 
his return to Buenos Aires, and aware of IDB‘s insistence in pre-fabrication, Allende 
gathered his team to think the feasibility of using pre-fabrication techniques. After long 
conversations, the personnel agreed that as a public organism it was not recommendable 
to support just one construction system, a decision that would have affected negatively 
local contractors and companies building traditionally. In addition, as a pilot project, the 
CMV wanted to experiment with different construction systems.  
Still, the design of Villa Lugano was modified in order to facilitate a mix-
technique and allow for the inclusion of prefabrication, serialization, and mass production 
of certain elements. The use of repeated modules was central. The CMV came up with a 
design that reduced all the building components to a particular unit (3.15-meter unit). All 
the designs of the project had to be reducible to that unit (or be multiple of it). The 
windows, for instance, are perhaps the best example to illustrate this point. Considering 
the scale of the project, it was necessary to mass-produce offsite themore than 6,500 
windows. The CMV used this opportunity to try different materials and solutions. The 
final result were fiber cement panels of 3.15 meters long with aluminum windows of 
3.15m by 1.50m that were added to the buildings with cranes.
100
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As a result, Villa Lugano became an experimental program and served local 
authorities to realize that Argentina was a country more suitable for the use of mixed 
construction systems rather than one, fully mechanized prefabricated system. 
Prefabrication appeared more reasonable in Europe or the US where labor costs were 
higher and weather conditions imposed limits in the seasonality of civil construction. In 
Argentina, prefabrication was not economically reasonable, which in other terms means 
that it was more profitable to hire poorly paid manual labor than investing in technology. 
As Guillermo Vitelli pointed out in the past, construction workers‘ salaries increased less 
than productivity, making construction companies to gain profit and keep a flexible 
structure more suitable for an unstable market.
101
  
In the case of Ciudad General Belgrano, the scale of the project was significant 
although smaller in comparison to the VL1-2. The plan was simpler. [Figures 19-21] 
Localized in La Matanza district, Greater Buenos Aires, CMV planned the construction 
of a neighborhood unit of 3,024 single-family units, covering 90 hectares of the 400 the 
city owned in the province. This was an unusual operation as it was strange for the city to 
have territory in another jurisdiction. According to Allende, there were internal debates 
with the CMV team of sociologists and social workers leaded by sociologist Joaquín 
Fischerman about whether to build monoblocks or single-family homes. Fischerman was 
working at that time in Villa #5, 6, 6 bis, and 18, located in PAB, whose residents were 
going to be relocated mostly in CGB. Among the people who supported the detached 
home were many that argued that the as rural migrants, many of the future resident would 
prefer to have their backyard as they were more used to that habitat, a discourse that, we 
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have seen in Chapter 1, repeated the general stereotypes about these urban residents. In 
this sense, VL1-2 was a more expensive project and, therefore, the people to be relocated 
there were of a higher income than the ones that were going to be settled in CGB. The 
units were kept to a simple design that maximized a rather small space.  The finishing 
was also basic.  Defined as a self-aided project, new residents were expected to assume 
active responsibilities for their place. As it was the case with VL1-2, the project also 
required the extension of the urban infrastructure and communal facilities characterstics 
of a self-contained integrated neighborhood unit, including schools, health posts, day-
care centers, community centers, commercial center, playgrounds, churches, and public 
offices. The CMV‘s original plan also programmed a design that facilitated repetition and 
the serialization of the construction procedures in order to rationalize costs and time. The 
construction rhythm was fast at a pace of 200 homes per month.
102
  
In terms of construction plans, the CMV envisioned the division of the area in 
nine sectors to split the work among nine construction companies.
103
 The idea was to 
promote the participation of individual (local) small and medium companies. 
Nevertheless, the CMV granted the whole project to one large developer: the US-based 
FIELD Argentina SA. The study of this operation suggests some lines of analysis to 
explore the relationship between foreign assistance, cold war politics, authoritarianism, 
and corruption in a historical context in which the Alliance for Progress was coming to an 
end. By the end of the 1960s, it was clear that the purposes of the Alliance to contribute 
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to the development of Latin American democracies had turned into the support of 
military dictatorships, more efficient in containing social discontent.  
In his classic work, Guillermo O‘Donnell has pointed out that the period 
inaugurated with the coup of General Ongania in 1966 until the return of Perón in 1973 
represented the emergence of the bureaucratic-authoritarian state, an association between 
technocratic elites and the military governments to undertake the modernization process. 
In Argentina, it represented the most serious effort, until then, to break the hegemonic 
struggle among different alliances of classes and national projects. It was the government 
of the so-called Revolución Argentina that imposed the most systematic attempt to 
consolidate the position of the most advanced part of the traditional oligarchy, 
concentrated national industrial sectors, and foreign corporations. Building upon this 
model, Yujnovsky has shown that the construction sector also witnessed a moment of 
concentration leaded by the association among few international developers with the 
capital and technological capacity to work in large-scale project and local construction 
companies.
104
 State-sponsored large-scale construction projects, which also included 
highways and dams (ie, Chocón-Cerros Colorados), offered these companies significant 
opportunities.
105
   
FIELD Argentina, owned by a US developer Mr. Field, began to operate in 
Argentina in 1961, by the time when the USAID and Argentine authorities were in 
negotiations to stimulate the housing market and the construction sector. By the mid 
1960s, the company's board was composed mostly of members linked with the armed 
forces, a characteristic of the bureaucratic-authoritarian state in Argentina. For instance, 
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FIELD‘s Director in 1965 was Nicanor Costa Mendez, who resigned in 1966 to become 
Minister of Foreign Relations of the military dictatorship of Ongania (he hold that 
position again during the military dictatorship of 1976-1983 and was a central during the 
Malvinas War in 1982). Captain Guillermo Rawson replaced him as director then. 
Envisioning the possibility to build CGB in its totality, FIELD authorities began 
conversations in 1968 with the representatives of the Rockefeller‘s IBEC Housing 
Company to sell them 51% of their shares. From August to December 1968, several 
communications with IBEC headquarters in New York and its representatives in Buenos 
Aires showed the degree of privilege access the company had among top-level officials at 
the CMV and the IDB‘s officials working in the project. In August of that year, Frederic 
W. Botts informed Rodman Rockefeller that architect Bill Cook, the consultant the IDB 
assigned for the MCBA-IDB program, had told him that he had supported in front of 
CMV authorities FIELD‘s offer.
106
  Botts even gave Rodman Rockefeller details about 
the secret public bid, suggesting the possibility that he had accessed privilege information. 
A month later, Botts announced Rockefeller that he should not be worried about CMV‘s 
original plans to grant the work to nine different contractors, ―Quite contrary to the 
worries expressed in your letter,‖ wrote Botts, ―contacts with BID/Municipality 
subsequent to release of pliegos [tender specifications?], clearly confirm their desire for 
one contractor performing the entire job. If you can believe them, they have expressed 
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clear favoritism that this single contractor be Field Argentina. I will have a better picture 
upon my arrival in NY.‖
107
  
From that moment on, IBEC focused on analyzing the building capacity of 
FIELD to analyze if the company was in condition to undertake the complex task. FIELD 
had previously built a housing program (1,000 units) in Rosario, Santa Fe, for which it 
had built a factory to produce bricks and many of the housing‘s component parts. In 
October, and after much analysis, IBEC‘s representatives requested the approval ―for the 
acquisition of 51% of the common stock of Field Argentina and for granting a peso 
working capital loan to finance the construction of 3,000 homes in Buenos Aires‖ was. In 
the memo R.Rockefeller sent to IBEC‘s Executive Committee, he supported the 
acquisition affirming, ―The City of Buenos Aires has now put for bids a large, potentially 
quite profitable project that Field Argentina proposed IBEC join them in doing. This is 
the opportunity we have waited for, and we wish to seize it.‖
108
 IBEC expected to make a 
net profit of one million dollars in CGB.
109
  
Showing close contact with municipal Authorities, FIELD representatives tell 
Rockefeller in November 19 that, ―The ‗jefe de la Comisión Municipal de la Vivienda‘ 
was quoted as saying to a mutual friend: ‗Field Argentina se robó la licitación. Lo que 
debemos hacer ahora es adjudicar la obra y empezar la construcción lo más rápido 
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posible. [Field has stolen the bid. We now must be giving them the work and begin the 
construction as quickly as possible].‖ After months of negotiations, however, IBEC 
apparently declined to accept the FIELD offer in December 3, 1968.  
Unfortunately, the evidence disappears here and it is impossible to know whether 
new conversations began at a later stage. Architect Silvio Grichener, who worked for 
FIELD in the revision of the CMV specifications for CGB and in the construction‘s first 
stage, recalls a Rockefeller visiting FIELD‘s headquarters in Buenos Aires but research 
does not allow confirmation of this fact. Yet, whether IBEC was involved or not in the 
project, the evidence shows the degree of connection between CMV top authorities, IDB 






In the 1960s Buenos Aires witnessed a moment of expansion marked by huge 
contrasts. The character of the economic and social modernization during the 
developmentalist era contributed to the expansion of consumption and the 
cosmopolitanization of the city. The flipside of this process was the increasing levels of 
inequality and poverty that caused an increase in the number of slums and slum residents 
in the city and especially in the outskirts. 
With the ouster of Perón, the state abandoned the social justice approach that had 
considered housing as a social right and organized the mechanisms that regulated and 
modernize the mortgage market. Homeownership had to be the result of the sacrifice and 
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effort of the individual who would save and contribute in the production of the housing 
market. State efforts in this regard focused in the organization of the financial market, 
with particular attention to the creation of the Savings and Loan System. This 
understanding of the housing problem and the solutions implemented targeted the middle 
and lower-middle classes who were in conditions to save. Yet, living conditions for the 
poor worsened and construction levels also decreased at serious rates in the second half 
of the 1950s until 1962. Slums became recognized as the outcome of the unequal 
character of the Argentine economy and its existence was perceived as a potential focus 
of social disintegration and political unrest. To this sector, the state promoted a more shy 
policy of housing construction.  
The Alliance for Progress in Argentina made available funds to capitalize the 
mortgage market and to secure US private investment in the region. It also contributed in 
the construction of low-income housing. In so doing, the US sought to contribute in the 
expansion of homeownership and the formation of a middle class of proprietors, all 
features associated with the modernity. These measures were significant in the struggle to 
build stable democracies that would deter the threat of social unrest. Perhaps, more 
obvious, the intervention of AIFLD, a blunt cold war organization, represented the more 
direct relationship between housing, US foreign relations, and Cold War. More 
mundanely, the Alliance also represented new opportunities for business and profit for 
US capital and developers.  
In Buenos Aires, the 1960s represented a new moment of urban expansion and the 
possibility to intervene in the spatial structuration of the city. The Oficina del Plan 




the construction of much needed housing. The urbanization of the Bañado de Flores, 
involving the incorporation of almost ten percent of the city‘s total surface, created an 
opportunity to regulate and find solutions to many of the city‘s problem: it promised new 
green areas, a new demographic balance, and the provision of a whole set of urban 
facilities. It also meant the construction of housing for low-income sectors. For the 
architects gathered at the CMV, the plans for the Parque Almirante Brown was the 
opportunity to build city (―hacer ciudad‖), not only housing. The architectural design of 
Villa Lugano 1-2, shows that the transnational flows were beyond the intense North-
South exchanges in the Americas. The influence of the ideas of the Team X, conditioned 
by the demands of the IDB, and contextualized in the context of local technological and 
working conditionings showed the extent the housing program was also a ―contact zone.‖  
Yet, as Chapter 5 will show, the striking architecture of Villa Lugano 1-2 and the 
modest respectability of the single-family homes built in Ciudad General Belgrano failed 
to provide for a varied and textured landscape. The highly theorized and abstract 
conception of the city that followed the postulates of the TEAM X created its own 
ambiguities. The obsession to create the ―street‖ by creating a pedestrian corridor among 
the building towers and connected bridges were too foreign for the kind of street life that 
residents were used to. The new urban pattern, which broke the traditional grid, was 
conceived in a progressive context but the arrival of the military dictatorship perverted 
those original intentions.
 
 The mechanisms of assignations of the new homes that sought 
to organize a transparent process were abandoned and units were now assigned to 
members of the armed forces and state employees. Homes were now given to members of 




250,000 residents became underutilized as the remaining complexes envisioned for Villa 
Lugano were never built, with the exception of a number of new towers built in the 1980s. 
In addition, the CMV also intervened and the staff multiplied as the state became a source 
of employment, losing much of its original character. The new housing units, as well as 
the CMV itself became later, in the early 1970s, the ground of radical politics. The 
distance between the optimistic hopes of the modernization of housing and the city and 




CHAPTER 4 - ILLUSTRATIONS 
 
Figure 18 - Analysis of the Argentina savings and loan proposal, memorandum from Alvaro Alsogaray, ex 
minister of Economy of Argentina, to Douglas Dillon, September 1961, entry 3167, records related to Argentina, 
box 3, RG 59, NACP 
 
 







Figure 20 - Barrio Parque de los Trabajadores. Planning was part of the operation of extension to the West that 
included the construction of the Airport Ministro Pistarini; “Barrio Parque de los Trabajadores, Primer Premio 
del VI Salón Nacional de Arquitectura, Proyecto de los Arquitectos Itala Fulvia Villa y Horacio E. Nazar (h), 
Revista de Arquitectura (Buenos Aires) no. 297, año XXX, (September 1945). 
 
Figure 21 - “Barrio Parque de los Trabajadores, Primer Premio del VI Salón Nacional de Arquitectura, 
Proyecto de los Arquitectos Itala Fulvia Villa y Horacio E. Nazar (h), Revista de Arquitectura (Buenos Aires) 







Figure 22 - “Barrio Parque de los Trabajadores, Primer Premio del VI Salón Nacional de Arquitectura, 
Proyecto de los Arquitectos Itala Fulvia Villa y Horacio E. Nazar (h), Revista de Arquitectura (Buenos Aires) 




Figure 23 - Maps of Slums in the city of Buenos Aires – Municipalidad de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires, “Censo 






Figure 24 - Parque Almirante Brown - Pilot Plan; Comisión Municipal de la Vivienda, Parque Almirante Brown 




Figure 25 - Parque Almirante Brown – Aerial View and a villa miseria in the Bañado de Flores; Comisión 
Municipal de la Vivienda, Parque Almirante Brown - Conjunto Urbano Lugano I-II (Buenos Aires: 







Figure 26  - The program envisioned the construction of two neighborhood units -Villa Lugano and VIlla 
Soldati- to house more than 250,000 families; Comisión Municipal de la Vivienda, Parque Almirante Brown - 
Conjunto Urbano Lugano I-II (Buenos Aires: Municipalidad de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires; circa 1971) 
 
 
Figure 27 - The canalization of the Cildañez Creek; Comisión Municipal de la Vivienda, Parque Almirante 






Figure 28 - Villa Lugano and Ciudad General Belgrano – Location; Municipalidad de la Ciudad de Buenos 
Aires, Solicitud de préstamo al Banco Interamericano de Desarollo (Buenos Aires: Municipalidad de la Ciudad de 




Figure 29 - Villa Lugano 1-2; the area is already urbanized and the main corridor is already built; Comisión 






Figure 30 - Villa Lugano I and II, Comisión Municipal de la Vivienda, Parque Almirante Brown - Conjunto 





Figure 31 - Parque Almirante Brown – Aerial View and a villa miseria in the Bañado de Flores; Comisión 
Municipal de la Vivienda, Parque Almirante Brown - Conjunto Urbano Lugano I-II (Buenos Aires: 





Figure 32 – Villa Lugano I-II, drawings attached to the loan proposal to the Inter-American Development Bank; 
Municipalidad de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires, Solicitud de préstamo al Banco Interamericano de Desarollo 




Figure 33 - Villa Lugano I-II, drawings attached to the loan proposal to the Inter-American Development Bank; 
Municipalidad de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires, Solicitud de préstamo al Banco Interamericano de Desarollo 





Figure 34 - Villa Lugano I and II, view from the main corridor; Comisión Municipal de la Vivienda, Parque 




Figure 35 – Building, floorplan; Comisión Municipal de la Vivienda, Parque Almirante Brown - Conjunto Urbano 









Figure 36 - General Layout of Ciudad General Belgrano in Greater Buenos Aires. Municipalidad de la Ciudad 
de Buenos Aires, Solicitud de préstamo al Banco Interamericano de Desarollo (Buenos Aires: Municipalidad de 
la Ciudad de Buenos Aires, 1965) 
 
 






Figure 38 – Ciudad General Belgrano; Revista Construcciones (Buenos Aires) no. 232, November-December 










MODERN HOUSEHOLDS: BETWEEN THE EXPERTS' EXPECTATIONS AND 





Carlos Lacerda used the publication of Manual do Proprietário (1965), a sort of 
users‘ manual, as the occasion to educate the new residents of Vila Kennedy, a 
publically-financed low-income housing complex built in the suburbs of Rio de Janeiro, 
about their new homes. ―Fellow Homeowner," wrote the governor, "life has been made 
for everyone. It is for each family to HAVE A HOME, but it is not just that. It is also for 
every home to HAVE A FAMILY (…) It is my hope that the owner of this house, under 
the tutelage of God, remembers those who have not had that opportunity yet and also 
helps us to give it to everyone.‖
1
 In the following pages, drawings and captions showed 
an immaculately dressed white woman cleaning the house, hanging out the laundry in the 
backyard, disposing the trash in a proper receptacle and in a timely manner and 
registering their children at the local school. In the minds of the people at COHAB, the 
resettled squatter who was to occupy Vila Kennedy required instruction of the proper and 
respectable use of their new environment. The images reproduced the core dualistic 
understanding of modernization theory that contrasted the domestic practices of a 
"traditional" peasantry, such as food cultivation and animal rearing in close proximity to 
the home, with the more modern, urban domestic practices suitable for the orderly 
conditions of the modern home. Taken together, the illustrations conveyed a white, 
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middle-class domestic imaginary that reinforced traditional and conservative gender and 
racial relations. They evidenced the expectations and desires of the technical, political, 
and social elites about the role of housing as a component of ―social peace.‖
2
 At the same 
time, these imagines reflected the fears and anxieties of these sectors in an era of political 
and social turmoil.  
 Five years later, in Buenos Aires, the Municipal Housing Commission (CMV) 
distributed To Enter into the Present, a user‘s guide for the low-income families relocated 
to Ciudad General Belgrano. In the guide‘s preface, a picture of a set of keys preceded 
the phrase: ―These keys that we are giving you serve to enter into the present, this present 
in which every human being has the right, that of light, air, the comforts and simplicities 
of modern life, a home worthy of our time.‖
3
 As in the Brazilian case, an optimistic and 
proscriptive discourse on homeownership, space, and domestic behavior defined modern 
urban life. The idea that the new, modern urban environment might ―instill a sense and a 
need for change‖ among the former slum dwellers was widely shared among technical 
elites, policymakers, US representatives, foreign consultants, and social scientists.
4
  
In 1967, however, the cover page of the Wall Street Journal denounced to the 
American public the dire situation of VK. The WSJ reporter described VK as "a place 
that U.S. foreign administrators would just as soon forget about.‖ The irony was that VK 
had once been seen ―as a showcase for the American effort to aid Brazil, a must-stop on 
the tour of any visiting VIP.‖ In the article, the correspondent advised that US President 
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Johnson not visit the community in a scheduled visit to South America. Yet, the reporter 
acknowledged that VK was worth seeing for one particular reason and that was that 
―what has gone wrong here tells a great deal about what can -and often does- go wrong in 
America‘s massive foreign aid program.‖ In other words, ―the basic lesson of Vila 
Kennedy seems to be that much more thoughtful planning often is required before 
taxpayers‘ dollars are shelled out for any new project.‖ Both user‘s manuals and the 
article in the WSJ show both how high the hopes and optimism were in the beginning and 
also how deep the disappointment was just a few years after the completion of these 
housing developments.  
In this chapter, I explore the state and technical imagination behind the design of our 
historical cases, how both residents and experts assessed these new environments, and 
what alternative ideas on housing for the poor emerged as a reaction to these large-scale 
slum eradication and relocation policies. As this dissertation intends to demonstrate, in 
the beginning of our periodization, the provision of housing for poor urban residents was 
seen as a way to integrate them into the formalities of capitalism and citizenship. 
Homeownership, self-help, and bourgeois (white, middle-class) domesticity were the 
keys in producing a new citizen, one whose supposedly traditional and emotional habits 
and behaviors would transform into the characteristics of urban life and political 
moderation.  
In the following pages, I analyze the way in which those in a position of power to 
exert policy or knowledge represented the role of housing in modernizing the poor urban 
resident. Then, I explore the way in which the new residents appropriated their spaces 




fragmented but the analysis is important to show the distance between the imagined and 
the real city. Finally, I will briefly explore the alternative solutions that a group of 
progressive architects and social scientists in both Rio and Buenos Aires proposed to 
cope with the housing problem by the late 1960s and early 1970s. I pay attention to the 
experiences of the urbanization of the favela Brás de Pina by the Community 
Development Company (CODESCO) in Rio and the urbanization of Villa #7 into the 
Barrio Villa Justo Suárez in Buenos Aires. These experiences, I seek to show, were part 
of emerging transnational trends in the field of housing that argued in favor of thinking of 
housing from the perspective of the slum dweller rather than that of the policymaker or 
the expert.  
 
Low-Income Housing as a Tool of Modernization 
 
This dissertation has argued that governments and technical elites of the postwar 
Americas sought to modernize Latin American societies not just by deepening the 
mechanisms for capitalist accumulation but also by creating built environments designed 
to generate modern sociabilities and behaviors. In Chapter 1, I have suggested how slums 
of Latin American cities were at the core of the ―urban problem‖ as defined in 
transnational circuits of scholarship and policymaking and how that was the result of the 
duality inherent to modernization theory. Within the antinomies of this theory, the city 
was a space of creation, change, innovation, rationality, secularism, and democracy. The 
model was the industrial European and American city that had given birth to an 




democratic space.  On the contrary, the countryside was portrayed as rather static, 
associated with tradition, ―magical‖ belief, kinship, emotion, and paternalism.  
Slums, and their improvised homes, represented in this model, rural, pre-modern 
―enclaves‖ coexisting in an urban setting. In the city, they were the loci of tradition, rural 
ways of life, and personal disorganization that limited the full release of social, cultural, 
and productive forces necessary for the full development of Latin American nations. 
They were the ―village‖ in the city.
5
  As sociologist Andrew Pearse put it in his 
description of the favela do Esqueleto, the slum house was ―indeed a house of the rustic 
type, being nothing more nor less than the intrusion, into the interstices of an urban 
system of life, of rural standards of housing.‖
6
 Within this framework certain scholars, as 
well as state and technical elites, projected physical features into social attributes and life-
styles. They assumed that the bad quality of the slums and the slums house was actually 
the manifestation of internal qualities.  
In addition, slums and working class neighborhoods were important to these 
scholars and policymakers because in the political history of Latin America these had 
been the places from where the populist regimes of Vargas in Brazil or Perón in 
Argentina received most support. Clientelism and populism were practices that these 
scholars associated with a limited or incomplete democracy and with the residual 
presence of rural and traditional elements in a society in transformation. In this context, 
governments saw the provision of modern housing as an agent of transformation. 
Homeownership and modern housing were to remedy urban squalor, promote the 
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integration and assimilation of new urban residents, inculcate middle-class habits and 
mass consumption, and moderate political behavior.  
The transformation of the squatter dweller into a homeowner, with domestic and 
collective responsibilities, was a key notion behind the construction of the housing 
complexes for both US and Latin American authorities. During a ceremony to mark the 
finalization of the funding agreement for the construction of the housing complexes in 
1962, US Ambassador to Brazil Lincoln Gordon argued that, "the role of housing in a 
free nation is vital to the full development of its economy and society, and that a free 
people is better assured of stability and healthy growth by possessing at least a minimum 
standard of decency in housing." Referring to the commitment of Latin American nations 
to the construction of low-income housing during the Charter of Punta del Este in 1961, 
Gordon continued, "the essence of true friendship of the United States for the people of 
Brazil can only be realized by our financial assistance being used as an impetus to their 
own efforts to solve their problems.‖ For US geopolitical interests in the cold war context, 
the formalization and expansion of the housing market, especially for the poor, and the 
dissemination of the very own ideology of homeownership meant a triumph of capitalism 
over the communist threat. In his analysis of the relationship between homeownership, 
capitalism, and anti-Communism in middle-class housing projects built in Peru in the late 
1950s, Thomas Zoumaras cites a revealing exchange in 1959 between the US Council on 
Foreign Economic Policy (CFEP) and US private investors.
7
 Arguing in favor of the 
importance of investing in housing in Latin America, CFEP representatives argued, 
―Private home ownership is basic capitalism. If the free enterprise capitalistic system is to 
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be propagated and strengthened elsewhere in the world, there is no greater appeal to the 
hearts and minds of men than to espouse the cause of owning one‘s home.‖ 
Proprietorship would be politically positive; it would generate a rejection of the 
Communist ideology and its concepts of state ownership and elimination of private 
property. ―As a further bulwark against Communism, expanded private home ownership 
will help to build a substantial citizenry and more stable political climate.‖
8
  
Squatters‘ illegal occupations of public and private lands challenged the very notion 
of private property, the fundament of capitalism, sanctioned in both Argentine and 
Brazilian constitutions.
9
 As Brodwyn Fischer pointed out for the case of Rio, a ―poverty 
of rights‖ was the condition of poor cariocas whose weak enfranchisement was the result 
of the practical ways in which the rule of law affected them. Ironically, slum residents 
were in many occasions successful in their disputes against private owners and managed 
to stay in those occupied lands as squatters although they never won land rights.
10
 
Through eradications and resettlement in different housing complexes or temporal 
dwellings according to income, the state incorporated those former squatters who could 
pay into the mechanisms of the capitalist free-market.
11
  
In Guanabara, urban renewal, slum eradication, and relocations was part of the 
efforts to reorient Rio‘s economy post Brasília. The formalization of the squatter‘s 
situation through the provision of housing close to the development of an industrial area, 
to be built, was central to this project. In assessing Lacerda‘s plan for the development of 
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an industrial area in Santa Cruz, US consultants from Howard Chase Associates argued 
that,  
Such industrial decentralization is worthy of maximum state inducements, not only 
from the more important human sense, but also in the substantial economic savings 
which will result from any reduction in the rate of congestion in the city‘s center. 
Decentralization builds up the suburban areas and increases all the property values 
providing a growing source of income for the government, with perhaps a lesser 
relative cost in meeting the demand for increased social services. Above all, it can 
be used to help reduce the growth rate of favelas, whose inhabitants are in those 




Not surprisingly, the report recommended to ―provide incentives for location of new 
industries in outlying fringe areas of the State and next to or in low-cost housing clusters 
in the industrial decentralization program.‖
13
 
In addition, property rights were connected to the moral economy of the postwar 
era, especially in the cold war context. Notions of homeownership in a capitalist, free-
market economy, stressed the idea of individual sacrifice, organization, responsibility, 
discipline, and planning. A modern capitalist society demanded of the individual 
legitimate payment for urban land and public services. The Manual of the Homeowner for 
the residents of VK highlighted the responsibility of the homeowner to legalize 
possession of his propriety: ―This house is yours! Keep it, enlarge it, and decorate it. It‘s 
your duty,‖ informed the manual. [Figure 1]. "After legalizing your commitment you 
made by signing the deed of purchase, pay your monthly fee on time. Remember, your 
punctuality is worth a home.‖
14
  In the case of Ciudad General Belgrano in Buenos Aires, 
the first page of the user‘s manual, titled ―To Enter into the Present,‖ showed a set of 
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keys that represented the possibility of entering into the (modern) present through the 
possession of the house.
15
 [Figure 19]  Buying a home either in Rio or Buenos Aires 
required from the individual the capacity to pay mortgage regularly and to allot sums of 
money that were previously spent on other, more immediate, needs.  
The underlying assumption, here, was that the poor individual would develop an 
instrumental rationality, key in a modern society. Through sacrifice, self-determination, 
and prudent organization of the family‘s budget, the former squatters would follow a 
course of action to achieve their desired end. This homo economicus, forged in this case 
through the provision of affordable housing, was then an integrated citizen rather than an 
illegal, ―marginal‖ squatter.   
Individual responsibilities, in addition, were the basis for life in society. ―IN 
UNITY THERE IS STRENGH!‖ said in capital letters the COHAB‘s manual, 
―Participate in meetings with your street‘s representative and work together with the 
neighborhood council.‖ [Figure 11] This exercise of citizenship at the street and local 
level would contribute in creating community links; key to project success, ―The Vila 
will be beautiful and pleasant if all the residents do their part‖ praised the manual in its 
final page [Figure 12].  
The home was thus not just a material structure but also a whole transformative 
environment that might encourage a new predisposition for urban life. The set of keys 
(the symbol of homeownership) offered in the first page of the manual for the people of 
CGB represented a symbolic way to cross the threshold to modernity, leaving once and 
for all the traditional life localized in the slums. In the following pages, the manual 
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established a counterpoint between Buenos Aires‘s past and present. The past was the 
Buenos Aires of the Gran Aldea [the Big Village], the city of the late colonial time.
16
 
Back then, the guide explained, urban life was not comfortable: there was not running 
water, ―they did not have the ease of merely turning on a faucet to get out the fluids that 
now we give so little importance‖ and the children had to retrieve it by carrying 
containers on their shoulders. A housewife had to get up early in the morning, ―to rub her 
eyes, and to wash her face with the little remainder of water of the day before [and] light 
the fire to prepare the breakfast for the man who had to go out to work.‖ Now, however, 
Buenos Aires became a modern city, a metropolis that incorporated the comforts of 
modern life. In that present of the late 1960s,  
The new houses of General Belgrano are an expression of today's Buenos Aires, 
one of the most modern and beautiful cities in the world. These homes are, then, 
not only a great architectural work: they provide many families what is necessary 





The juxtaposition of the past and the present was not just a contrast between two 
historical eras. On the contrary, the narrative referred to a different counterpoint, one that 
opposed traditional to modern societies, a cultural and social condition that could exist 
simultaneously in the same historical time. Figuratively, the attributes of everyday life in 
the Gran Aldea depicted in the text did not differ so much from the life of the poor people 
of Buenos Aires in the 1960s: illegal settlements lacking electric power, running water, or 
even water faucets.  
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This broadly shared image of the ‗traditional‘ character of the inhabitants of the 
villas was well expressed in 1966 in the first sociological survey conducted in the slums 
of the Bañado de Flores. The ―Pilot Plan for the Eradication of the Villas de Emergencia 
5-6-18‖ pointed out the role of the government as an agent of change and social 
integration by providing community development plans as a ―temporal and precarious 
solution to the deep needs of the inhabitants of the Villas de Emergencia, that facilitates 
the motivation of those communities to participate with their own efforts, providing the 
necessary labor, in the execution of the proposed works in this plan.‖ The Pilot Plan, 
organized during the democratic administration of President Illia, stipulated certain basic 
improvements in the original villas to be executed by the residents in community 
development and self-help projects. These upgrades sought to provide an immediate 
solution to serious problems and to build bonds of solidarity. As the Plan argued, ―It is 
not about mitigating needs but about instilling a sense and a need for change (…) 
trying to change the mental attitude of the inhabitant of the villas, whose characteristic is 
a tendency to static quietism, and transform that attitude into a dynamic process of order, 
organization, and development (…) the Villa de Emergencia represents more a mental 
problem than a physical one.‖  The same Pilot Plan explained ―it is not acceptable that 
those who live in the Villa de Emergencia, with their minds in the Villas, then go and live 
in a definitive house without a total change in attitude and abilities.‖
18
   
Educating the poor in community development and self-help projects was a way 
to transform habits associated with traditional sociability into productive modern living. 
As Chapter 1 pointed out, this notion of poverty as a ―mental‖ problem did not refer to a 
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biological (physical) attribute but a behavioral, therefore cultural, aspect of poor squatters. 
This understanding may have been a perverse way of blaming the poor for their living 
conditions, but it also reflected the reformist thinking of many experts and scholars in 
Latin America that considered the provision of social welfare, vocational training, and a 
new built environment a central, but partial, remedy to social maladjustment and 
poverty.
19
   
The notion of progress and modernization -that longstanding aspiration of Latin 
American social and state elites- attached to the housing projects reproduced a white 
bourgeois (middle-class) domestic order. The illustrations of the manuals depicted homes 
and family life that embedded gendered and racialized expectations and hopes, but also 
fears and anxieties in a society in rapid change. The series of drawings of the COHAB 
manual depicted one family –father, mother and a small child- performing different tasks 
within and outside the home. [Figure 1 to 12]  The house resembled the postwar 
American suburban home, whose model was reproduced infinitely in movies and 
fanzines around the world. Accompanying illustrations clearly demarcated the gendered 
expectation of a male breadwinner and female housewife. Men were advised not to turn 
their house into a workplace as it probably was the case in many favela’s houses, ―This is 
no workplace! Use your home only as a residence. There are other appropriate places for 
work and commerce.‖ [Figure 4]. Another picture showed a pair of newlyweds and also a 
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father at the foot of his daughter‘s bed; the captions read ―Register all family events with 
social services: marriages, death, contagious diseases,‖ and, ―inform the social services of 
every birth.‖ [Figure 9] This image certainly contrasted with the situation present in 
favelas where family relations differed from middle class standards measured by the 
significant number of consensual unions (as an alternative to legal marriage) and the 
relatively high rate of infants per household. Moreover, the insistence on keeping vital 
records with the local office of the Secretary of Social Service not only talks about the 
significant number of illegal births among poor but also, and more generally, about the 
weakness of the state in knowing and controlling favelas.  
The women of the vila were always portrayed as the white mother and wife who 
performed domestic tasks inside the home. A picture of a neat white mother with a broom 
in one hand and a duster in the other accompanied the caption ―keep your house and 
surroundings in order and clean.‖ [Figure 3] The description for a picture of the mother 
brushing her daughter‘s hair mentioned, ―Housewife, mother: Look for the Secretary of 
the Social Services‘ office to learn about the preparation of food and care for your 
children.‖ [Figure 10] Women were responsible for getting their dogs vaccinated and 
were expected to keep their kids under control by preventing them from making noises 
and obeying the ―law of silence.‖ In terms of the house care, they were advised to hang 
their clothes only in the backyard -not outside-, to dispose the trash in trash bins, and to 
check the gas nozzles were closed and to avoid leaving gasoline or alcohol in her kids 
reach. [Figures 6-7] Of course, the modern housewife would enjoy doing these tasks with 
the help of modern appliances (the drawing showed a happy mother ironing while 




them properly in order to save water, electricity or gas. Ironically, this ideal female 
resident of the vila looked more like the probable employer of the real residents, most of 
these women were thus not only mothers and housewives but also domestic workers, 
cooks, or seamstresses. 
That the house would reinforce family and therefore social order was certainly not 
new in the 1960s. As we have seen in chapter 2, the home had been the target for state 
and industrialists modernization projects all around Latin America. In Brazil, as Barbara 
Weinstein has shown, the creation of the SENAI (Serviço Nacional de Aprendizagem 
Industrial/National Service for Industrial Training) and SESI (Serviço Social da 
Indústria/Industral Social Service) in the 1940s developed a whole program of worker 
training beyond the limits of the factory, including the domestic realm. In Argentina, the 
Peronist imaginary also reinforced traditional notions of family attached to the home at a 




 The strengthened of domesticity in Rio, as in Buenos Aires, in the 1960s should 
be understood within the broader cultural and political context marked by rapid social 
change and increasing political conflict at the height of the Cold War.
21
 Guanabara was 
the sounding board of national politics in a moment when its own political and 
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administrative status was being defined. Despite Lacerda‘s best efforts to dismantle the 
power of local political bosses through his administrative reforms, they managed to 
remain influential. In addition, Varguista Lionel Brizola, the governor‘s political 
adversary from the left, increased his political ascendancy among poor cariocas. They 
participated in food riots and popular turmoil throughout Rio‘s suburbs caused by 
shortages orchestrated by Brizola.  On the other side, conservative forces reacted against 
President Goulart‘s Basic Reforms plan (Reformas de base) announced in March 1964 
which US officials and Brazilian right wing and military sectors considered evidence of 
Jango‘s socialist tendencies. In March 1964, these conservative sectors took over the 
streets of Rio aligned behind middle and upper-class catholic women in what was 
denominated the Marcha da Família com Deus pela Liberdade (Marches of the Family 
with God for Freedom).
22
 These series of marches anticipated and prepared the ground 
for the military coup that ousted Goulart in April 1964.  
Governor Lacerda actually praised the role of women in the coup against Goulart 
in a meeting of the Campanha da Mulher pela Democracia (CAMDE), a group of 
conservative, catholic women. At the Cinema Pax, in Ipanema, Lacerda said, ―the true 
owner of the Revolution is the Brazilian woman.‖
23
 The conservative modernizing 
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character of Lacerda‘s administration could also be seen in actions such as the 
replacement of Jose Arthur Rios by Sandra Cavalcanti, connected to Catholic 
conservative groups, as Secretary of Social Services. Favorable press like O Globo 
covered the life of former residents from Favela do Pasmado in Vila Kennedy. As prove 
of the rapid assimilation in the new environment, O’Globo commented on the election of 
the ―Mother of the Year‖ in both VK and VA, in celebration of Mother‘s Day.
24
  
Conservatism and traditionalism in Argentina was also strong already in the early 
1960s and very much influenced state policies in a period of rapid modernization. Recent 
scholarship has challenged the traditional understanding of modernization of Buenos 
Aires society in the 1960s as a moment of liberalization of social norms about sexual 
relations and women‘s respectability. In the traditional version, this process was radically 
interrupted by the military dictatorship of the so-called Revolución Argentina that had 
imposed a conservative, authoritarian reaction to those social and cultural changes. But, 
as Valerio Manzano has pointed out, conservatism was already present in the early 1960s, 
as shown in morality campaigns.
25
 As Isabella Cosse points out, the characteristic of the 
Argentine process was precisely the coexistence of conservative and modernizing forces: 
changes in customs (costumbres) and morals occurred in an authoritarian context. 
Traditionalists and conservative principles, however, had the power to influence state 
policies. The reinforcement of domestic imaginaries associated with new housing are 
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consistent with the ambiguities of the modernization process in cities like Rio or Buenos 
Aires when the relaxation of certain cultural and social norms encountered strong 
reaction and opposition.  
Such conservative vision of modernity also produced a racialized definition of 
modernity. The modernity imagined in the depictions of the housing projects was a white 
one. These representations definitely contrasted with the faces of those women that met 
the social workers of the Secretary of Social Services when the later showed faveladas a 
scale model of the Vilas‘ house. [Figures 13-5] Of course, there was not discrimination 
between whites and non-whites when assigning the housing units. Actually the favelado 
population in those years were only one-third were black (preto), one-half white, and the 
rest pardo. Even though the number of whites may be surprising, this does not equate 
racial balance. Racial inequality operated in other levels. Blacks constituted a third of 
favela residents and accounted for almost the entire black population of the city.
26
 In the 
drawings of COHAB User‘s Manual, it is more than significant that the only 
representation of an Afro-Brazilian in COHAB is the picture that alerts the mother not to 
leave any incendiary artifact within the children‘s reach. In the picture, a black and a 
white kid are setting fire to a campfire inside the home and playing with what look like 
fireworks. [Figure 7]  
Both representations, the white residents of the User‘ Manual and the favela 
female residents observing the demonstration of the Social Worker recalls Michael 
Mitchell‘s analysis regarding the conservative modernization of Brazilian race relations. 
For Mitchell, ―a conservative vision of modernization –in which elites encoded into 
Brazilian political culture racial prohibitions as well as other controls on social behavior- 
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survived, reproduced itself, and has maintained its power within both modernization and 
race relations as the dominant discourse.‖
27
 Despite this very general statement to explain 
years of race relations, Mitchell presents a more dynamic analysis of changing 
intellectual conceptualizations of the role of Afro-Brazilians for the progress and 
modernization of Brazil. Intellectuals like Gilberto Freyre and Mario Reale challenged 
the assumptions of scientific racism and eugenics that portrayed certain groups, 
especially blacks, as ―drags‖ to Brazil‘s progress, a characterization that led to their 
social and political exclusion. Freyre and Reale, on the contrary, saw in the presence and 
inclusion of Afro-Brazilians the specificity –and exceptionality- of Brazil. While Freyre 
believed in the power of miscegenation, Reale concluded that a strong interventionist 
state would regulate the political and social conflicts inherent to the contradictions of a 
modern society. The modernity portrayed in COHAB‘s drawing is a white middle class 
modernity. Brazilians of color are absolutely invisible except the drawing of an afro-
Brazilian girl who actually is an element of disruption of the domestic order. Yet, the 
photographs of the female crowd around the social worker present in COHAB‘s reports 
tells a different story, one in which race is not a drag or an obstacle to modernity. The 
central place of the social worker showing and introducing the squatters into their 
potential new home represented the power of the state and the political and technical 
elites. The pictures show the Freyrian ―controlled modernization, in which that process 
might somehow preserve the paternalistic relationships that had been the hallmark of 
former regimes,‖ as well as the strength of the state, so close to Reale‘s thinking.
28
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In Argentina, the racial question was more mediated than in Brazil; and actually 
the issue of blackness was less central. This, however, did not preclude racial 
connotations to appear in more mediated forms, especially as a way to emphasize and 
denigrate the rural origins of Perón‘s working-class supporters. The set of drawings and 
blueprints for VL1-2 and CGB attached to the MCBA loan proposal to the IDB imagined 
a warm spatial arrangement in which a white middle class socialized in the areas 
designed for that purpose. [Figures 20-21] The human figures that appeared in the 
drawings looked more like the imaginary about Buenos Aires that porteños helped to 
consolidated by the 1940s, that of a white, European-descendent city -the ―Paris of South 
America.‖
29
 These human figures, however, are not particular to Buenos Aires. They are 
part of conventional signs that architects use to show that their imagined space –the ones 
portrayed in their drawings- are actually spaces for human beings.
 30
  
These default images, which have a minimum of detail, represents a particular 
way of seeing, one in which the architect or the planner represents himself as a neutral 
observer who is more concern with the detail of the work than with the particularities of 
the individual. The contrast between the degree of detail in the buildings and the lack of it 
for the future residents is meaningful. These sanitized, ―neutral‖ imagines of the drawings 
occluded the fact that VL1-2 and CGB were intended for low-income populations, 
therefore, people of an ethnic component probably different with that of older porteño 
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 In this way, the modernity imagined in the housing projects was white and 
middle class.   
 Architecture and urbanism were not only important to social transformation but 
also to the construction of political and social imaginaries. At the same time, those social 
and political imaginaries nourished aesthetic and design choices. The question that comes 
up in Rio‘s case is about the election of single-family homes for the vilas, particularly 
considering that public housing during the Vargas era had been built in a high modernist 
language. Unfortunately, the research did not reveal any significant debate about 
aesthetics. The evidence indicates that since the beginning of negotiations IDB and 
USAID missions demanded Guanabara authorities build economic homes. The embryo 
design was also part of the initial conversations as local and foreign authorities were 
interested on providing the core structure and allow the residents to add and expand. The 
embryo-type, which implied the possibility of spatial expansion, limited other kind of 
formal resolutions such as the multi-story apartment buildings. It could have also been 
the case that the availability of lands in remote rural suburbs allowed for a horizontal 
growth instead of vertical, highly densified apartment buildings. The layouts and pictures 
show, however, a rather crowded mass of houses tightly distributed within the given 
limits of the plot. Actually, the construction of modernist buildings could have liberated 
more land for public and recreational use. It might have been the case that high 
modernism could have looked particularly odd in such isolated rural landscape but 
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Brasília, built precisely in an isolated rural landscape, is a good counter example to this 
statement.  
The reasons that led to the single-family home, I would argue, lie in Lacerda‘s 
conservative modernization in a moment of strong reaction to political, social, and 
cultural radicalization in the first half of the 1960s. High modernism was symbolically 
too attached to both the Vargas past and Kubitschek‘s vision of the future. The single-
family home emphasized privacy and domesticity in contrast to the emphasis on public 
space and sociability of high urbanism. The dissonance between Lacerda and modernist 
aesthetics can be seen in Affonso Reidy‘s resignation as the head of architecture at the 
Department of Popular Housing of the Federal District (Departamento de Habitação 
Popular do Distrito Federal). Reidy, who had designed the Museum of Modern Art in Rio 
and the housing complexes of Pedregulho, objected to Lacerda‘s obstructions to his 
public housing project designed in Gávea in which the governor wanted to build a 
highway and the campus of the Pontificia Universidad Católica (PUC). In that sense, the 
election of the design of the Vilas, which reinforced a disciplinizing imaginary of white-
middle class domesticity and respectability for former slum residents is consistent with an 
administration characterized by its modernizing impulses framed within conservative 
standards. In this backdrop, the vilas might well have symbolized economic austerity, 
rationalization, and executive efficiency as a counterpoint to the unrestrained 
grandiloquence of the welfare state and overspending that Lacerda associated with 
Vargas‘ populism and Kubitscheck‘s developmentalism.  
In the case of Buenos Aires, the CMV used two very different languages to 




begun to undermine the influence of the modernist movement. As Chapter 4 has shown, 
the notion behind the housing program was to build a city through the creation of tall slab 
buildings arranged in such a manner that would allow for new forms of circulation and 
sociability. CGB presented a more traditional layout of single-family homes. In the case 
of VL1-2, the whole incorporation of such a significant portion of land that represented 
the urbanization of Parque Almirante Brown, meant for the architects of the CMV an 
unprecedented opportunity to build a city and make a significant contribution to the 
city.
32
 There was a formal condition that influenced the design of tall towers, as the IDB 
demanded the achievement of high densities in a relatively small footprint. The particular 
solution for VL1-2 imposed an urban design that directly challenged the city‘s traditional 
urban grid. As Gorelik has argued, the urban grid and the plaza in Buenos Aires were key 
cultural artifacts that embedded the republican ideals of a democratic (and 
democratrizing) urban space of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.
33
 As a 
result, VL1-2 manifested a modernizing attempt to situate Buenos Aires within the 
European reformist movement in architecture. This reformist architecture that sought to 
build a city more adequate for human beings, ironically, made use of a brutalist style that 
reinforced authoritarian spatial arrangements.  
In comparison, the design of CGB was less spectacular and offered a more simple 
solution: relatively small single-family homes built in the ground floor, organized in 
housing strips. The location, in a rather isolated suburban area, did not offer the same 
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excitement in terms of impact and significance as that of Parque Almirante Brown. 
Moreover, CGB was for families of a lower income than those that qualified for VL 1-2 -
which reinforces our general argument that the state and the market operated a spatial 
segregation based on income). According to architect Allende, the head of CMV‘s 
technical area, CGB‘s design was the outcome of conversations with CMV‘s team of 
sociologists and social workers who deliberated about the adequate urban arrangement 
for former squatters of rural origins. According to this version, squatters were still 
emotionally attached to the land and their spatial practices attached to their rural 
environment. This made the villero more inclined to live in the ground level, close to the 
land. The construction of backyards, for instance, was the spatial materialization of the 
technical imagination. Yet, urban backyards were not the same thing of rural patios, at 
least for those who published the CGB manual as they advised the soon to be residents 
not to use the backyard to rear poultry, or expand the home, or even to storage things-
practices that the manual might associated with a rural than an urban environment.
34
  
This understanding was not exclusive to the team of experts gathered at the CMV. 
In 1956, the Extension Program of the University of Buenos Aires (UBA) established the 
Centre for Integrated Community Development (CDI; Centro de Desarrollo Integral) in 
Isla Maciel a working-class neighborhood located in Greater Buenos Aires, bordering the 
capital city.
35
 The CDI organized interdisciplinary groups of scholars and students to 
work together with the residents to find solutions to the most urgent social needs. 
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Pediatricians and doctors, psychologists, social workers, educators, social scientists, and 
architects involved in this program saw their participation as a way to bring knowledge 
and society together. They understood their expertise and practice as committed to the 
betterment of the most deprived sectors of Argentine society, especially those living in 
the villas. In 1957, the CDI asked sociologist Germani to study the population of Isla 
Maciel to have a more scientific, empirical assessment of the population of the 
neighborhood.  
In 1960, Wladimiro Acosta, a modernist architect and a professor at the 
University of Buenos Aires School of Architecture and Urbanism, developed a housing 
project for the poor families living in Maciel. In his project, large balconies and terraces 
became centerpieces as the architect sought to recreate in the urban setting what he 
assumed was central of the rural immigrants‘ everyday life now living in Maciel: the 
patio. Acosta believed the humble ranchos that populated the slum were actually the 
reproduction of the rural home in the urban setting and he sought to reelaborate rural 
space in a modernist way.   
For Acosta, as for other Latin American modernist architects, modernism was not 
the adoption of a foreign aesthetic language but the application of a modernist attitude, a 
humanist belief in the social uses of architecture for the betterment of human life through 
the rationalization of space and the uses of technological innovation rooted in the local.
36
  
The housing program had to respond to a careful assessment of the living conditions of 
the villa population. Following this principle, Acosta gathered a group of young students, 
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some of them involved later in the CMV, and asked them to conduct a careful study of 
the villa residents and their built environment.
37
 To do so, the architects visited the villas 
to establish personal contact with the residents and their places and they engaged in 
conversations with the social workers and CDI authorities. Also important to the 
understanding of the residents was the study that Gino Germani had conducted in Maciel 
in 1957, which preliminary results the sociologist presented at the ECLA meeting in 
Santiago in 1959.  
After gathering all this information, Acosta concluded that the residents of the 
villa organized their spatial experience around the rancho (a precarious ranch house), 
allegedly the traditional form of housing in rural areas. As a space of sociability, the patio 
(terrace) of packed dirt yard was as important as the interior space. The project 
emphasized the use of stairs rather than elevators, which determined the maximum height 
of the building, a decision that came not only from the evaluation of maintenance costs 
but especially from Acosta‘s assumption that the villa residents were unfamiliar with the 
use of elevators. But as a member of Acosta‘s team recalls, social workers discredited 
this lack of knowledge of elevators noting that most of the women worked as domestic 
workers for middle class families that lived in tall apartment buildings.
38
  
The example of Maciel and Acosta‘s project, which was never built, showed the 
extent to which the experts; misconceptions and assumptions about the villa resident 
could have an impact in the actual design of the housing project. In CGB, as in Maciel, 
the experts assumed that poor resident, or the slum dweller, still reproduced the spatial 
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conventions and arrangements of their places of origin. Less progressive versions of these 
stereotypes were part of the conventional repertoire of anti-peronist hatred 
manifestations. Many residents of Buenos Aires accused the new residents of the housing 
complexes built during Perón‘s administration of turning the apartments bathtubs into 
mini-gardens and taking the parquet flooring to fuel asados (barbeques). This prejudice 
against the popular sectors reflected a class bias that connoted more subtlety ethnic and 
even racial prejudices.
39
  The biased images of people cultivating in their houses or 
making asados with the flooring sought to reinforce the prejudice that Perón received 
support from the poor recent migrants of the Peronist masses, derogatorily characterized 
as ―cabecitas negras‖ (earth-colored faces).
40
 In this way class prejudice also reproduced 
in more subtle ways ethnic and, therefore racial, prejudice.    
 
Life in the Housing Complexes 
 
As the Wall Street Journal’s article cited in the introduction to this chapter shows, 
criticism about the situation in Rio‘s vilas among Brazilians and US authorities and the 
press appeared few years after their inauguration. A USAID mission, articles in local 
newspapers, and anthropological studies all pointed out the difficult situation that 
relocated favelados were experiencing after their arrival in their new neighborhoods. 
Among the problems that piled up in the vilas were, besides the traumatic eradication in 
itself, spatial segregation and isolation, lack of job opportunities close to the residences, 
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deficient transportation, abandonment and neglect from the government, and the high rate 
of delinquency in mortgage payment.
41
  
In June 1966, Lawrence Selman –at that time a US student with interests in 
Anthropology- conducted research field in VK and Vila Esperança to evaluate the impact 
of the residents‘ recent relocation in the short term in both neighborhoods and between 
them.
42
 He found that thirty-six percent of VK‘s population and a fifth of VE‘s residents 
expressed desire to return to the favela. Journal do Brasil (JB) even mentioned that 
twenty percent of VK‘s dwellers had actually left the complex. In comparison, more 
people in VK were dissatisfied than in VE even when VK was a better urban project than 
Esperança that lacked most of the collective infrastructure, including public and 
recreational spaces. Salmen attributed this to most of the residents of VE being relocated 
from the same favela –João Candido—and could keep most of their social and economic 
networks. In addition, proximity to their original favelas implied proximity to their 
workplace, the opposite to VK.  
Internal USAID/HUDO reports revealed frustration among supervisors about the 
state of abandonment and official neglect, ―maintenance of streets and public services in 
Vila Kennedy has been less than satisfactory,‖ while trash collection happened only 
sporadically. Streets lacked paving and, as the reported commented, ―they need, but 
seldom get, careful maintenance. Consequently, heavy rains every year do maximum 
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damage. Vehicular and pedestrian traffic become difficult.‖
43
 The article in the JB 
described what they saw as images already seen in the favelas: kids walking barefoot, 
apparently malnourished. Dwellers were certainly upset by the abandonment and the 
decline of interest from the government.  
In VE, residents complained about the lack of recreational areas and open spaces 
in both the whole complex and individual homes. According to Salmen, kids in VE play 
in the only available area, which was in close proximity to vehicular traffic. As a result, 
people at VE complained about the high concentration of residents in a relatively small 
plot which, as Salmen noted, affected the privacy of the home. In VK urban design was 
more careful about open spaces and recreational areas although in the first years there 
were many works that were still pending. In the first four years, VK actually lacked a 
secondary school. Residents also complained about the sense of monotony, closure, and 
confinement in the design of the vilas. As chapter 3 showed, COHAB architects had to 
develop new housing types and eventually they had to redesign the whole block as a 
concept, which was later reelaborated in the quadra-bloque in Cidade de Deus. Young 
people in the vilas showed a low morale, according to Salmen, given the lack of areas for 
recreation and sociability. The lack of job opportunities close by also affected young 
inhabitants. Security issues such as walking at night were also a matter of concern among 
youth, especially females.  
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Despite original plans, residents soon engaged in clientelistic relationships with 
the housing authority agents. As Valladares showed in her doctoral work, these practices 
were ―invisible, that implied inventiveness, expertise and discretion and that possess a 
rationality and logic of its own,‖ allowed a more personal treatment and gave the resident 
some space for negotiation and benefit. For the agents this implied personal favors, 
getting their homes painted or their car fixed, for instance.
44
 The agent, eventually, could 
become an electoral boss or provide a political clientele to any given candidate.  
In any case, relocation had been traumatic. People lost their social and affective 
networks, they were far from the beach, and certainly far away from workplaces. 
Residents were nostalgic about the sense of community and familiarity they found in the 
favelas in contrast to the ―anonymity‖ of the vila.
45
 To make things worse, governmental 
plans to attract industries did not developed as expected creating a serious spatial 
segregation. Activities such biscate, street commerce, was still limited in scale. As a 
result, people had to keep, or look for, jobs in the city. But VK and VA were poorly 
planned in terms of transportation and commuting to workplaces in the city‘s downtown 
or South Zone took an average of an hour-and-half to two hours in old buses that usually 
got broken.
46
 The trip was surely tortuous: the main artery between VK and the city‘s 
downtown was still unpaved. Many people, especially men, opted to stay in the city 
during the week to save money and time, which also affected women who had to stay at 
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home. In some cases, extended families or neighbors would take care of kids so their 
mothers could go to their works. In this way, relocation affected women in particular 
ways. As Salmen pointed out, ―More than a loss of income and a less varied experience, 
it seems likely that this change has deprived the woman of a good part of what little 
independence she formerly had. Where she was once able to obtain some pocket money 
with which to enjoy the amenities of social life, she is now dependent n her husband.‖
47
  
This problem of transportation created an extra economic burden as commuting 
costs increased dramatically. Transportation and mortgages were thus new spending for 
an already limited domestic budget. Unemployment grew in VK to a twenty-three percent 
and almost a third in VE. Households had to disburse money to pay mortgage plus 
expensive transportation costs, compromises that were hard to keep up. Financial 
delinquency became one of the most serious problems for residents, and COHAB and 
state authorities. In VK delinquency reached more than sixty percent and in VE, forty 
percent.
48
 According to Valladares, a large number of residents that could not afford their 
homes faced eviction.
49
 Others found alternative options, including the transfer of rights 
on the home (cessão de direitos), voluntary leaving their dwellings. In this later case, the 
mechanism implied an economic benefit for the ―seller.‖ To transfer the rights on the 
home, the holder of the house had to prove payment consistency. In practice, however, 
the ―seller‖ is way behind in payments so the ―buyer‖ was responsible for past due debt. 
This gave the original residents a sum of cash which they used to go back to the favela, 
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open a small business, or build a modest house in the suburbs of Greater Rio. These 
transactions showed, as Valladares noted at that time, that the former favelados were far 
from marginal. As a result of the transference of homes, the vilas began to change its 
social composition as families of a relatively higher income (police members, low-
ranking military, state employees, more skilled workers) began to move in. Valadares 
associates the improvements in the homes and the flourishing of new commercial life in 
the vilas as a result of this process of social selection.
50
 Likewise, Salmen found a 
relationship between the ―willingness to stay in the vila and a family‘s per capita income. 
That, it is clear that the more income the family had, the better it was to afford the costs 
of rent and commuting and the greater its contentment with life in Vila Kennedy.‖
51
 
Still, a fully negative assessment of the project would neglect the fact that many 
families were willing to move and found in the vilas, despite the many problems, a better 
place to live. In Lacerda‘s archive there are many letters from people asking the governor 
for a home. In Chapter 3, I have analyzed these letters in terms of the continuity of 
clientelistic practices even for an administration that introduced itself as overcoming the 
populist past. But these letters also revealed that people actually wanted to live in the 
vilas. Squatters may have wanted to reach their dream of homeownership and middle-
class respectability. Leaving behind the favelado stigma and actually having a concrete a 
solid roof was not a marginal detail: modernization may have been as attractive for the 
squatter as it was for the policymaker.  
Many residents expressed high opinions of their in the homes and neighborhood 
and a personal improvement in their situation. The homes were made of concrete served 
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with water, sewage, and electricity. Salmen actually did his interviews just months after 
the copious rains that so badly affected many favelas in January and February of 1966, 
causing landslides and displacements. It is not surprising that residents felt particularly 
protected in their homes.  People commented about the quality of the surroundings and 
the quality of the air in contrast to the favela. The article in the JB emphasized how 
people put effort and time in planting flowers and trees, embellishing their fronts, and 
even expanding their homes. USAID supervisors also used these examples to stress how 
people adapted quickly and positively to their new environment. In governmental reports, 
still during Lacerda‘s time, the pictures of the vilas showed happy families in festival 
scenes, people playing sports, kids playing together. Those same pictures, certainly part 
of a governmental dossier, also showed how people had decorated and embellished the 
houses‘ front and improved the surroundings. [Figures 16-17] As we mentioned before, O 
Globo had several articles narrating the celebration of Mother‘s Day in VA and VK. 
These latter images could have been produced to support the relocation theory but it is 
also true that for many residents who could afford the mortgages and commuting costs, 
living in the vilas was a way to get rid of the favelado stigma. As Salmen pointed out, the 
former favelado ―now has an opportunity to gain a foothold, however tenuous, into the 
ranks of the ‗respectable middle class.‘ At last, he can plan, work, and defend his gains 
with some hope that society and its institutions may assist him in his efforts to improve 
his own condition.‖
52
  In 1968, VK‘s residents inaugurated their own bloco carnavalesco, 
which later became samba school, Unidos da Vila Kennedy (popularly known as A 
Princesinha da Zona Oeste) whose flag reproduced the image of the Statue of Liberty. 
[Figure 18] 
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Villa Lugano 1-2 and Ciudad General Belgrano 
 
The occupation of VL1-2 and CGB occurred in a context marked by the 
radicalization of politics and everyday life, in the period from the end of the military 
dictatorship to the return of Perón to power. This backdrop is important because both 
housing complexes were caught between the arbitrary policies of the military and the 
internal dispute within Peronism for spaces of power. By then, the villa population 
became an important in the political agenda of the radical left and social Catholicism, 
including the curas villeros of the movement of third world priests. As a result, VL1-2 
and CGB became ground of radical politics.
53
  
An original resident of VL1-2 recalled that after being selected and he was 
assigned the new home, he hurried to sign the conditional bill of sale [boleto de 
compraventa] and as soon he received the keys of the unit immediately took a taxi to the 
complex. That was his first visit to the site. He had taken a set of warm clothes and a 
sleeping bag. Time was of the essence. There were rumors that slum residents were 
squatting [―tomando‖] units. In following days, a group of people like him organized a 
system of shifts to guard the apartment against occupations. They had a gun to defend 
their property.
54
  In CGB, few days before the inauguration of President Cámpora in May 
1973, the army mobilized troops and tanks to evict illegal occupants who were taking the 
homes to force the CMV to fulfill their original compromises. Such practices would 
increase in the following years until the military coup in 1976, following which there was 
an aggressive campaign of slum eradication and repression against the villas.  
                                                 
53
 VL1-2 first 1,000 units became available after inauguration in 1970 and more upon completion in the 
following years. Occupation in CGB began in 1973, months before the inauguration of President Cámpora.   
54




The tomas were part of both the struggles of the organized villero movement and 
the own struggles within the Peronist movement that were entering into a cycle of violent 
feud. In CGB, occupations happened just few days after the inauguration of Cámpora. 
The new peronist president –who prepared the terrain for Perón‘s comeback few months 
after—had won the election with the support of the Peronist Left. The Peronist Youth 
(Juventud Peronista; JP) sought to hegemonize the mobilization of the different 
expressions of the ―campo popular,‖ which included the villero movement. The creation 
of the Movimiento Villero Peronista in 1973, an organization of Montoneros –the 
peronist paramilitary arm—showed the strong ascendancy of the Peronist left, especially 
the JP by incorporating the Frente Villero de Liberación Nacional (The Villa Front for 
National Liberation).
55
 El Descamisado, periodical of Montoneros, the revolutionary 
front of the JP, covered the occupations in CGB. The journal denounced corruption and 
political clientelism in the distribution of homes.
56
 The occupations were organized and 
were part of the agenda of the Movimiento Villero Peronista to gain prominence with the 
villero movement and also as a challenge to the right-wing forces within peronism.
57
 For 
that reason, El Descamisado denounced the corruption of local leaderships, connected 
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with influential political figures in the Municipality, themselves connected to right-wing 
union leaders (i.e. the Metal Workers Union). Announcing that the corruption in the 
assignments of homes was collusion between these actors, El Descamisado established its 
vanguardist position and delimited the lines between loyalty and treason, ―This is so that 
people know about the methods and learn to better differentiate, between their authentic 
leaders and the traitors.‖
58
  
Political radicalization was also taking place at every level of the bureaucratic 
structure, as it was the case in the CMV.
59
 A group of workers of the housing agency 
(especially those whose task involved a direct relationship with villero population) 
pressed for the unionization of the CMV and the formation of a representative body. This 
internal division at the interior of the CMV came from young workers, mostly middle-
class professionals or university students with connections with JP and Montoneros. As 
most of them worked in the Community Development section, directly involved with 
squatters, they established political or working relationships with the villas. The Mesas de 
Trabajo were the name of that space in which members of the villa and the CMV workers 
met and coordinated works in the slums, as it was the case in the urbnization of the Villa 
7 in the neighborhood Justo Suárez, anlyzed below.  By the time Cámpora was to assume 
the presidency, this internal commission within the CMV pressed for the removal of the 
agencies‘ directors, becoming the de facto authority. This leftist-peronist CMV was, 
however, in conflict with the right-wing Ministry of Social Welfare (MBS; Ministerio de 
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Bienestar Social), responsible for housing policy at the national level.
60
 José López Rega 
was the minister appointed by Perón. He had been Perón‘s personal assistant, and 
represented the peronist-right wing. In this sense, the rightist MBS and the leftist CMV 
represented two irreconcilable factions. Yet the former subsumed the capacity of the 
CMV. In broader way, Perón‘s rightward turn forced the left into taking a more 
clandestine approach.  
As a result, the ―tomas‖ in VL and CGB indicate the degree to which the housing 
question became part of the broader history of political radicalization and violence in 
Argentina in the 1970s. Working class neighborhoods and slums were the place where 
the peronist masses lived, from where the new Patria Peronista was to be forged. The 
high number of villeros and activist disappeared during the last military dictatorship 
(1976-1983), which included many residents of VL 1-2 and CGB, are good indicators of 
the degree of political mobilization.  
From the point of view of the people‘s experience of their new built environment, 
it is possible to argue that in the following decades CGB deteriorated as part of the more 
structural decline of Argentine working classes along with the urban environment. New 
squatter settlements and those state-organized temporary dwellings, part of broader 
eradication programs of the dictatorships, contributed in the emergence of new 
segregated spaces, increasing inequality, and political subjection to clientelist politics. 
CGB, or ―Barrio BID‖ as it is currently known, is now situated in one of the toughest 
areas of Greater Buenos Aires. Crime, delinquency, narco-trafficking, and police abuse 
are the main problems that the working population that has to deal with. This status quo 
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is useful to local authorities and governments in power, which recruit vast political 
clienteles. At the same time, this is an area for potential social and political conflict: here 
began the popular upheavals and lootings in December 2001 that led to the resignation of 
President De la Rua and the end of the neoliberal era in Argentina.
61
  
 In the case of Villa Lugano, in the long-term, architects and experts recognized 
the housing complex became a deteriorated space rather than the city they were expecting 
to build. Whereas the program emphasized the use of public spaces to enhance social and 
democratic life, those areas then became dangerous places, the meeting point for gangs 
and petty crime. This outcome was not entirely a problem of architecture or planning as 
both are inserted into the structural situation of the country. Yet, housing complexes 
inspired by the ideas of Team X in several parts of the world, received strong criticism 
for their poor outcomes. Particularly in Buenos Aires, VL 1-2 residents expressed their 
discomfort with the neighborhood. Among the mentioned problems were that the gigantic 
scale and the morphology of the project, which basically established a central axis 
enclosed by a tall mass of concrete buildings, created a sense of claustrophobia and 
enclosure. The whole project appeared to the residents as an external imposition or as the 
bureaucratic decision of technocrats not very much informed about resident‘s necessities. 
According to a research undertaken by a group of UBA‘s architects, anthropologists, and 
psychologists at Lugano, residents also expressed a sense of nostalgia for the traditional 
grid, neighborhood, blocks, and plazas, which reflected a sense of estrangement with the 
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 This has contributed to a sense of isolation, expressed by terms like 
―ghetto‖ or ―island‖ which, in recent years, is also connected to feelings of insecurity.  
Design might have also been a factor in the increasing levels of insecurity and 
gang sociability that residents complained about, especially in a context in which 
residents are particular sensitive to crime. The spatial labyrinthine design, dispositions of 
the columns, stairs, shadowy areas, insufficient public lightning, and abandoned stores 
created spaces for hiding and ambush. Women, in particular, expressed more 
apprehension, as they felt even more unsafe with the built environment. The original idea 
of creating a vibrant social and commercial life on the first floor never worked. People 
kept walking at the ground level and avoided the use of bridges, as they did not seem 
useful. They are now insecure and conducive to robbery and assault especially at night. 
Green spaces, in addition, did not favor sociability: according to a group of UBA 
architects these places became more empty spaces rather recreational areas. As it happens 
with other large-scale complexes in Buenos Aires and abroad, VL1-2 was very expensive 
in terms of maintenance, leading to physical deterioration, poor lightening, broken 
elevators, and structural problems. Yet, VL1-2 are better in terms of maintenance in 
comparison to nearby housing complexes built in the l970s. Better construction 
specifications and materials guaranteed, in comparison, a better result.
 63
 
Finally, many experts have argued that VL1-2 failed in creating a collective 
identity as a community. People used to identify themselves as ―municipal (workers)‖, 
―military,‖ and ―police,‖ but not as luganenses or members of the Conjunto Savio (as it is 
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 According to UBA‘s study, contemporary forms of identity are in relation 
to the building or tower of residence, age group, music band, or soccer team. In my own 
research, however, I did find some kind of self-identification when I asked residents 
about their opinions of the people of the other housing complexes located in the area 
(Conjuntos Villa Soldatti and Piedrabuena).
65
 In this case, the interviewed differentiated 
from those other inhabitants by stressing the supposedly ethnic origin of the people of the 
other complexes. People in Soldatti or Piedrabuena were, according to the interviewed in 
Lugano,  ―bolitas‖ and ―paraguas‖ (derogatory term for Bolivian and Parguayan 
nationals). The stigmatization also stressed the villero origin of the people of Soldati or 
Piedrabuena. The people in Lugano, on the contrary, paid for their homes. In this way, 
residents expressed their sense of difference in social and ethnic terms and hide the fact 
that many came from slums.
66
 Yet, as it was the case in Rio de Janeiro with the vilas, 
most of the original residents I talked to expressed a sense of pride for having achieved 
their dream of the ―casa propia.‖ Social mobility through homeownership, recognized the 
people in my sample, was a definitive moment in their experience. The neighborhood 
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Building for and with the Poor: Alternative Urban Planning Experiences in Rio and 
Buenos Aires  
 
As a way of conclusion, I will briefly refer to the experience of the Companhia de 
Desenvolvemento Comunitario (CODESCO) in the urbanization of Brás de Pina, in 
Guanabara (1968-1971) and the construction of the Barrio Justo Suárez, in Buenos Aires 
(1971-1974). Both experiences represented alternative urban interventions to the politics 
of eradication and relocation in large-scale housing projects. In both cases, they were 
built by progressive leftist actors (religious and political) and were supported by local 
organizations. They were also realized thanks to a transnational context in which the 
experience of poor urban residents and their solutions for shelter began to be evaluated 
positively under the distinction to past experience. Poor urban residents were not 
anymore the expression of tradition and marginality but rather a mass of workers that 
produced, circulated, and consumed the city. Borrowing from anthropologist William 
Mangin, slums became the solution rather than a problem. This positive valuation of 
popular knowledge and poor people‘s practices was certainly part of the context of 
political radicalization in which many professionals and experts decided to abandon their 
place of privilege to work with and for the poor. In the field of social housing, this 
implied a challenge to top-down approaches considered not only economically and 
socially irrational, but also authoritarian and repressive. As a result, these housing 
initiatives offered another vision of modernization, one that posited the transformative 
power in the very hands of the working classes.
67
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In the Brazilian case, CODESCO was a public agency that received the support 
from the Negrão de Lima administration (1965-1971) to implement an innovative 
housing program that would make use of a small sum of USAID funds earmarked for that 
purpose. The favelas Brás de Pina, Morro União, and Mata Machado became the object 
of CODESCO‘s intervention.
68
 Negrão de Lima was the last governor of Guanabara 
chosen directly by popular suffrage during the military dictatorship. He authorized the 
formation of CODESCO as a political gesture to progressive forces. In authorizing the 
urbanization of favelas of relative small size, he was cultivating a more popular image. In 
this sense, CODESCO not only openly challenged Lacerda‘s eradication and relocation 
programs, but also allowed the governor to assume the paternity of a project that 
represented an alternative to the housing policies of the federal government. The military 
dictatorship actually took Lacerda‘s housing policy and projected it into the federal level. 
The creation of CHISAM (Coordenação de Habitação de Interesse Social da Area 




At the same time, there was a more favorable climate among certain sectors about 
the situation of favelados. Rio‘s middle classes became slightly more sympathetic for the 
plight of favelados after the exceptional rains and landslides that occurred in early 1966 
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and then again in early 1967, which killed many favelados and left many more dislocated. 
USAID also became more hesitant about the eradication and relocation in housing 
complexes. The ―Wagner Report‖ was the result of a USAID mission to Guanabara to 
evaluate a housing and urban development program.
70
 It criticized the construction of the 
Vilas in the same way we have detailed in the previous section and argued that a careful 
analysis would have shown that the cost of rehabilitating slums was lower than 
eradicating and building new complexes.
71
 This assessment actually recognized that all 
kind of improvements the residents did to their houses and the slums in general were 
capital investment in addition to social improvement, ―as a result, a rehabilitation 
program it is not only desirable from a social point of view but also economically 
viable.‖
72
  Adding to the climate against eradication was the fact that favelado 
organizations showed their ability to oppose eradications and made urban rehabilitation 
their political objective, although the repressive policies of the military regime were 
increasingly imposing limits to social mobilizations.  
CODESCO‘s director, Silvio Ferraz, journalist and sociologist whose firsthand 
contact with the favelado situation began when he got involved with the situation in 
Pasmado before its eradication and contacted a group of young architects of the 
architectural firm QUADRA. The leading figure in QUADRA was Carlos Nelson 
Ferreira dos Santos who had been involved with the neighborhood association in Brás de 
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Pina, located in North Rio, neighboring Cordovil, Vila da Penha, and Irajá. While still a 
student of architecture, Carlos Nelson had closely followed the resistance to eviction 
which had been organized in the favelas. There, a group of Catholic priests joined the 
neighborhood associations in repudiating Lacerda‘s visit to announce the relocation. This 
case was a victory in a moment when the Federação de Favelas do Rio de Janeiro 
(FAFEG) was in formation.
73
 Carlos Nelson and his colleagues believed that architecture 
had to serve the necessities of the favelados, working for and with them and made 
themselves available to Brás de Pina‘s neighborhood association to work with them in 
improving their built environment.
74
 
Brás de Pina became the pilot experience. The program insisted on the 
collaborative work between architects and experts, and favelados in a community 
development project based on self-help. The process, in broad terms, implied the whole 
urbanization of the slum, spatial rearrangements, and the construction or redesign of 
homes. Urbanization works included installing basic infrastructure (sewage, water, 
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electricity), paving, and reordering of streets and blocks when required. In some cases, 
works required the relocation of slum houses to other areas within the same favela. One 
of the central aspects of the project was to give slum residents land rights to formalize 
their situation. The assumption, shared among other architects and reformers working 
with squatter communities in third world countries, was that once land tenure was 
granted, then residents would take more active steps toward the improvement of their 
property.
75
Thus, CODESCO, with BNH financing, bought lands and re-sold them to the 
residents with low-interest rates. In this way, such innovative project did not challenge 
the very core of the capitalist system (which they would agree was the cause behind the 
favelado situation) of private property and prescribed an assistentialist approach that 
seemed to have given good results.    
In every aspect of the project favelados participated not only by providing labor 
but also, and most important for CODESCO‘s experts, in the decision-making process. 
Families were actually required to design their own homes according to their preferences. 
In order to establish a way of representing their preferences, CODESCO team of 
architects, which included students of architecture and engineering, provided residents 
with a grid sheet and asked them to draw their ideal layout. Residents returned more than 
three hundred designs in total. In a majority of cases, the ideal design reproduced middle-
classes spatial arrangements like hallways [pasillo] or balconys [varanda].
76
 For Carlos 
Nelson, this spatial imagination made sense since male favela residents actually built 
middle-classes homes in Rio and faveladas worked in those houses as domestics. This 
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experience allowed the architect to understand the importance which squatters gave to 
certain symbolic elements and that could make less sense to the expert‘s eyes. Popular 
knowledge and everyday spatial practices dictated what was important and what was less 
convenient in the design of the homes, despite the rational opinion of the ―doutores.‖ As 
Carlos Nelson put it, ―the solutions to everyday needs are given by the very act of living 




To simplify the problem of design, the architects came up with three different 
models which they presented to the neighborhood association so that resident could 
choose from. While a few chose the more rational solution, many stayed with their own 
design. But the most popular model was a house of 55 m
2
 with living room, two 
bedrooms, bathroom, kitchen, balcony, and service area; almost a conventional middle 
class apartment. Then construction of the homes occurred with residents investing their 
own labor and experts providing technical assistance. To keep costs low, CODESCO 
bought building materials in bulk and offered low interest rates for the residents. In that 
way, as Janice Perlman pointed out, the project rested in the notion that by offering the 
security of tenure possession individual residents would unleash their full potential in 
improving their house and working together with others in their built environment, 
transforming a slum into a community and neighborhood. In this way, ownership, but 
also community and solidarity would work in building a more fair and progressive urban 
space and life. Favelados, in this perspective, were not a mass of helpless and marginal 
people but rather the very own agents of their social and living transformation. 
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CODESCO‘s life, however, was short. The institutional weakness within the Guanabara 
government and the increasing hostility of the federal administration led to the programs 
end, although Brás de Pina, Morro União, and Mata Machado proved to be positive 
experiences and which showed that there were actually alternative paths to the goal of 
modernization of housing.  
In Buenos Aires, a similar experience of promotion of homeownership and the 
active participation of the squatter in a self-help project was found in the urbanization of 
the villa 7, between 1971-1974, which gathered together villa residents, architects, and 
experts.
78
  The urbanization of this small slum (122 families) involved the relocation of 
the residents in a housing project designed and partially built by the residents, and which 
was one block from their original villa. Like in Rio, the political conjuncture was central. 
The housing program was a curious project of slum rehabilitation in the midst of the 
aggressive eradication policy the dictatorship enacted since the launching of the Plan de 
Erradicación de Viviendas. By 1971, organized resistance against the dictatorship made 
evident that the military had to negotiate a transition to a democratic government. The 
Gran Acuerdo Nacional (GAN) [Great National Deal] established a space of negotiation 
between political parties and the military to come up with a orderly transition. The great 
question was how to integrate the Peronist party to Argentina‘s political life. By then, we 
have seen, the villero movement organized to resist eradications, especially with the 
support of the radical left, mostly Peronista, and the movement of curas villeros. In this 
context Major Saturnino Ruiz–appointed by the military—authorized a group of 
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architects and experts, connected with the JP, to establish a pilot plan of urban 
rehabilitation. The villa 7 fitted perfect for the architects and for the government. It was a 
small settlement in Buenos Aires in a traditional working class area in Mataderos (in the 
city‘s west), one block from the meat packing company Lisandro de la Torre. The slum 
was relatively new (18 years) and was mostly composed of porteño families. For the 
architects, the small size would allow them to develop a housing program that would 
cheapen construction costs, create a culture of cooperativism, facilitate the collective 
sprit, and the strengthening of community and solidarity ties.
79
 For the government, it 
offered a low-risk opportunity to show political openness and the gesture of good will 
toward residents.  
While in the case of Brás de Pina, in Rio de Janeiro, Carlos Nelson approached 
the favela drawn by the mobilization of the favelados to resist eradication, in the case of 
Villa 7 it was a group of militant, leftist Peronist architects leaded by Osvaldo ―Cholo‖ 
Cedrón that were looking for a slum to carry out the housing program.
80
 The 
Municipality of Buenos Aires gave support to the project by hiring these architects and 
providing the institutional support of the CMV and its team of experts, sociologists, and 
social workers.
81
After initial contact with the neighborhood council (Junta Vecinal), 
dominated by the Movimiento Villero Peronista, all the participants established a ―mesa 
de trabajo,‖ a series of meetings and to talk about the project, hear about residents‘ needs, 
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define possible designs, and organize the works.
82
 In the beginning, the residents 
hesitated about the good intentions of these middle-class experts, the ―experimental‖ 
character of the project, and their own capacity to contribute in any way to the project. As 
Marcelo Cangiano, part of the CMV team in Justo Suarez put it, ―our role in the project 
was as difficult to understand to the residents as it was the understanding of their own 
participatory role.‖ The architect‘s challenge was to assume ―a technical role to service 
those who need our wisdom (sabiduría) and enters into a creative conversation with the 
user and who interprets him [the user].‖
83
 
According to Marcelo Cangiano, an architect that participated in the experience, 
the whole project was inspired by the attitude and the assumptions behind the project 
Vladimiro Acosta had established for Isla Maciel (1960), commented above.
84
 They took 
from Acosta‘s project the notion that the design had to come up from the residents‘ own 
understanding of their space and their everyday spatial practices. Any formal solution had 
to come up from the careful analysis of the material and symbolic needs of the squatters. 
There was consensus that relocation had to be in a very close location. There was a 
terrain available just one block from the villa 7. But given the size of the terrain was 
smaller than the villa, any solution to house all the families had to include the 
construction of apartment buildings. This was unanimously rejected at first as residents 
wanted to live in ―chalecitos,‖ middle class single-units homes. People also resented that 
apartment buildings did not offer the possibility to make additions or transform it 
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according to family changing necessities and eliminated the possibility of having a front 
or back yard. 
The solution was the construction of five strips of three and four-story buildings 
with no elevators and one ten-story apartment building, all served with circulation areas 
and green spaces that would reproduce the recreational zones for sociability already 
present in the slum. As it was the case with Acosta‘s project for Isla Maciel, the architects 
also assumed that the villa residents were used to a type of housing linked with rural life, 
as the ―ranchos‖ they had improvised in the slum seemed to prove. As a result, the 
architects came up with a design that looked for the ―elimination of superfluous areas, 
such as hallways and use that space in places of more variable use.‖
85
  The apartments‘ 
layout was open could adapt it to according to their own spatial needs. Internal walls 
would be made of furniture or other elements, allowing flexibility and adaptability. In 
addition, the layout included a balcony that would serve as a sort of backyard.  
The plan originally included the construction of common service areas to save 
costs and to promote sociability. To the surprise of CMV‘s personnel, residents rejected 
this idea when they discussed about a common laundry area. They said they were ―fed up 
of sharing,‖ as they did in the villa where they shared water faucets and other ―common‖ 
areas. In this sense, the expectative of getting a new home came with the desires of living 
a more individualist, intimate life.  On a different matter, squatters initially rejected 
childcare services but the increasing presence of women in the meetings with CMV 
authorities established that as a top priority.  
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To gain the initial confidence of the squatters, the CMV team speeded up urgent 
improvements much needed in the villa. Installation of water faucets and paving 
contributed to the creation of a sense of collaboration while professionals and dwellers 
worked together in project. At the same time, squatter demanded of CMV authorities that 
the project had to create job opportunities. As a result, a group of workers that lived in 
the villa organized and managed a cooperative that produced prefabricated brick panels 
used in the dwellings‘ fronts. This cooperative organization became an example of the 
positive impact of self-management, especially suitable for smaller villas.  
When López Rega imposed a tighter control in the CMV‘s internal situation 
getting rid of radical elements, the agency‘s team in Justo Suárez quit in 1973. By then, 
most of construction works were almost finished or well in advance, and by 1974 the 
project was completed. The balance was mixed. Collaborative and self-help experiences 
like the experience of Justo Suárez were not repeated again in until the late 1990s. In the 
short term, however, many activists and residents remembered the great influence the 
project had in creating a dynamic of work between the villeros and the members of the 
CMV, especially through the ―mesas de enlace,‖ in the context of the politization and 




Taken together, the experience of CODESCO and Barrio Justo Suárez were 
possible thanks to the emergence of a new transnational context of ideas that emerged to 
overcome the premises of modernization theory and the characterizations of poor urban 




slums of Latin America (and also Africa and South Asia) to conduct detailed 
ethnographies and research work that provided a more dynamic account of the 
settlements.
86
 This interdisciplinary way of understanding the poor was part of the 
determination to think about the individual practices as part of a more integral project to 
service the needs of the most deprived. Now influenced by dependentismo, many Latin 
American progressive professionals and experts realized that the promises of 
modernization and developmentalism not only did not occur, but also were responsible 
for the expansion of social inequality.  
The housing problem could not be solved just by providing homes, although such 
policy and the formalization of the situation of squatters remained important. As William 
Mangin put it in an influential article that challenged the stereotypes associated with 
poverty and spaces of inequality, favelas and villas were not the problem but rather the 
solution for shelter.
87
 By the end of the decade, architect John F.C. Tuner who was 
working in the barriadas of Lima and was in close contact with Peruvian anthropologist 
Jose Matos Mar, came to the conclusion that slums improve over time.
88
 In Lima, Turner 
saw that squatter settlements began as simple and basic land occupations. In later stages, 
squatters built their homes, improved their environment, claimed governments for 
specific improvements, and managed to get water, and their streets paved. With time, 
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homes underwent transformation according to material capacities and needs. For squatter, 
an improvement in their personal situation did not translate into geographical mobility 
but in upgrading their houses and surroundings.
89
 
By investing their labor into the improvement of their homes and built 
environments, squatters were making a direct capital investment. Valued as such, self-
help housing became an alternative to the more expensive and socially disruptive policy 
of slum eradication and relation in new housing complexes. More important, experiences 
such as the ones undertook by CODESCO and the team of CMV‘s architects in Justo 
Suárez showed the importance of attempting to understand housing less from the 
perspective of the expert or the policy makers and rather from the point of view of the 
dweller. In the decades to follow Turner expanded the ―Freedom to Build‖ movement 
while international organisms like the UN and the World Bank generalized this approach 
to cope with the problem of housing in developing countries.
90
 And yet, as the letters of 
favelados to governor Lacerda soliciting homes in the Vilas, many poor people still 
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Figure 39 –―This house is yours! Keep it, enlarge it, and embellish it. It‘s your duty…,‖ Secretaria de 





Figure 40 – ―Go to the Social Service‘s office and have your child transfer to the local school,‖ Secretaria 






Figure 41 – ―Keep your home and surroundings neat and clean,‖ Secretaria de Serviços Sociais - COHAB-




Figure 42 – ―This is no workplace! Use your home only as a residence. There are other appropriate places 
for work and commerce,‖ Secretaria de Serviços Sociais - COHAB-GB, Manual do Propriétario (Rio de 






Figure 43 –On the top, ―You can add on to your house to make your family more comfortable. Ask the 
engineering office and start today;‖ at the bottom, ―Don‘t make any change of your building without 
authorization from the engineering office,‖ Secretaria de Serviços Sociais - COHAB-GB, Manual do 
Propriétario (Rio de Janeiro: COHAB, 1965), p.8.  
 
Figure 44 – ―Hang your clothes only in the backyard,‖ Secretaria de Serviços Sociais - COHAB-GB, 






Figure 45 – ―FIRE! Always check the gas nozzles and don‘t leave gasoline or alcohol in your children‘s 
reach,‖ Secretaria de Serviços Sociais - COHAB-GB, Manual do Propriétario (Rio de Janeiro: COHAB, 
1965), p.12.  
 
Figure 46 – ―Use household‘s appliances appropriately. Do not waste water, electricity, gas, etc,‖ Secretaria 






Figure 47 – At the top, ―Register all family events with social services: marriages, death, contagious 
deceases,‖ at the bottom, ―Inform the social services of every birth,‖ Secretaria de Serviços Sociais - 
COHAB-GB, Manual do Propriétario (Rio de Janeiro: COHAB, 1965), p. 15. 
 
 
Figure 48 – ―Housewife, mother: Look for the Secretary of the Social Services‘ office to learn about the 
preparation of food and care for your children,‖ Secretaria de Serviços Sociais - COHAB-GB, Manual do 





Figure 49 – ―IN UNITY THERE IS STRENGH! Participate in meetings with your street‘s representative 
and work together with the neighborhood association,‖ Secretaria de Serviços Sociais - COHAB-GB, 
Manual do Propriétario (Rio de Janeiro: COHAB, 1965), p. 19.  
 
 
Figure 50 – ―The Vila will be beautiful and pleasant if all the residents do their part,‖ Secretaria de 





Figure 51 - A Social Workers doing a house demonstration in Favela de Bom Jesús, eradicated to Vila 
Aliança; Estado da Guanabara-COHAB, Plano de recuperação de favelas e de habitações de interesse social 
(mimeo), July 1962.  
 
 
Figure 52 - House demonstration in Bom Jesús; Estado da Guanabara-COHAB, Plano de recuperação de 






Figure 53 - Vila Aliança - A favelada visits the site; Estado da Guanabara-COHAB, Plano de recuperação 




Figure 54 - Vila Aliança; Companhia de habitação popular, A COHAB através de números e imagenss, 












Figure 56 - Unidos da Vila Kennedy, logo of Vila Kennedy‘s samba school. 
 
 
Figure 57 - ―These keys that we are giving you serve to enter into the present, this present in which every 
human being has the right, that of light, air, the comforts and simplicities of modern life, a home worthy of 
our time.‖ Comisión Municipal de la Vivienda, Para entrar en el presente (Buenos Aires: Municipalidad de 






Figure 58 - Villa Lugano I-II, drawings attached to the loan proposal to the Inter-American Development 
Bank; Municipalidad de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires, Solicitud de préstamo al Banco Interamericano de 
Desarollo (Buenos Aires: Municipalidad de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires, 1965) 
 
 
Figure 59 - Villa Lugano I-II, drawings attached to the loan proposal to the Inter-American Development 
Bank; Municipalidad de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires, Solicitud de préstamo al Banco Interamericano de 




Figure 60 – CMV‘s jeep and military trucks used to remove the illegal occupants in CGB; ―Pidieron casa 









It has been my central argument that the processes that led to the modernization of 
the Latin American city in the postwar era also produced a landscape of urban poverty 
and inequality. After 1945, and especially in the early 1960s, cities like Rio and Buenos 
Aires achieved significant improvement of urban infrastructure. In Rio, overpasses, 
tunnels, and land reclamation helped to overcome the obstacles imposed by geography. 
Bottlenecks of vehicular traffic were relieved. The expansion of the water and sewage 
systems as well as the expansion of energy distribution secured the provision of basic 
public utilities to commercial centers and residential neighborhoods. In Buenos Aires, the 
urbanization of the Bañado de Flores incorporated a huge area to the urban fabric, greatly 
expanding the city's green spaces, while diminishing the frequency of flooding. The 
newly habitable land was made available for the construction of housing complexes for 
working families as well as recreation zones for the entire city.  In Rio, and most 
especially in Buenos Aires, the growing financial sector expanded access to long-term 
credit, and the associated political economy and political culture of homeownership 
Urbanists in Rio and São Paulo, in collaboration with their transnational partners, secured 
the technical expertise, political will, and financing to restructure the city spaces and 
urban civism.  
At the same time, social transformation led to the emergence of new middle 
sectors that were the consumers and white-collar managers of new "modern" urban-




international corporations that sought a presence in the Latin American marketplace— 
left their imprint in the cities. In Buenos Aires, firms like Fiat, Olivetti, and others erected 
office towers in international style, providing the city skyline with a more cosmopolitan 
look and accelerating the rise of a middle-class managerial, consumerist workforce. This 
process of cosmpolitanization and mass consumption also led to the vibrancy of urban 
life in Rio and Buenos Aires. Commercial galleries, cinemas, and cafes spread rapidly in 
certain areas of the cities and captivated the imagination of residents and non-residents 
alike. Rising incomes allowed middle classes to move into neighborhoods remade by  
newly constructed high-rise apartment buildings, as it was the case with Copacabana and 
other "noble" neighborhoods of  Rio's South Zone. For many residents of the Marvelous 
City, the move to these once-distant neighborhoods was emblematic of the broader 
process of mobility associated with modernity. The expansion of fashionable 
neighborhoods situated in close proximity to the white-sand beaches, a picturesque 
lagoon, or a verdant urban forest, however, put increasing stress of an urban 
infrastructure that also strained to accommodate population increases in working-class 
and industrial areas, as well as in the "unregulated" spaces of hillsides and mangroves. 
Unable to escape the scourge of overcrowding, irregularity, and unreliable public 
services, the middle class residents of Copacabana came to know the limitations of an 
urban modernization, marred by the craven interest of realtors and the construction 
industry, the inadequacies of municipal government, and the competing demands of 
popular classes 
 As I have suggested, the underside of urban modernization was the dramatic 




number of new squatter settlements and of squatters was unprecedented, particularly the 
percentages relative to the larger population. Favelas in Rio grew in the hills of the city 
and in the suburbs to the North. In Buenos Aires, villas miserias occupied available 
public and unutilized lands within and beyond the city limits, particularly to the suburbs 
of Greater Buenos Aires where new industries appeared close to the city. In most cases, 
slums were the response of the poor to their problem the solution for shelter for working 
classes individuals and families that could not afford a formal dwelling in the city but 
needed to live close to their workplaces. Squatters lived in a state of vulnerability that 
came from inequality in general, the illegal occupation of public or private lands and, the 
subjection to the power of local bosses, authorities, or politicians. This did not preclude 
squatters to find ways to push for their interests, albeit in a context of unequal relations of 
power.   
Meanwhile, predominant social imaginaries attached to these slums among 
middle and upper classes, and also among experts and policymakers, journalists and the 
public in general characterized them as places of moral decadence, pathology, disease, 
and crime. At the same time, an emergent, postwar sociological understanding of slums 
and slumdwellers emerged as a way to provide a more scientific, empirical interpretation 
of the sociological phenomena of urban under-development. Built transnationally through 
the circulation and encounter of figures, ideas, and networks, different actors that 
included scholars, experts, policymakers, and international organization of the Americas, 
sought to come up with a more legible and more universalizing understanding of slums 
and slumification. In a global postwar context in which the use of applied science, 




development and modernization became a new credo among nations and state elites in 
the globe. Fed with modernization theory and the developmentalism of the ECLA, but 
also from other sources such as Catholic reformism –as it was the case in Brazil with 
Économie et Humanisme- such experts, scholars, and policymakers were called upon to 
understand and act upon the problem of housing for low-income populations.  
As a social problem, slums came to epitomize the urban problem, itself 
characterized as a consequence of the peculiar structural situation of Latin American 
economies and the challenges of development for late industrializers. For many scholars, 
architects, and even urban planners, the urban slum represented an enclave of rural 
poverty in the modern city. The slum dweller, therefore, was understood as a traditional 
personality whose attitudes were at tension with the urban setting. For these scholars, the 
rancho or the barraco were not only forms of vernacular architecture brought to the city 
by recent rural migrants. Physical attributes of the home were a manifestation of a whole 
behavioral and attitudinal predispositions of the slums dweller in the city: displacement, 
dislocation, and disjuncture. In a historical moment when intellectuals, experts, 
politicians, and policymakers who spoke from a variety of ideological perspectives 
shared an understanding and optimism about the historical opportunity to overcome 
―underdevelopment,‖ the house became also a problem of development.   
This recognition, however, did not suppose one particular answer but multiple 
ones. In Rio de Janeiro and most especially in Buenos Aires, local and international 
authorities placed an emphasis on establishing the market mechanisms for the expansion 
of a national mortgage market and financial system that could channel domestic funds for 




sectors with a possibility to generate a surplus to be spent in housing, it left aside a large 
number of lower income individuals and families who lived precarious lives, especially 
in the context of uncontrolled inflation. To meet the housing needs of the latter group, the 
local governments of Rio and Buenos Aires reached out, in the 1960s, to foreign 
institutions for economic and technical assistance, to implement large-scale housing 
programs particularly in the form of housing complexes. In a global geopolitical context 
in which actions in the field of foreign affairs were measured according to the field of 
power defined by the Cold War, the United States made dollars available for the 
expansion of capitalism as well as for the execution of programs of social reform to 
appease potential explosions of social discontent. US assistance for programs such as 
low-income housing, or community development and aided self-help projects, belong to 
such rationale of providing means to ―underdeveloped‖ societies for a pacific social 
reform. Moreover, if new housing and a new built environment was to bring not only a 
formal urban dweller, but a consumer and a citizen, this would also imply that housing 
was an element it the political maturation of former squatters.  
The construction of housing complexes such as the Vilas in Rio and Villa Lugano 
1-2 and Ciudad General Belgrano in Buenos Aires to relocate low-income residents, most 
of them former squatters, condensed all these different aspects delineated above. These 
complexes were conceived within a transnational sociological imaginary about the 
character of the squatter and the urban poor as well as around the expectations about new 
built environments and homeownership as agent of modernization. These new planned 
housing were made possible thanks to the economic and technical assistance channeled to 




encounters organized by multilateral organizations including the OAS. In planning the 
modernization of the mortgage market, the expansion of homeownership among poor 
residents, and the provisions of modern homes, local authorities and international 
agencies sought to spread a particular way of life, one that promoted an ideal image of 
white, middle class domesticity.  In the regularization of the housing conditions of former 
squatters, experts and policymakers intended to build both a "decent" home and its 
worker-citizen-consumer-resident. And, as a result, a politically moderated and 
responsible urban resident would deflect the threat of social revolutions.  
And yet, the modern Latin American city —or more generally, the ―Third-World" 
city — became a built environment of huge contrasts. The planning and building of 
modern residences for the well-off and poor alike did not solve the problem of housing. 
By the middle of the 1970s, the urban residential dwelling in both cities at the end of the 
era of modernization did not become the rationalized, commodified and democratized 
space that early post-war planners and policymakers had envisioned. Still, these housing 
developments in Rio and Buenos Aires differed in outcome with public housing projects 
in US cities like Chicago or New York, where they became a machine for racial 
segregation. In Rio, housing projects slid into informality because that was the particular 
logic of Rio. But did not mean they utterly failed. Actually, there were many ways in 
which the housing developments facilitated improvements for residents.  
In the 1980s, wondrous apartment buildings and planned worker housing 
developments stood alongside new chaotic land invasions and squatter settlements. 
During the military regimes, slums and housing complexes in Rio and Buenos Aires 




conventional practices of systemic police brutality. The expansion of transnational 
nacrotrafficking networks into the South Atlantic would exact a heavy toll on the poor 
and their neighborhoods. In the neoliberal era, new gated communities would reinforce 
spatial segregation, this time of the wealthiest urban residents. As a result, the popular 
housing intended to alleviate the housing problem during the era of developmentalism 
were affected by the same historical conditions that defined the Latin American urban 
societies and their cityscape since the 1960s. In other words, the plans and hopes for 
modernity through housing may have been partially fulfilled, but a poverty of housing 
became an intrinsic part of the modern Latin American urban landscape. It is in the sense 
that slums in Latin America, as in other cities of the so-called Third World were not the 
result of a failed or incomplete modernization but actually the result of the way in which 
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